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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1. The Epistemology of Modality 
A modal statement asserts what could have been the case or what must have been 
the case, that is, what is possible or what is necessary.1 In our everyday life, we often 
encounter modal claims and judgments. Here are some common examples: 
●  It is possible that Donald Trump is the 45th President of the United States. 
●  Although Lily wore a green dress this morning, she could have worn a yellow 
one. 
●  It is possible that there are dangerous animals around us, although we cannot 
see anything.  
●  It is necessary that there is a valley between two mountains. 
●  It is necessary that Goldbach Conjecture (GC) is true. (Let us assume that it is 
true.)  
●  It is necessary that water is H2O. 
All of these modal statements are true. Moreover, we know that they are true. If that is 
the case, then a natural question arises:  
How do we know that a given modal claim is true, or how are we justified in 
believing that it is true?  
To answer this question, we need an epistemology of modality (which is also known 
as modal epistemology). Compared with a general epistemology, whose central task is 
to answer how an agent acquires knowledge or justifies her beliefs, the scope of an 
epistemology of modality is narrower. An epistemology of modality answers the 
question how an agent gets to know or is justified in believing what is necessary and 
what is possible. In this dissertation, I will confine my discussion to the epistemology 
of claims concerning possibilities. 
One way to acquire modal knowledge is to make inferences from what is actual. 
It is a generally accepted assumption that what is true entails what is possibly true. 
                                                
1 Throughout the dissertation, the term “possibility” without further qualification refers to metaphysical possibility, 
which should be distinguished from epistemic possibility and logical possibility. I will elaborate on epistemic 
possibility and logical possibility in Chapter 2.  
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Using the terminology of possible worlds, we can say that our knowledge of the 
actual world is a reliable guide to that of any possible world. However, by resorting to 
what is true in the actual world, we can only know the realized possibilities. A modal 
statement ◊s describes a realized possibility iff s is true. For example, the statement 
“Donald Trump is the 45th President of the United States” is true. Hence, the 
possibility that Donald Trump is the 45th President of the United States is a realized 
possibility. Since we know that the statement “Donald Trump is the 45th President of 
the United States” is true, we can validly deduce that it is possibly true.  
It is worth noting that not all of our knowledge of realized possibilities comes 
from our knowledge of actuality. If we lack the knowledge of the truth-value of s 
(even if s is actually true), then we cannot infer that s is possibly true. For example, 
without the knowledge that it is raining today, we cannot infer that it is possible that it 
is raining today, even if it is indeed raining. In short, our knowledge of realized 
possibilities comes from different sources. Some of it comes from our knowledge of 
actuality; some does not. Due to this difference, I separate realized possibilities into 
two exclusive groups. For any modal statement ◊s in the first group, we know that s is 
true. For any ◊s in the second group, we do not know the truth-value of s.  
Except for realized possibilities, there are mere possibilities — the possibilities 
that are not realized. For example, the statement “Lily could have worn a yellow dress” 
describes a mere possibility.2 A modal statement ◊s describes a mere possibility iff s 
is false. Our knowledge of mere possibilities cannot come from our knowledge of the 
actual world. In the same way in which I classify realized possibilities, I separate 
mere possibilities into two exclusive groups. For any ◊s in the first group, we know 
that s is false. For any ◊s in the second group, we do not know the truth-value of s.  
For the sake of discussion, here I draw a graphic to show how I separate 
possibilities into different groups. See Fig. 1.  
Figure 1 
                                                
2 The two names in italics, namely, realized possibilities and mere possibilities are indebted to Vaidya (2017). See 
Vaidya, Anand, “The Epistemology of Modality”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/modality-epistemology/>. 
  3 
 
The two grey boxes show that the two groups of possibilities require a modal 
epistemology: 
Group 1:  ◊s is a modal statement such that we do not know the truth-value of s.  
Group 2:  ◊s is a modal statement such that we know that s is false. 
Why is an epistemology of modality for statements of these two groups of 
philosophical interest? Let us consider Group 1 first. One reason is that in some cases 
(especially in some philosophical discussions), the purpose to acquire what is true in a 
possible world is to discover what is true in the actual world. For one thing, it is easier 
to establish arguments that begin with claims about possibilities than to establish 
arguments that begin with claims about actuality; for another, in these cases, we 
believe that it is valid to infer what is true from what is possibly true.3 Indeed, the 
truths of some ◊s in Group 1 are reliable indicators of the truths of s.4 Thus, for these 
statements, we are in a position to know that s is true if we know that ◊s is true. This 
explains why an epistemology of how we know the modal statements in Group 1 is of 
philosophical interest.  
Then we consider Group 2. For some statements ◊s in Group 2, it is to be 
determined whether s is necessarily false. So if we can establish an epistemology by 
means of which we can know that ◊s is true, we are in a position to determine whether 
s is necessarily false.   
                                                
3 Van Inwagen holds a similar view. He writes: “I would suppose that we find arguments that proceed from 
assertions of possibility more interesting than arguments that proceed from assertions of necessity for two reasons. 
First, we are inclined (at least initially) to regard assertions of possibility as easier to establish than assertions of 
necessity. Secondly, we are inclined (at least initially) to find it surprising that anything about how things are or 
must be can be deduced from a premise about how things might be; but it is hardly surprising that conclusions 
about how things are or must be can be deduced from premises about how things must be.” See van Inwagen 
(1998), p. 67. In my view, the validity of the inference from possibility to actuality also matters.  
4 I will elaborate on this in the following chapters.  
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Below I provide some examples for the modal statements in Group 1 and Group 
2. I list four modal arguments, each of which has a modal claim as a crucial premise. 
The truth-values of these crucial premises are to be determined.   
Argument 1 
●   It is possible that pain ≠ C-fiber firing. 
●   If it is possible that pain ≠ C-fiber firing, then pain ≠ C-fiber firing. 
Conclusion: Pain ≠ C-fiber firing. 
Argument 2 
●   It is possible that it is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally 
perfect being exists. 
●   If it is possible that it is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and 
morally perfect being exists, then it is necessary that an omniscient, 
omnipotent, and morally perfect being exists. 
Conclusion: It is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect 
being exists. 
Argument 3 
●   It is possible that conceivability does not entail possibility. 
●  If it is possible that conceivability does not entail possibility, then 
conceivability does not entail possibility.  
Conclusion: Conceivability does not entail possibility. 
Argument 4 
●   It is possible that zombies exist.5 
●     If it is possible that zombies exist, then physicalism is false. 
Conclusion: Physicalism is false.  
We do not know whether pain ≠ C-fiber firing, or whether it is necessary that an 
omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being exists, or whether conceivability 
does not entail possibility, so the modal premises of Arguments (1)-(3) are members 
of Group 1. The crucial premise of Argument (4) is a member of Group 2, because we 
                                                
5 A zombie world is the microphysical duplicate of the actual world but lacks of phenomenal consciousness. The 
actual world is not a zombie world, so it is false that zombies actually exist. But it is to be determined whether or 
not it is possible that zombies exist. 
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know that the actual world is not a zombie world but we do not know whether or not 
zombies do not exist in all possible worlds. So if there is an epistemology of modality 
by which we can know that it is possible that zombies exist, then we can know 
whether it is necessary that zombies do not exist. 
For some philosophers who endorse these modal arguments, conceivability is a 
reliable guide to possibility. In this dissertation, I aim to evaluate whether 
conceivability is helpful to expand our modal knowledge. In particular, I discuss 
whether we can expand our knowledge to include some philosophically interesting 
modal statements, such as the crucial premises of the arguments listed above.  
2. Conceivability as a Guide to Possibility 
Conceivability has generally been assumed to be an epistemic guide to 
possibility. There are two kinds of accounts of the relationship between conceivability 
and possibility: the evidential account and the entailment account. Proponents of the 
evidential account hold the view that conceivability only provides evidence of 
possibility.6 Proponents of the entailment account hold the view that conceivability 
entails possibility, a view that I call CEP in the following and that is my central 
concern in this dissertation:   
(CEP)  Conceivability entails possibility.7 
Many details of this view, however, require investigation. What does it mean to say 
that something is conceivable? Is conceivability a property of statements, propositions 
or states of affairs? How can we determine whether what a proposition says is 
conceivable? The answers to these questions relate to each other and jointly determine 
whether conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility and whether CEP can play a 
role in acquiring modal knowledge.  
Interpretations of the concept “conceivability” abound. Yet, under some 
interpretations, CEP is confronted with obvious counterexamples. So the proponents 
of CEP have to find an appropriate definition of conceivability, so that CEP 
formulated on the basis of this definition is immune to counterexamples. Below are 
some definitions of conceivability that are commonly found in philosophical literature 
                                                
6 For a more detailed discussion of this view, see Yablo (1993). 
7 For a more detailed discussion of this view, see Chalmers (2002). It is not hard to see that the entailment account 
entails the evidential account. In most parts of my dissertation, I focus my attention on the discussion of the 
entailment account. However, in Chapter 7, I also discuss the evidential account.  
  6 
(Let A stand for any agent and s for any statement.): 
i.  s is conceivable for A iff A believes that s is true.  
ii.  s is conceivable for A iff A sees that s is possible. 
iii. s is conceivable for A iff A can imagine a world that A takes to verify s. 
iv. s is conceivable for A iff A cannot a priori rule out s.8 
Each of these definitions of conceivability has its advocates. But each one also has its 
problem. Consider (ii) for example, which is proposed by van Cleve. Van Cleve 
imports the notion of possibility directly in the definition of conceivability. One 
problem with defining conceivability in this way is obvious: We risk that the link 
between conceivability and possibility is trivialized.9  
Moreover, (i)-(iv) have a problem in common: The notion of conceivability is 
rendered agent-relative. Whether what a sentence describes is conceivable for an 
agent depends on her background knowledge or beliefs, or which concepts she grasps. 
In this case, something may be conceivable for one agent, but not so for another who 
lacks necessary background information. But the notion of possibility is 
agent-independent: What is possible does not depend on what an agent knows or 
believes, or which concepts she grasps. If conceivability is agent-relative but 
possibility is not, then the “standard objection” to CEP applies: Conceivability, which 
highly depends on one’s epistemic status, cannot be considered a guide to possibility, 
which is independent of one’s epistemic status.10  
Here is an example. Many people believe that the Goldbach Conjecture (GC) is 
a false thesis (in terms of the definitions (ii)-(iv), we can also say that many people 
see that GC is possibly false, or can imagine a world that they take to verify ¬GC, or 
cannot a priori rule out ¬GC). Yet GC, as a true mathematical proposition (let us 
assume that it is true), is necessarily true. In other words, it cannot be the case that GC 
is possibly false. To avoid cases like this, conceivability should not be defined in 
terms of any agent-relative notion. Otherwise, it cannot be considered a reliable guide 
to possibility.11  
                                                
8 For a more extensive discussion of these definitions, see van Cleve (1983), pp. 35-45; Yablo (1993), p. 29; 
Chalmers (2002), p. 148. For more possible attempts to define conceivability, see Yablo (1993), p. 26; Gendler & 
Hawthorne (2002), p. 7. 
9 The danger of circularity is pointed out by Chalmers. See Chalmers (2002), pp. 150-151.  
10 The “standard objection” is due to Brueckner (2001). 
11 In this dissertation, I regard statements like “if it is conceivable that p, then it is possible that p” or 
“conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility” as synonymous expressions with “conceivability entails 
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Another kind of possible counterexamples comes from Kripkean a posteriori 
necessities. Conceivability, whether or not understood as agent-relative, is tied to 
apriority and other rational notions. Thus, we can always in some sense conceive that 
some a posteriori truths of the actual world are false in another world. For example, 
we are able to conceive of a situation in which water is not H2O. If conceivability 
entails possibility, we have to accept that it is possible that water is not H2O. However, 
as Kripke points out, that water is H2O is not only a fact in the actual world, but also a 
fact in all the other worlds, although the necessary identity of water and H2O can only 
be known in an a posteriori way.  
To accommodate the two problems mentioned above, Chalmers distinguishes 
different kinds of conceivability and demonstrates which kinds entail possibility by 
explaining away the counterexamples. According to Chalmers, only two of them, 
namely ideal negative conceivability (INC) and ideal positive conceivability (IPC), 
are reliable guides to possibility. By incorporating INC and IPC, he provides two 
refined versions of CEP: 
(CP−)  Ideal negative conceivability entails possibility. 
(CP+)  Ideal positive conceivability entails possibility.12 
In other words, Chalmers establishes CP− and CP+ on the grounds that they are 
immune to the two types of counterexamples mentioned above. Furthermore, 
Chalmers and some other philosophers who endorse CP− and CP+ regard these two 
theses as a plausible epistemology of modality.  
There are at least two important questions one can raise about Chalmers’ theory. 
One question relates to the metaphysical claim about the relation between (ideal) 
conceivability and possibility. The other relates to the adequacy of CP as an 
epistemology of modality. Regarding the first question, one might wonder whether 
ideal conceivability actually entails possibility.13 In this dissertation, I put this issue 
aside. I assume that the entailment between ideal conceivability and possibility holds 
and focus my discussion on the second question. 
If X entails Y, it seems natural to take X as an epistemic guide to Y. But whether 
                                                                                                                                      
possibility”. 
12 In this dissertation, “CP” or “the CP thesis” will be used to refer to either CP− or CP+. 
13 Works on this issue abound. For considerations from the philosophy of language, especially concerning 
two-dimensionalism, see Soames (2005); (2007). For discussions regarding strong necessities (the existence of 
strong necessities entail that CP fails), see Loar (1990); Hill & McLaughlin (1999); Goff & Papineau (2014); 
Levine (2014). For considerations from logic, see Vaidya (2008). 
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the X-to-Y entailment is qualified as an epistemology of Y requires further 
investigation. As an epistemology, the entailment from X to Y has to be not only true, 
but also of practical use. Here is an example of a conceivability-possibility entailment 
that is true but has no practical use. One may define conceivability in this way: 
For any sentence s, what s says is conceivable iff s is possible.  
A conceivability-to-possibility entailment formulated with reference to this definition 
of conceivability is surely true, because it is a tautology. But the practical significance 
of this entailment is negligible. In view of this, this conceivability-to-possibility 
entailment is not to be considered an epistemology of modality. In my dissertation, I 
probe into the practical significance of CP− and CP+. In particular, I consider whether 
we can expand our modal knowledge by means of the CP thesis to include some 
philosophically interesting modal statements, such as the modal premises of the 
aforementioned modal arguments. 
3. Plan of Dissertation 
In Chapter 2, I present how Chalmers establishes the link between ideal 
conceivability and possibility, which hinges on his theory of modal monism and 
two-dimensional (2-D) semantics. To avoid the “standard objection”, Chalmers 
introduces the notion of ideal rational reflection and defines ideal conceivability in 
terms of this notion. According to him, it is ideal conceivability, which is in fact 
logical possibility, that is a reliable guide to possibility. Since the notion of ideal 
conceivability (i.e., logical possibility) is agent-independent, the CP thesis therefore 
can resist the “standard objection”.  
To eliminate the counterexamples from Kripkean a posteriori necessities, 
Chalmers introduces his theory of 2-D semantics. 2-D semantics assigns to any 
statement two intensions. That is to say, within the framework of 2-D semantics, a 
statement expresses two propositions, namely a primary and a secondary intension. 
According to 2-D semantics, any a posteriori necessary statement is associated with 
an a posteriori contingent proposition as its primary intension, and an a priori 
necessary proposition as its secondary intension. As a result, within the framework of 
2-D semantics, Kripkean a posteriori necessities arise only at the level of statements 
but not at the level of propositions. Therefore, the thesis that ideal conceivability (i.e., 
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logical possibility) entails possibility (i.e., metaphysical possibility), which is 
established at the level of propositions, remains intact.  
At the end of Chapter 2, I argue that a consequence of Chalmers’ theory of 
conceivability is that all necessary propositions (i.e., propositions that are either 
necessarily true or necessarily false) come to be a priori true or a priori false. That is 
to say, if p is a proposition such that if it is possibly true, then it is true; and if it is 
possibly false, then it is false, then the truth-value of p is a priori knowable.   
In Chapter 3, I discuss a series of criticism of the CP thesis. They pertain to the 
issue of whether CP is qualified as an epistemology of modality. The extreme version 
of criticism holds that for any proposition p, we cannot know or have evidence for 
whether it is ideally conceivable that p. As to ideal positive conceivability, Hanrahan 
argues that to know or have evidence for whether it is ideally positively conceivable 
that p requires that we construct a maximal consistent set that entails p, which is too 
demanding a requirement to be met. Bailey (2007) argues that any argument for the 
claim that it is ideally positively conceivable that pn requires an independent argument 
for the claim that it is ideally positively conceivable that pn+1, where pn+1 entails pn. 
Thus, we will face a regress when we try to determine whether it is ideally positively 
conceivable that pn. Since the regress is infinite, for any pn, we cannot know or have 
evidence for whether it is ideally positively conceivable that pn. Hanrahan is also 
skeptical about the adequacy of our judgment of what is ideally negatively 
conceivable. She argues that to know or have evidence for whether it is ideally 
negatively conceivable that p requires that we examine every logical consequence of 
p. Since the number of logical consequences of any proposition is infinite, according 
to Hanrahan, we can never know or have evidence for whether a given proposition is 
ideally negatively conceivable. Worley (2003) expresses a moderate version of the 
skeptical view. She argues that for some proposition p, we cannot know or have 
evidence for whether it is ideally conceivable that p.  
In this chapter, I respond to the arguments for the extreme version of criticism in 
turn. I endorse the moderate version. I accept that there are some propositions whose 
ideal conceivability cannot be known or justified. Moreover, I go one step further by 
specifying the ideal conceivability of what kind of propositions cannot be known or 
justified. I argue that in the following cases, we cannot know or have evidence for for 
whether a given proposition is ideally conceivable:  
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(1) If the truth-value of p is a priori knowable, then we cannot know or have 
evidence for whether it is ideally conceivable that p without knowing or 
having evidence of its truth-value. 
(2)  If p is a proposition such that if it is possibly true, then it is true; and if it is 
possibly false, then it is false, then we cannot know or have evidence for 
whether it is ideally conceivable that p without knowing or having evidence 
of p’s truth-value.  
(3)  If p is a proposition such that we know that p is false but do not know or 
have evidence for whether the truth-value of p is a posteriori knowable, 
then we cannot know or have evidence for whether it is ideally conceivable 
that p. 
These conclusions will be used in the discussion of the following chapters.  
In Chapter 4, I discuss a series of reductio arguments against the CP thesis. 
Howell and Mizrahi & Morrow provide three reductio arguments, each of which 
begins with a conceivability premise, stating that the falsity of CP (or the necessary 
falsity of CP) is conceivable. By the same CP thesis, they conclude that it is possible 
that CP fails (or necessarily fails). Then Howell and Mizrahi & Morrow draw the 
conclusion that CP fails from the fact that it is possible that CP fails (or necessarily 
fails). However, none of the conceivability premises of these arguments is fully 
justified. Howell, for example, does not provide a reason for his conceivability 
premise at all. To show that it is ideally conceivable that CP necessarily fails, Mizrahi 
& Morrow appeal to the existence of a Spinozistic deity. However, it is to be 
determined whether the notion of a Spinozistic deity is coherent (i.e., logically 
possible).  
I argue that, in order to justify the soundness of these reductio arguments against 
CP, we have to show that the following propositions are ideally conceivable (i.e., 
logically possible):  
(a)  CP (CP+ or CP−) fails. 
(b)  A Spinozistic deity exists. 
(c)  It is necessary that CP− fails. 
I propose two possible ways in which the ideal conceivability (i.e., logical possibility) 
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of (a)-(c) can be vindicated. However, I argue that a move in either direction would 
render the reductio arguments redundant.  
At the end of Chapter 4, I provide a reason why it is hopeless to refute CP by 
appealing to the reductio arguments: Each one of (a)-(c) is a proposition such that if it 
is possibly true, then it is true; and if it is possibly false, then it is false. According to 
the conclusion in Chapter 3, we cannot know or have evidence for whether (a)-(c) are 
ideally conceivable without knowing or having evidence of their truth-values. This is 
why we cannot provide a reason for the soundness of these reductio arguments. 
In Chapter 5, I outline the main ideas of several versions of physicalism and 
dualism and their modal commitments, including:  
(i)  substance physicalism/dualism;  
(ii)  type physicalism/dualism;  
(iii) minimal physicalism/dualism.14  
Moreover, I discuss the conceivability arguments for or against each version of 
physicalism or dualism, including:  
(1)  Descartes’ arguments for substance dualism;  
(2)  Kripke’s modal argument against type physicalism;  
(3)  Chalmers’ zombie argument against minimal physicalism;  
(4)  the meta-modal argument for minimal physicalism.  
The soundness of Arguments (1), (2) and (4) depends on the ideal conceivability of 
each of the following propositions, respectively: 
(a)  My mind ≠ my body (or my mind is not material). 
(b)  Pain ≠ C-fiber firing. 
(c)  □ (PT→Q).15 
However, by assuming that the negation of each one of (a)-(c) is ideally conceivable, 
we can establish an “inverted” conceivability counterpart of each argument of (1), (2) 
and (4), which has the contrary conclusion. I argue that, between a conceivability 
                                                
14 The so-called “minimal physicalism” is supervenience physicalism, according to which the distribution of all 
phenomenal properties of the actual world supervenes on the distribution of all microphysical properties of the 
actual world.  
15 P, T and Q stand for a conjunction of all the microphysical truths of the actual world, a “that is all” statement, 
and an arbitrary phenomenal truth of the actual world, respectively. 
  12 
argument and its “inverted” counterpart, only one is sound. However, I argue further 
that, if we can tell the sound one from the unsound one, another independent 
argument is required, by which we can know the truth-value of (a)-(c) and which 
therefore renders the original conceivability argument redundant. Thus, there is a 
dilemma: If we can provide such an independent argument, then a conceivability 
argument is not needed; if we cannot provide such an independent argument, whether 
or not Arguments (1), (2) and (4) are sound is to be determined. The discussion of 
Chapter 3 has indicated this dilemma. Each one of (a)-(c) is a proposition such that if 
it is possibly true, then it is true, and if it is possibly false, then it is false. So without 
knowing or having evidence of its truth-value, we cannot know or have evidence for 
whether it is ideally conceivable. But if we know or have evidence of its truth-value, 
then a conceivability argument is not required. 
As to Argument 3, i.e., the zombie argument, I argue that we cannot determine 
whether it is sound, either. The soundness of the zombie argument hinges on its first 
premise, which says that it is ideally conceivable that PT∧¬Q. Since PT∧¬Q is false 
(because Q is true), according to the definition of ideal negative conceivability, it is 
ideally conceivable that PT∧¬Q iff the truth-value of PT∧¬Q is a posteriori 
knowable. However, Chalmers does not provide a sufficient reason for the claim that 
the truth-value of PT∧¬Q is a posteriori knowable. As has been argued in Chapter 3, 
if p is a proposition such that we know that p is false, but we do not know or have 
evidence for whether the truth-value of p is a posteriori knowable, then we cannot 
know or have evidence for whether it is ideally conceivable that p. So we cannot 
know or have evidence for whether it is ideally conceivable that PT∧¬Q and 
therefore cannot know or have evidence for whether the zombie argument is sound.  
In Chapter 6, I discuss the problem with meta-modal conceivability arguments. 
By establishing a conceivability argument, we can infer that p is possibly true from 
the fact that it is ideally conceivable that p. If p is itself a modal claim that can be 
written as □q, then we can construct a so-called “meta-modal” conceivability 
argument, which has the following structure: 
It is ideally conceivable that □q. 
Ideal conceivability entails possibility. (CP− or CP+) 
If it is possible that □q, then □q is true. (S5: ◊□q→□q) 
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Conclusion: □q is true. 
However, for any meta-modal conceivability argument, by replacing □q with ¬□q in 
the first premise, we can always construct an “inverted” argument, which has the 
conclusion that ¬□q is true. In other words, by constructing a pair of “inverted” 
meta-modal conceivability arguments, we can infer that both □q and ¬□q are true, 
which is unacceptable.  
Both opponents and proponents of the CP thesis have provided their diagnosis of 
this problem. The opponents of CP, such as Yablo, argue that the CP thesis is not true. 
However, from the fact that CP leads to a pair of contrary conclusions, we can only 
conclude that CP is not consistent with the presumption that both □q and ¬□q are 
ideally conceivable. Without providing a sufficient reason for the claim that both □q 
and ¬□q are indeed ideally conceivable, we cannot conclude that CP fails. However, 
it is far from clear that Yablo provides such a reason, so his argument is not as 
convincing as he thinks.  
In order to avoid Yablo’s objection, Chalmers proposes to exclude all modal 
claims from the scope of CP for the reason that it is too difficult to conceive of what a 
modal proposition □q says. However, for one thing, difficulty is irrelevant to the issue 
of whether □q is ideally conceivable. Thus, it is not necessary to exclude all modal 
claims from the scope of CP. For another, even in the non-modal realm, we can 
nevertheless construct a pair of parallel conceivability arguments that have contrary 
conclusions. For example, by assuming that pain = C-fiber firing is ideally 
conceivable and that pain ≠ C-fiber firing is ideally conceivable, we can conclude that 
pain both is and is not C-fiber firing. Hence, excluding all modal claims is not 
sufficient to avoid the problem if there is one. 
 At the end of Chapter 6, I point out the problem that Yablo and Chalmers fail to 
see. Between a meta-modal conceivability argument and its “inverted” counterpart, 
only one is sound. When we try to tell the sound one from the sound one, we fill face 
a dilemma: Any □q is a proposition such that if it is possibly true, then it is true; and 
if it is possibly false, then it is false. According to the discussion of Chapter 3, without 
knowing or having the evidence of the truth-value of □q, we cannot know or have 
evidence as to which one is sound. On the other hand, if we know or have evidence 
for whether □q is true, a meta-modal conceivability argument is not needed. 
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In Chapter 7, I defend van Inwagen’s moderate modal skepticism within the 
framework of Yablo’s theory of conceivability and argue that his modal skepticism 
cannot be eliminated even within the framework of Chalmers’ theory of 
conceivability, which is a more refined theory than Yablo’s. Van Inwagen 
distinguishes between ordinary modal claims and extraordinary modal claims. 
Moreover, he suggests that to conceive of a scenario in which p holds requires that 
this scenario be incompatible with ¬p. According to van Inwagen, if ◊p is an 
extraordinary modal claim, then we cannot conceive of a scenario that is incompatible 
with ¬p. So he concludes that if ◊p is an extraordinary modal claim, it cannot be 
justified via Yablo-style conceivability.  
However, for some ◊p, even if ◊p is an ordinary modal claim, we cannot conceive 
of a scenario that is incompatible with ¬p. That is to say, if we insisted on van 
Inwagen’s high standard of conceivability, some ordinary modal claims could not be 
justified via Yablo-style conceivability, either. However, this conclusion is not 
consistent with van Inwagen’s own view. In order to avoid this problem, Hawke 
suggests that van Inwagen’s high standard of conceivability be applicable to 
extraordinary but not to ordinary modal claims. I think that this proposal is reasonable. 
But one question poses itself: What kind of claims are extraordinary claims? I propose 
that ◊p is an extraordinary modal claim iff p is a claim such that if it is possibly true, 
then it is true; and if it is possibly false, then it is false. Furthermore, I argue that our 
beliefs of extraordinary claims cannot be justified via Chalmers-style conceivability, 
either.  
Chapter 8 is the conclusion, in which I review the most important respects of this 
dissertation.  
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Chapter 2: Chalmers on Conceivability and Possibility 
In this Chapter, I set the stage for an evaluation of Chalmers’ theory of 
conceivability and possibility. In Part 1, I briefly introduce some relevant notions, 
such as modal monism, modal rationalism, logical possibility, etc., and then go on to 
explain in more detail the concepts of modal monism and modal rationalism. In Part 2, 
I discuss how Kripkean a posteriori necessities threaten modal monism and modal 
rationalism. In Part 3, I show how Chalmers explains away this type of 
counterexamples within the framework of 2-D semantics and re-establishes modal 
monism and modal rationalism on the grounds that there are no obvious 
counterexamples. In the last part, I sketch the whole picture of Chalmers’ program on 
the relation between metaphysical possibility and ideal conceivability, which is 
defined as logical possibility.   
1. Modal Monism and Modal Rationalism 
The hypothesis of modal monism can be formulated as follows:  
(MM)  The space of logically possible worlds is co-extensive with the space of 
metaphysically possible worlds.  
Metaphysical possibility characterizes how things could have been. For example, we 
can say, “Hillary Clinton could have won the presidential election”, or, “Lily could 
have worn a yellow dress”. Many things could have been different from how they 
actually are. How things could have been is neither epistemological nor agent-relative: 
It does not depend on what one thinks, believes, or knows.  
In contrast, there is a kind of possibility that is epistemological and agent-relative: 
epistemic possibility. For example, we can say, “Hillary Clinton may have won the 
presidential election (because the latest opinion polls showed that Clinton’s approval 
rating was higher than Trump’s)”, or, “Lily may have worn a yellow dress (because 
she has told me that she would wear the yellow one)”. According to the standard view, 
epistemic possibility can be defined in the following way: 
(EP)  For any statement s, s is epistemically possible for an agent A iff A cannot 
rule out s a priori.  
Epistemic possibility is relative to the status of an agent’s knowledge or beliefs. A 
  16 
statement may be epistemically possible for someone but not so for someone else who 
is endowed with better logical or mathematical skills. For example, the negation of 
Goldbach Conjecture (i.e., ¬GC) is epistemically possible for us ordinary people, 
since we cannot a priori rule out ¬GC. But someone with superior mathematical 
understanding and background knowledge can know a priori that ¬GC is false. So for 
her ¬GC is not epistemically possible.  
Based on the notion of epistemic possibility, we can obtain an agent-independent 
notion of possibility by considering a limited case in which the possible agent is an 
ideal one. An agent is an ideal one if she has ideal rational capacities, or in other 
words, if she has no cognitive limitations. By introducing the notion of an ideal agent, 
we can say that s is epistemically possible for an ideal agent iff the ideal agent cannot 
rule out s a priori. Moreover, as generally accepted, to say that s is not ruled out by an 
ideal agent a priori is equivalent to say that s is not ruled out a priori. Hence, s is 
epistemically possible for an ideal agent iff s is not ruled out a priori. The type of 
epistemic possibility in this limited case is the so-called “logical possibility”. 
I have to admit that it is not easy to define the notion of an ideal agent. What 
does “ideal rational capacities” mean? What does it even mean to have “a cognitive 
limitation to be idealized away from?”16 It is even to be determined whether this 
notion is coherent. In this dissertation, I follow Chalmers’ definition of an ideal agent: 
An agent A is an ideal one iff A’s reasoning cannot be defeated by better reasoning. 
Nevertheless, one can ask further what “good reasoning” means. Again, I follow 
Chalmers and take all of these “rational notions as primitive”.17  
Now we can formulate logical possibility as follows: 
(LP)  For any statement s, s is logically possible iff s is not a priori ruled out.  
It is not difficult to see that logical modality, which is understood in terms of apriority, 
“has no special connection to modal logic”.18 Logic necessity/possibility, both in this 
dissertation and in Chalmers’ theory, include semantic necessity/possibility, 
conceptual necessity/possibility, etc. Because of this, logical necessity is more 
extensive than what can be deduced from a system of modal logic. Consider, for 
instance, these examples that are logically necessary but may not be consequences of 
                                                
16 Chalmers (2002), p. 148. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Chalmers (2010), p. 185. 
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a modal logic system: 
●   2+2=4 
●   A bachelor is an unmarried man. 
●   Nothing is round and square (at the same time).  
Consequently, some statements may be true in a logic system without being logically 
possible:  
●   2+2≠4 
●   A bachelor is not an unmarried man. 
●   Something is round and square (at the same time).  
It is also worth noting that logical possibility is epistemological but not 
agent-independent: What is logically possible is not relevant to what we cannot rule 
out a priori. ¬GC is not ruled out a priori by ordinary persons, but it is ruled out a 
priori on ideal rational reasoning. Thus, although ¬GC is epistemically possible for us, 
it is not logically possible.  
With the notions of metaphysical and logical possibility clarified, modal monists, 
who endorse that logical possibility and metaphysical possibility coincide, would 
accept the view of modal rationalism: 
(MRS)  For any statement s, s is metaphysically possible iff s is not ruled out a 
priori. 
They would also accept the equivalent formulation of MRS: 
    (MRS’)  For any statement s, s is metaphysically necessary iff s is a priori true. 
In other words, for those who endorse modal monism and modal rationalism, a 
statement is necessarily true or necessarily false iff its truth-value is a priori knowable; 
a statement is contingent iff its truth-value is a posteriori knowable. That is to say, a 
modal rationalist would deny that there are a posteriori necessary statements and a 
priori contingent statements. 
(Indeed, the notion of apriority and necessity concern different domains and 
areas. The former deals with epistemological issues, whereas the latter deals with 
metaphysical issues. But whether they are extensionally equivalent is another question. 
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One cannot conclude that they differ in extension merely by virtue of their meanings. 
If there are no obvious counterexamples to the claim that metaphysical possibility and 
logical possibility coincide, it is innocuous if we regard this claim as a plausible 
hypothesis. This is why modal monism and modal rationalism have a lot of 
advocates.) 
2. A Threat to Modal Monism and Modal Rationalism  
However, modal rationalism is confronted with obvious counterexamples that 
are constructed by Putnam (1972) and Kripke (1980). Kripke argues against modal 
monism and modal rationalism by putting forward the notion of a posteriori necessity 
and a priori contingency. In his view, apart from a priori necessary statements and a 
posteriori contingent statements, there are also a posteriori necessary statements and a 
priori contingent statements. In defense of his idea, Kripke makes two pairs of 
distinctions concerning singular terms: (a) rigid designator vs. non-rigid designator; (b) 
reference vs. reference-fixer. 
A rigid designator is a term that picks out the same thing in all possible worlds in 
which that thing exists. On the contrary, a non-rigid designator picks out different 
things in different possible worlds. According to this view, “Donald Trump”, which is 
a proper name, is a rigid designator since it refers to Donald Trump in all possible 
worlds where Donald Trump exists. Except for proper names, indexical expressions 
and natural kind names are also rigid designators. For example, the indexical 
expression “I” singles out in all possible worlds the speaker who uses it. Or, for 
instance, “water”, which is a natural kind name, picks out the same kind, that is, water, 
in any possible world where water exists. By contrast, descriptions are usually 
regarded as non-rigid designators. For example, the expression “the 45th president of 
the US” is a non-rigid designator, for it does not pick out the same man, that is, 
Donald Trump, in all possible worlds. In another possible world, the 45th president of 
the US is not Donald Trump.  
To illustrate the difference between rigid and non-rigid designators, we can take 
the following two sentences as examples: 
(1)  Donald Trump is Ivanka Trump’s father. 
(1’)  The 45th president of the US is Ivanka Trump’s father. 
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Since both “Donald Trump” and “Ivanka Trump” are proper names, they refer rigidly. 
They refer to Donald Trump and Ivanka Trump in all worlds, respectively. Given that 
Donald Trump and Ivanka Trump exemplify the relation of being the father of, it is 
necessary that they exemplify this two-place relation.19 Hence, (1) is necessarily true. 
By contrast, the term “the 45th president of the US” picks out different people in 
different worlds. In other words, there is a world in which the 45th president of the 
US is someone other than Donald Trump. Since in that world Ivanka Trump’s father 
is nevertheless Donald Trump, in that world the 45th president of the US is not Ivanka 
Trump’s father. Hence, (1’) is not necessarily true.  
For the same reason, for each pair of statements in the following, the former 
statement is necessarily true but the latter is not. 
(2)  Water is H2O. 
(2’)   Water is watery stuff. 
(3)  I am Shuyi. 
(3’)  The author of the dissertation is Shuyi. 
The distinction between reference and reference-fixer has a connection with that 
between rigid designator and non-rigid designator. The way we associate a name, 
which is a rigid designator, with a definite description, which is a non-rigid designator, 
is to introduce this name in a language with the help of a description and use this 
name to single out the thing that satisfies the description. For example, when we first 
see the watery stuff (let us assume that the term “watery stuff” is short for 
“transparent, colorless and odorless fluid that fills in Earth’s lakes and oceans”), we 
introduce the name “water” into our language, in this case, English, with the help of 
the description “watery stuff”. From then on, we use the name “water” to single out 
anything that satisfies the description “watery stuff” in the actual world.  
In the same way, we introduce the natural kind name “gold” with the help of the 
description “bright and slightly reddish yellow metal” and use it to pick out anything 
that is a bright and slightly reddish yellow metal in the actual world. By the same 
token, the proper name “Phosphorus” is introduced by using the description “the 
brightest star in the morning” and is used to pick out the object that is the brightest 
star in the morning in the actual world. In a word, what a name refers to in the actual 
                                                
19 Let us assume that the principle of essentiality of origins is true.  
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world hinges on what the description by which this name is introduced picks out in 
the actual world. Or, the reference of a name can be fixed by a description.  
However, we should note the difference of how names and descriptions work 
when we use them to describe another possible world. The description “watery stuff” 
picks out anything that is watery stuff in that world, even though this stuff is not 
comprised of hydrogen and oxygen. By contrast, the name “water”, as a rigid 
designator, picks out H2O in that world.   
With these points made, we are in a position to know why there are a priori 
contingencies. In the case of water, since we introduce the name “water” with the help 
of the description “watery stuff”, any competent speaker of English will know that 
water is watery stuff a priori.20 Thus, the statement “water is watery stuff” is a priori 
true. In this statement, “water”, as a rigid designator, picks out the same thing in all 
possible worlds, whereas “watery stuff”, which is a non-rigid designator, picks out 
different things across possible worlds. Thus, in some possible worlds, “water” and 
“watery stuff” pick out different things. In other words, “water is watery stuff” is not 
necessarily true.  
To see why there are statements that are necessarily true without being a priori 
true, we can take the sentence “water is H2O” as an example. No one can know a 
priori what water is comprised of. Chemists had to carry out thousands of experiments 
in order to find out that water is H2O. Hence, the statement “water is H2O” can only 
be known in an a posteriori way. Moreover, in this statement, “water” and “H2O” are 
both rigid designators. Given that they pick out the same thing in the actual world, 
they pick out the same thing throughout all possible worlds. Put differently, “water is 
H2O” is necessarily true.  
If Kripke is right, then at the level of statements, apriority and necessity come 
apart. Some statements are a priori true and contingent, some statements are a 
posteriori true and necessary. In other words, if Kripke is right, then MRS and MRS’ 
are false. Since logical possibility can be characterized in terms of apriority, it follows 
that logical possibility and metaphysical possibility do not coincide at the level of 
statements. This opens up the possibility of modal dualism: 
                                                
20 Please note by “a priori”, I merely mean that one can know a priori that water is watery stuff if one knows how 
to use, or knows the meaning of, the terms “water” and “watery stuff”. It does not follow that one can know how 
to use, or know the meaning of, the terms “water” and “watery stuff” a priori. To know the latter, empirical 
experiences are indispensible.  
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(MD)  The space of logically possible worlds is not co-extensive with the space 
of metaphysically possible worlds.  
According to modal dualists, Kripke’s examples not only show that logical modality 
and metaphysical modality differ in extension at the level of sentences, but they also 
reflect a difference at the level of worlds. Modal monists, such as Chalmers and 
Jackson, hold the opposite view. According to them, Kripke’s a priori contingencies 
and a posteriori necessities just arise at the level of language, but not at the level of 
metaphysics.  
It is the proposition which is expressed by a sentence that is the truth-bearer of 
this sentence. To say that a sentence is true in a possible world is to say that the 
proposition it expresses is true in a possible world. That apriority and necessity come 
apart at the level of sentences does not entail that they come apart at the level of 
propositions or worlds. If at the level of propositions, there is a way to explain away 
the Kripkean a priori contingencies and a posteriori necessities, then at this level the 
hypothesis of modal monism and modal rationalism remains intact. For this purpose, 
Chalmers introduces his two-dimensional (2-D) semantics.21  
3. Modal Monism and Modal Rationalism Revisited 
According to two-dimensionalists, any statement is associated with two 
propositions, or “intensions”, namely, to use Chalmers’ terminology, a primary and a 
secondary intension. In Chalmers’ view, the Kripkean a priori contingencies arise 
because the primary intension of an a priori contingent statement is a priori and the 
secondary intension of it is contingent; the Kripkean a posteriori necessities arise 
because the primary intension of an a posteriori necessary statement is a posteriori 
and the secondary intension of it is necessary. If we distinguish the two intensions of 
a statement, we will find that at the level of propositions, there are no so-called “a 
priori contingent propositions” or “a posteriori necessary propositions”.22 
Let us take the term “water” as an example. Assume that in our model, there are 
only two worlds, the actual world a and another possible world w. In the actual world 
                                                
21 For more details about a generalized 2-D semantic framework, which is used to isolate an a priori aspect of 
meaning, see Chalmers (1996); (2002); (2004); (2006); Jackson (1998); (2004). For the earlier work of 2-D 
semantics, see Kaplan (1989a), (1989b). A difference is that Kaplan’s framework is used to explain semantic rules 
governing only indexical expressions like “here”, “I”, “this”, etc.  
22 Some philosophers deny that the Kripkean a priori contingencies and a posteriori necessities can be explained 
away using Chalmers’ 2-D semantics. For these objections, see Soames (2005); Roca-Royes (2011), etc. 
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a, we introduce name “water” by using the description “watery stuff”. Moreover, this 
watery stuff in world a is H2O, which is comprised of hydrogen and oxygen. In world 
w, the name “water” is also introduced by the description “watery stuff”. The watery 
stuff in w is XYZ, which is substance that plays the role of water but has a different 
chemical structure. Now we can consider the following question:  
What does the name “water” refer to in w?  
There are two ways to understand and answer this question, both of which depend on 
how we consider the world w. Firstly, we can consider the world w as actual. In a 
possible world considered as actual (for example, in Putnam’s Twin-Earth world), 
anything fitting the description “watery stuff” is water, no matter what it is comprised 
of. In this case, the name “water” picks out XYZ in w.23 In other words, we can 
interpret the question in the following way: If w is considered as actual, what does 
“water” refer to? The answer to this question is: “XYZ”. (Moreover, given that “water” 
refers to XYZ if we consider w as the actual world, “water” refers to XYZ in any 
possible world if that world is considered as counterfactual.) 
Secondly, we can consider w as a counterfactual world. Given that “water” refers 
to H2O in the actual world, it refers to H2O in all possible worlds considered as 
counterfactual. Hence, “water” refers to H2O in w. In this case, we interpret the 
question in another way: If w is considered as counterfactual, what does “water” refer 
to? The answer is “H2O”. Below is a table to show the two understandings of what the 
term “water” refers to: 
Table 1 
 
The distinction of the two understandings can be explained within the framework 
of 2-D semantics. In possible-world semantics, a linguistic expression is associated 
with one extension and one intension. The extension of a name is the object that it 
                                                
23 See Putnam (1972).  
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refers to; the intension of a name is a function from possible worlds to its references. 
The extension of a sentence is its truth-value; the intension of a sentence is a function 
from possible worlds to its truth-values. By contrast, in 2-D semantics, a linguistic 
expression is associated with two extensions and intensions. Put differently, there is 
only one way in which possible-world semantics assigns an intension to an expression, 
but there are two ways in which 2-D semantics does so.  
Within the framework of 2-D semantics, one intension, that is, the so-called 
“primary intension”, of a term is a function from possible worlds when considered as 
actual to its references.24 In the case of water, if world w turned out to be the actual 
world, “water” would refer to the watery stuff in w, that is, XYZ. Given that world a 
turns out to be actual, “water” refers to the watery stuff in a, that is, H2O. In other 
words, the intension of the term “water” maps a to H2O, and maps w to XYZ. 
Roughly speaking, we can say that the primary intension of “water” is “watery stuff”. 
The other intension, that is, the so-called “secondary intension”, of a term is a 
function from possible worlds when considered as counterfactual to its references.25 
In the case of water, given that world a is the actual world and “water” refers to H2O 
in world a, “water” refers to H2O in any possible world considered as counterfactual, 
no matter whether or not H2O is watery stuff in that world. We can say that the 
secondary intension of “water” is “H2O”.  
Like names, a sentence also has two intensions. Let us take the sentence “water = 
H2O” as an example. We can consider the question: 
Is the sentence “water = H2O” true in world w? 
There are two interpretations and two answers to this question. Firstly, we can 
interpret the question as meaning “if w turned out to be actual, would the sentence 
‘water = H2O’ be true in world w?” The answer to this question is “no”. If w turned 
out to be the actual world, then the watery stuff in w, namely XYZ, would be water. 
In this case, the sentence “water = H2O” would be false in world w. (Moreover, given 
that “water = H2O” is false in world w if we consider w as the actual world, “water = 
H2O” is false in any possible world if it is considered as counterfactual.) Secondly, we 
can interpret the question as meaning “given that ‘water = H2O’ is true in the actual 
world a, is the sentence ‘water = H2O’ true in the possible world w if it is considered 
                                                
24 See Chalmers (2006), pp. 585-586. 
25 Ibid. 
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as counterfactual?” Given that water is H2O in the actual world, water is H2O in any 
possible world if that world is considered as counterfactual. Hence, the answer is 
“yes”. Below is the table to show the two understandings of the truth-value of the 
sentence “water = H2O”: 
Table 2 
 
We can also explain the distinction of the two interpretations by appealing to 2-D 
semantics. Within the framework of 2-D semantics, the primary intension of a 
sentence is a function from possible worlds considered as actual to its truth-values. 
The sentence “water = H2O” is true in world a and false in world w if we consider 
these worlds as actual. Roughly speaking, we can say that the primary intension of 
this sentence is “watery stuff = H2O”. The secondary intension of a sentence is a 
function from possible worlds considered as counterfactual to its truth-values. The 
sentence “water = H2O” is true in both world a and world w if we consider these 
worlds as counterfactual. The secondary intension of the sentence “water = H2O” is 
“H2O = H2O”. 
Now it is not difficult to see why Kripkean a priori contingencies and a posteriori 
necessities can be explained away within the framework of 2-D semantics. Let us take 
the sentence “water is watery stuff” as an example of a priori contingent sentences. Its 
primary intension is “watery stuff is watery stuff”, which is an a priori necessary 
proposition. Its secondary intension is “H2O is watery stuff”, which is an a posteriori 
contingent proposition. Thus, neither intension of an a priori contingent sentence is a 
so-called “a priori contingent proposition”.  
Let us take the sentence “water = H2O” as an example of a posteriori necessary 
sentences. Its primary intension is “watery stuff is H2O”, which is an a posteriori 
contingent proposition. Its secondary intension is “H2O is H2O”, which is an a priori 
necessary proposition. Thus, neither intension of an a posteriori necessary sentence is 
a so-called “a posteriori necessary proposition”. In a word, Krikean a priori 
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contingencies and a posteriori necessities merely arise at the level of sentences but not 
at the level of propositions. If 2-D semantics is assumed, then it is innocuous to 
assume that apriority and necessity at the level of propositions coincide. In other 
words, if 2-D semantics is assumed, the following thesis has no obvious 
counterexamples:  
(MRp)  For any proposition p, p is metaphysically necessary iff p is a priori 
true. 
MRp is equivalent to MRp’: 
(MRp’)  For any proposition p, p is metaphysically possible iff s is not a priori 
ruled out. 
Since saying that p is not a priori ruled out is saying that p is logically possibly true, 
MRP’ is equivalent to MRP’’: 
(MRp’’)  For any proposition p, p is metaphysically possible iff p is logically 
possible. 
MRp’’ is the equivalent expression of modal monism. In other words, by introducing 
2-D semantics, both modal rationalism established at the level of propositions and 
Kripkean cases can be accommodated by appealing to only one modality. The 
hypothesis that the space of logically possible worlds and that of metaphysically 
possible worlds are co-extensive remains intact.  
4. An Epistemology of Modality: the CP Thesis 
Chalmers’ theory of conceivability is grounded in the hypothesis of modal 
monism and 2-D semantics. Ideal conceivability, as defined by Chalmers, is 
equivalent to logical possibility. Since the hypothesis that logical possibility and 
metaphysical possibility coincide can hold if 2-D semantics is assumed, the 
hypothesis that ideal conceivability is co-extensive with metaphysical possibility can 
also hold within the framework of 2-D semantics.  
However, the entailment from possibility to ideal conceivability is not essential 
to our discussion. This is because in order to establish an epistemology of modality, 
we merely need to find a guide from conceivability to possibility, not vice versa. For 
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this reason, I focus my discussion in this dissertation on how Chalmers defines ideal 
conceivability and how he establishes the entailment from conceivability to 
possibility only. 
To find out which kind of conceivability entails possibility, Chalmers makes 
three pairs of distinctions: 
1.  Primary vs. secondary conceivability 
2.  Prima facie vs. ideal conceivability 
3.  Positive vs. negative conceivability 
4.1 Primary Vs. Secondary Conceivability 
The first distinction is used to overcome the problem from Kripkean a posteriori 
necessities. The notion of conceivability is tightly linked to apriority and other 
rational notions. Based on this understanding, we always seem to be able in some 
sense to conceive of situations in which water is not H2O. If conceivability entails 
possibility, then we have to conclude that it is possible that water is not H2O. 
However, as Kripke points out, the statement “water = H2O” is necessarily true. If 
Kripke is right, then conceivability cannot be considered a guide to possibility.  
But this kind of counterexamples will not arise within the framework of 2-D 
semantics. As has been mentioned, 2-D semantics assigns two intensions to any 
statement, namely a primary and a secondary intension. The two intensions result in 
two different ways in which a statement can be conceivable and possible. Below are 
some definitions concerning conceivability and possibility in Chalmers’ 2-D 
framework: 
(PC)  A statement s is primarily conceivable (1-conceivable) iff its primary 
intension is conceivable.  
(SC)  A statement s is secondarily conceivable (2-conceivable) iff its secondary 
intension is conceivable.  
(PP)  A statement s is primarily possible (1-possible) iff its primary intension is 
possible. 
(SP) A statement s is secondarily possible (2-possible) iff its secondary 
intension is possible. 
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Correspondingly, primary necessity (1-necessity) and secondary necessity 
(2-necessity), respectively, can be defined as follows:  
(PN)  A statement s is primarily necessary (1-necessary) iff its primary 
intension is necessary. 
(SN)  A statement s is secondarily necessary (2-necessary) iff its secondary 
intension is necessary. 
Based on the definitions of conceivability and possibility in 2-D framework, two 
conceivability-to-possibility entailments at the levels of propositions can be 
formulated:  
(CP1)  For any statement s, that it is 1-conceivable that s entails that it is 
1-possible that s. (In other words, for any statement s, that the primary 
intension of s is conceivable entails that the primary intension of s is 
possible.) 
    (CP2)  For any statement s, that it is 2-conceivable that s entails that it is 
2-possible that s. (In other words, for any statement s, that the secondary 
intension of s is conceivable entails that the secondary intension of s is 
possible.) 
As Chalmers asserts, if we distinguish the two senses of conceivability and possibility, 
then the Kripkean counterexamples can be explained away. For example, the 
statement “water is not H2O” is 1-conceivable, which means that its primary intension 
— the proposition “watery stuff is not H2O” — is conceivable. By CP1, it follows that 
“watery stuff is not H2O” is possibly true. However, the observation that this 
proposition is possibly true poses no threat to CP1, since the statement “water is H2O” 
is not 1-necessarily true. Secondly, the proposition “H2O is not H2O”, as the 
secondary intension of the statement “water is not H2O”, involves a logical 
contradiction. Hence, it is not conceivable at all. Thus, at the level of propositions, 
there are no counterexamples from a posteriori necessities.  
According to Chalmers, counterexamples of this kind arise because we take 
1-conceivability as a guide to 2-possibility. From the fact that it is conceivable that 
watery stuff is not H2O, we can only draw the conclusion that it is possible that 
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watery stuff is not H2O, not, however, that it is possible that H2O is not H2O. In other 
words, it is invalid to infer that it is 2-possible that water is not H2O from the fact that 
it is 1-conceivable that water is not H2O. If we avoid taking 1-conceivability as a 
guide to 2-possibility, counterexamples from a posteriori necessities will not arise.  
Another aspect worth noting is that CP2 does not always have practical use in 
philosophical discussions.26 A necessary condition to know whether a statement s is 
2-conceivable requires that we know what the secondary intension of s is. For 
example, to know whether the statement “water is not H2O” is 2-conceivable requires 
that we acquire its secondary intension “H2O is not H2O”. However, the secondary 
intension is not always acquired in an a priori way. To know the secondary intension 
of “water is not H2O” requires that we know what “water” refers to in the actual 
world, which further requires empirical evidence. So without necessary empirical 
evidence, we cannot know what the secondary intension of “water is not H2O” is, let 
alone determine whether its secondary intension is conceivable.  
Therefore, CP2 cannot assist us if we do not grasp the secondary intension of a 
sentence. On the contrary, we always gain a priori access to the primary intension of a 
sentence. Any competent speaker who knows the meaning of “water” can grasp the 
primary intension of “water is not H2O” without any empirical experience. This is 
why CP1 plays a central role in philosophical discussions.   
Since we cannot always know a priori whether what a statement says is 
2-conceivable in practice, the entailment between 2-conceivability and metaphysical 
possibility does not always have practical use. But if this is the case, then one problem 
naturally arises: It is 2-possibility, rather than 1-possibility, that characterizes 
metaphysical possibility, which is our central concern. When we ask whether it is 
metaphysically possible that water is not H2O, we pose the following question: Given 
what water is in the actual world (that is, H2O), is there a possible world in which 
actual water (that is, H2O) is not H2O? We are not asking this question: Is there a 
possible world in which the substance playing the role of water is not H2O, no matter 
what this substance is comprised of? In view of this, we can say that there is a gap 
between CP1, which as an epistemology of modality is immediately available to us, 
and 2-possibility, which we have to establish. Our central concern is 2-possibility, but 
we can only resort to 1-conceivability, which is merely a guide to 1-possibility.  
                                                
26 See Chalmers (2002), p. 162. 
  29 
But the gap will disappear if a statement’s primary intension and secondary 
intension coincide. In that case, it will be safe to draw the conclusion that a statement 
is 2-possible from the fact that what it says is 1-conceivable. Many philosophers are 
aware that some statements have the same primary and secondary intensions and 
validly infer that these statements are 2-possible from the fact that they are 
1-conceivable. For example, a key premise of Kripke’s modal argument against type 
identity theory is that the terms “pain” and “C-fiber firing” have the same primary and 
secondary intensions, respectively. In this case, if it is 1-conceivable that pain is not 
C-fiber firing, we can validly deduce that it is 2-possible that pain is not C-fiber firing. 
In Chalmers’ conceivability argument against materialism, P and Q, which 
respectively stand for a conjunction of all of our world’s microphysical truths and an 
arbitrary phenomenal conscious truth of our world, also have the same primary and 
secondary intensions. In this case, if it is 1-conceivable that P holds without Q being 
true, it is 2-possible that P holds without Q being true. Here are some other sentences 
that have the same primary and secondary intensions: 
●  GC is false. 
●  It is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being 
exists. 
●  Conceivability does not entail possibility. 
●  It is necessary that PT→Q. (P, T and Q respectively stand for a conjunction 
of all of our world’s microphysical truths, a statement which says that “that 
is all” and an arbitrary phenomenal conscious truth of our world.) 
By distinguishing the primary and secondary intension of a statement, Chalmers 
actually establishes a principle linking conceivability and possibility at the level of 
propositions. CP1 and CP2 in fact are equivalent expressions of the following thesis: 
For any proposition p, that it is conceivable that p entails that it is possible that p.  
But a question poses itself:  
Given that conceivability entails possibility at the level of propositions, what 
exactly is conceivability?  
The other two pairs of distinctions, namely the distinction between prima facie 
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conceivability and ideal conceivability, and that between negative conceivability and 
positive conceivability, are used to answer this question.  
4.2 Prima facie Vs. Ideal Conceivability 
It is prima facie conceivable for an agent A that p iff A cannot rule out p a priori 
or A can imagine a situation in which p is true.27 According to this definition, prima 
facie conceivability is relative to an agent’s epistemic status. If an agent A has 
cognitive limitations, then what she cannot rule out a priori or what she can imagine 
may involve contradictions. If this is the case, then what the proposition p says, which 
is prima facie conceivable for A, is not logically possible, and therefore also fails to 
be metaphysically possible. In a word, prima facie conceivability is not a guide to 
possibility.  
For example, according to the definition, both GC (Goldbach’s Conjecture) and 
¬GC are prima facie conceivable for us. We, who lack sufficient mathematical skill 
and understanding, cannot rule out a priori either GC or ¬GC. Moreover, we can 
imagine a situation in which mathematicians claim that GC is true and imagine 
another situation in which mathematicians claim that ¬GC is true. However, it cannot 
be the case that GC is both possibly true and possibly false. Hence, if a 
conceivability-to-possibility entailment is to be established, the kind of conceivability 
cannot be prima facie conceivability.  
Ideal conceivability requires ideal rational reflection. To characterize the notion 
of ideal reflection, there are generally two approaches. Menzies defines ideal 
reflection by invoking an ideal reasoner, which is a possible agent that is free from 
cognitive limitations.28 However, as Chalmers points out, it is not clear that the 
notion of an ideal agent is coherent. It may be the case that for any ideal agent, there 
is a better one. To avoid this problem, Chalmers defines ideal reflection by appealing 
to the “notion of undefeatability by better reasoning”.29 In this dissertation, I put 
aside the difference between the two approaches and consider them as equivalent: To 
say A is an ideal agent is to say that A’s rational reflection cannot be defeated by 
better reasoning. Defined in this way, ideal conceivability is agent-independent. 
Whether it is ideally conceivable that p does not depend on the background 
                                                
27 The definition here involves the notion of negative conceivability and positive conceivability, on which I will 
elaborate in the following.  
28 See Menzies (1998), p. 269.  
29 See Chalmers (2002), p. 148. 
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knowledge of a conceiver. Because of this, it is illegitimate to say that it is ideally 
conceivable for us that p. Moreover, that we can conceive of a situation in which p is 
true cannot be considered as evidence that p is ideally conceivable; that we cannot 
conceive of what p says cannot be considered as evidence that p is not ideally 
conceivable, either. In a word, what we can conceive of or our ability of conceiving of 
something is irrelevant to the issue of whether a given p is ideally conceivable.  
Moreover, according to Chalmers, ideal conceivability equals logical possibility. 
This is easier to see if we combine the distinction between negative conceivability and 
positive conceivability with the notion of ideal conceivability. 
4.3 Negative Vs. Positive Conceivability 
The prima facie version of negative conceivability can be formulated as follows: 
(FPNC)  For a proposition p, it is prima facie negatively conceivable that p for 
an agent A iff A cannot rule out p a priori. In other words, it is prima 
facie negatively conceivable that p for an agent A iff A cannot find a 
contradiction in p. 
The ideal version of negative conceivability can be formulated as follows: 
(INC)  For a proposition p, it is ideally negatively conceivable that p iff p is not 
ruled out a priori. In other words, it is ideally negatively conceivable 
that p iff there is no contradiction in p.30  
As to positive conceivability, Chalmers draws the analogy to imagination: “To 
positively conceive of a situation is to in some sense imagine a specific configuration 
of objects and properties.”31  Moreover, he distinguishes two kinds of positive 
imagination: perceptual imagination and modal imagination. An agent A perceptually 
imagines the state of affair that a proposition p represents iff she perceptually forms a 
mental image in which p is the case. For example, one perceptually imagines a pig 
flying iff one forms a visual image of a flying pig.32  
However, as Chalmers points out, some situations are beyond the scope of 
perceptual imagination. He provides two examples, such as that we cannot 
                                                
30 Chalmers (2002), p. 150. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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perceptually imagine the molecules of H2O or perceptually imagine that Germany 
won World War II.33 Another, though more contentious example, is that the existence 
of my zombie twin, who is a microphysical duplicate of mine but has no phenomenal 
consciousness, cannot be fully perceptually imagined. We can merely perceptually 
imagine a zombie’s position, figure, color of skin, etc., that is, her outward aspects. 
However, we cannot perceptually imagine what it is like for her to be in pain or to see 
a green leaf. In other words, her inner aspects cannot be grasped by appealing to 
perceptual imagination. Some further examples that are beyond the scope of 
perceptual imagination are listed below (it is not hard to see that most of them are 
commonly found in philosophical discussions): 
●  GC is false. 
●  Pain ≠ C-fiber firing. 
●  It is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being 
exists. 
●  Conceivability does not entail possibility. 
●  Phenomenal properties supervene on microphysical properties. 
… 
For any proposition listed above, we cannot form a perceptual image of the situation it 
represents, but we can nevertheless imagine what it represents in some sense. This is 
because we can provide a description of a situation (that is, a configuration of objects 
and properties) in which the proposition at hand is true. Chalmers calls this kind of 
imagination “modal imagination”. Although it is a guide to possibility, perceptual 
imagination, due to its limitations, cannot play a role in most philosophical 
discussions. For this reason, Chalmers gives up perceptual imagination and turns to 
modal imagination to establish an epistemology of modality.  
According to him, to modally imagine a situation in which a proposition p is true 
is to construct a set of propositions that verify p. In addition, Chalmers puts forward 
the notion of coherent modal imagination. To coherently modally imagine something 
requires the consistency of the set of propositions one constructs. In Chalmers view, 
coherent modal imagination is the only reliable guide to possibility. Moreover, it is 
worth noting that the notion of verification is not well-defined. A usual interpretation 
                                                
33 See Chalmers (2002), p. 151. 
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is to read verification as logical entailment: If there is a truth assignment under which 
each proposition in a set Г is true without p being true, then Г does not verify p.34  
By introducing the notion of prima facie conceivability, we can formulate the 
prima facie version of positive conceivability: 
(PFPC)  For a proposition p, it is prima facie positively conceivable that p for 
an agent A iff A can construct a set of propositions, Г, such that A 
regards Г as verifying (or entailing) p and A cannot find a contradiction 
in Г.35  
It is relatively easy for us to determine whether a proposition p is the logical 
consequence of a set of propositions. But it may be difficult to tell whether or not a 
given set of propositions is consistent. Sometimes, due to our cognitive limitations, 
what we take to be consistent may not actually be consistent. In this case, what we 
can modally conceive of may not be logically possible, and may therefore fail to be 
metaphysically possible. This is why PFPC cannot be a guide to possibility. But this 
problem will not arise if the agent in question is an ideal one. By appealing to the 
notion of an ideal agent, we can formulate the ideal version of positive conceivability: 
(IPC)  For a proposition p, it is ideally positively conceivable that p iff there is a 
consistent set of propositions, Г, such that Г verifies (or entails) p.36  
In Chalmers’ view, both INC and IPC are reliable guides to possibility. Based on INC 
and IPC, two refined versions of CP can be formulated: 
(CP−)  For any proposition p, that it is ideally negatively conceivable that p 
entails that it is possible that p. 
(CP+)  For any proposition p, that it is ideally positively conceivable that p 
entails that it is possible that p. 
For the remainder of this dissertation, I will use the term “the CP thesis” or “CP” to 
refer to either CP− or CP+. It is not difficult to see that INC and IPC are actually 
defined equivalent to logical possibility. There are generally two ways to characterize 
logical possibility. These two definitions, respectively, are also how Chalmers defines 
                                                
34 See Chalmers (2002), p. 152. 
35 See Chalmers (2002), p. 153. 
36 Ibid. 
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ideal conceivability. As has been said, the first way to characterize logical possibility 
is to resort to apriority. Consequently, it is natural to define ideal conceivability in 
terms of what is not ruled out a priori. Moreover, to say that p is not a priori ruled out 
is to say that p is not contradictory. This is why p is ideally negatively conceivable iff 
p is contradiction-free.37  
Another way to characterize logical possibility is to invoke the notion of a 
maximal consistent set. If p is logically possible, then there is at least one maximal 
consistent set in which p is true. But if we were required to construct a maximal 
consistent set in order to know that it is ideally conceivable that p, that would be a 
requirement too demanding to be met. In this case, the practical significance of CP as 
an epistemic guide to possibility would be negligible. This is why Chalmers turns to 
the notion of verification (at the cost that the notion of verification is not 
well-defined). According to him, it is equivalent to say that p is verified by a 
consistent set and to say that p is logically possible. If Chalmers is right, then both 
INC and IPC are equivalent to logical possibility. From this, some consequences 
follow.  
For one thing, the counterexample from the GC case can be explained away. 
¬GC is prima facie conceivable, but prima facie conceivability does not entail 
possibility. Hence, it is not valid to infer that ¬GC is possibly true from the fact that 
¬GC is prima facie conceivable. In addition, ¬GC is a priori false. By definition, ¬GC 
is neither ideally negatively conceivable nor ideally positively conceivable. For this 
reason, the case of GC poses no threat to the CP thesis. For another thing, the main 
idea of CP (both CP− and CP+) is that logical possibility entails metaphysical 
possibility, from which it follows that all necessary propositions (i.e., propositions 
that are either necessarily true or necessarily false) are either a priori true or a priori 
false. The following reasoning can also reveal this consequence: 
According to CP− and the definition of INC: 
(CP−)  For any proposition p, that it is ideally negatively conceivable that p 
entails that it is possible that p. 
(INC)  For any proposition p, that it is ideally negatively conceivable that p iff 
p is not a priori ruled out.  
                                                
37 For the remainder of this dissertation, expressions like “logically possible,” “contradiction-free,” “consistent,” 
“not ruled out a priori” will be used as equivalents. 
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We can conclude (1) and (2):  
(1)  For any proposition p, if p is not a priori false, then p is possibly true. 
(2)  For any proposition p, if ¬p is not a priori false, then ¬p is possibly true. 
(1) is equivalent to (3): 
(3)  For any proposition p, if p is necessarily false, then p is a priori false.  
(2) is equivalent to (4): 
(4)  For any proposition p, if p is necessarily true, then p is a priori true. 
Based on (3) and (4), (5) holds: 
(5)  For any proposition p, if p is either necessarily true or necessarily false, 
then p is a priori true or a priori false.  
Moreover, the claim that p is either necessarily true or necessarily false can be 
formalized as □p∨□¬p, which is equivalent to (◊p→p) ∧ (◊¬p→¬p).38 So (5) is 
equivalent to (6): 
(6)  For any proposition p, if □p∨□¬p (i.e., (◊p→p) ∧ (◊¬p→¬p)) holds, then 
p is a priori true or a priori false. 
To conclude this chapter, let me summarize how Chalmers establishes the link 
between conceivability and possibility on the basis of modal monism and 2-D 
semantics: Modal monism — the hypothesis that metaphysical possibility and logical 
possibility coincide — has been severed by Kripke’s arguments for a posteriori 
necessities and a priori contingencies. By introducing 2-D semantics, which assigns 
two intensions (i.e., propositions) to any statement, the a posteriori necessities and a 
priori contingencies can be explained away at the level of propositions. Thus, modal 
                                                
38 Here is the proof of why □p∨□¬p is equivalent to (◊p→p) ∧ (◊¬p→¬p). First, let us consider why □p∨□¬p 
entails (◊p→p) ∧(◊¬p→¬p). □p∨□¬p is equivalent to ¬□p→□¬p. Since ¬□p is equivalent to ◊¬p, and for any p, 
□¬p→¬p holds, therefore, ¬□p→□¬p entails ◊¬p→¬p. Moreover, □p∨□¬p is equivalent to ¬□¬p→□p. ¬□¬p is 
equivalent to ◊p, and for any p, □p→p holds. Therefore, ¬□¬p→□p entails ◊p→p. Thus, □p∨□¬p entails (◊p→p) 
∧(◊¬p→¬p). Then let us consider why (◊p→p)∧(◊¬p→¬p) entails □p∨□¬p. (◊p→p) ∧(◊¬p→¬p) is equivalent 
to (p→□p) ∧(¬p→□¬p). For any p, □p→p and □¬p→¬p hold. Therefore, if (p→□p) ∧(¬p→□¬p) is true, both 
p↔□p and ¬p↔□¬p hold. Since for any p, p∨¬p holds, hence, □p∨□¬p is true. Thus, (◊p→p) ∧(◊¬p→¬p) 
entails □p∨□¬p. As a result, □p∨□¬p is equivalent to (◊p→p) ∧(◊¬p→¬p).  
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monism remains intact within the framework of 2-D semantics.  
A consequence that follows from modal monism is that logical possibility entails 
metaphysical possibility. Moreover, there are generally two ways to define logical 
possibility. These two ways are how Chalmers defines ideal conceivability. This 
explains why the CP thesis is immune to obvious counterexamples: The idea behind 
CP is that logical possibility entails metaphysical possibility. Since the latter 
hypothesis is immune to obvious counterexamples, so is the former.  
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Chapter 3: Is the CP Thesis Qualified as a Modal 
Epistemology? 
In Chapter 2, I have shown how Chalmers establishes the CP thesis. According 
to Chalmers, ideal conceivability and logical possibility are equivalent. Some 
consequences follow from this: Firstly, in order to show that it is ideally conceivable 
that p, we can demonstrate that it is logically possible that p; in order to show that it is 
logically possible that p, we can also demonstrate that it is ideally conceivable that p. 
Secondly, the notion of ideal conceivability (i.e., logical possibility) is 
agent-independent: Whether a proposition is ideally conceivable (i.e., logically 
possible) does not depend on what we know or believe, or which concepts are 
available to us.39  
However, our judgments about what is ideally conceivable or logically possible 
are relative to our epistemic status. Given our cognitive limitations, in some cases, it 
may be too challenging for us to know or have evidence for whether a given 
proposition is ideally conceivable (i.e., logically possible). If this is the case, ideal 
conceivability cannot provide us with an epistemic guide to what is metaphysically 
possible, and therefore, the CP thesis is not qualified to be a modal epistemology. In 
this chapter, I discuss a series of criticisms that assert that the CP thesis is not 
qualified as an epistemology of modality.  
According to one extreme critique, for any proposition p, we can never know or 
be justified in believing that it is ideally conceivable that p. Hanrahan (2009) and 
Bailey (2007) are proponents of this view. As to ideal positive conceivability (IPC), 
they argue that we face a regress when we try to provide a justification for p’s ideal 
conceivability. They therefore claim that we can never know or have evidence that a 
given proposition is ideally positively conceivable. According to Hanrahan, the 
regress will come to an end, but that end is only reached when we can construct a 
maximal consistent set, which is beyond our reach. In this case, the justification of a 
conceivability claim cannot be achieved. According to Bailey, the regress is an 
infinite one. In this case, the justification of a conceivability claim cannot be achieved, 
                                                
39 It seems that the notion of conceivability merely applies to situations, but not to statements or propositions. But 
as defined by Chalmers, ideal conceivability and logical possibility are equivalent. So it will be acceptable if I use 
“p is ideally conceivable” to express that it is ideally conceivable that p, just like we can use “p is logically 
possible” to express that it is logically possible that p. However, I will not use “p is prima facie conceivable” to 
express that it is prima facie conceivable that p.   
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either.  
As to ideal negative conceivability (INC), Hanrahan argues that in order to 
determine whether p is ideally negatively conceivable requires that we examine all the 
logical consequences of p, the number of which is infinite. However, we are not able 
to do so. As a result, she concludes that for any proposition p, we cannot know or 
have evidence for whether it is ideally negatively conceivable that p.  
Worley (2003) proposes a less extreme critique. She argues that for some 
proposition p, we cannot know or be justified in believing that it is ideally 
conceivable that p. In what follows immediately, she argues that since there are some 
propositions such that we cannot know or have evidence for whether they are ideally 
conceivable, we cannot know or have evidence for whether the existence of zombies 
(who are our microphysical duplicates but lack phenomenal consciousness) is ideally 
conceivable. As a result, she concludes that the soundness of Chalmers’ zombie 
argument, which depends on the premise that the existence of zombies is ideally 
conceivable, is not justified.  
In this chapter, I examine these criticisms and the arguments in support of them 
in turn. In my view, the extreme critique of CP+ is not tenable because each version 
of the regress arguments involves a false premise. As to the critical view of CP−, I 
argue that Hanrahan proposes a requirement that is too demanding and that we do not 
have to fulfill. Thus, I think the extreme critique of the CP thesis collapses.  
As to Worley’s first argument, I think it is enlightening (although it involves 
some misunderstanding of Chalmers’ theory); as to her second argument, I think she 
is too quick in drawing her conclusion. By her first argument, she just tells us that 
there are some propositions such that to know or have evidence for whether they are 
ideally conceivable is beyond our reach. But she does not specify the ideal 
conceivability of what kind of propositions cannot be known or justified. So she 
leaves it to be determined whether we cannot know or have evidence that the 
existence of zombies is ideally conceivable. At the end of this chapter, on the basis of 
Worley’s first argument, I move one step further by specifying in which cases we 
cannot know or have evidence that a given proposition is ideally conceivable. 
1. Hanrahan and Bailey’s Regress Arguments 
1.1 Hanrahan’s Argument 
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Hanrahan and Bailey respectively argue that when CP+ is applied, we face a 
regress. I call their arguments together “regress arguments”. But there is a difference 
between these arguments: According to Hanrahan, the regress is finite; in Bailey’s 
view, it is infinite. I will first discuss Hanrahan’s argument, then followed by a 
discussion of Bailey’s argument. 
In her paper Consciousness and Modal Empiricism, Hanrahan makes the 
following claims: 
    Say I positively conceive of S, and hence declare S possible. But say someone 
questions my modal declaration. (Let’s refer to my interlocutor here as ‘the 
modal skeptic.’) The modal skeptic would be justified in asking me about the 
details of the situation I have intuited. And I would be obligated to demonstrate 
that those details in fact cohere and verify S, for I am the one who has declared S 
possible. And if the skeptic isn’t satisfied with the details I have offered, she 
could legitimately demand more and then more again...Given this, the demands 
of this persistent modal skeptic can and should ultimately require me to construct 
a maximally consistent set of propositions, not just in principle but in practice. 
But, again, no one can ever meet this requirement; so ideal positive primary 
conceivability can’t provide us with a guide to possibility.40  
Before moving on, some clarifications are necessary. Firstly, it should be noted that in 
Chalmers’ theory, conceivability is linked to statements or propositions. Indeed, when 
we say that what a sentence s describes is conceivable, we actually refer to a situation 
— the situation that s describes. But note that what we speak of is the situation under 
the description s. We are not talking about the situation under other descriptions, or a 
“bare” situation, which is associated with no descriptions. For example, when we say, 
“it is conceivable that Donald Trump is bald”, we are saying that the situation which 
is associated with the description “Donald Trump is bald” is conceivable, we are not 
saying that the situation which is associated with the description “the 45th President 
of the United States is bald” is conceivable, although the sentence “Donald Trump is 
bald” and the sentence “the 45th President of the United States is bald” describe the 
same situation.  
Moreover, as I have addressed in Chapter 2, the 2-conceivability of a statement 
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cannot always be acquired in an a priori way. This is why 1-conceivability, which is 
the conceivability of a statement’s primary intension, is Chalmers’ central concern. 
Hanrahan is aware of these two points. She writes: “this kind of conceivability (in 
discussion) is primary conceivability, or conceivability according to the primary 
intensions of the terms used in describing S.”41 In view of this, when it comes to the 
conceivability of S in her paper, we should read it as meaning the 1-conceivaiblity of 
the description of S. 
Secondly, the kind of conceivability in Hanrahan’s discussion is ideal 
conceivability, which is irrelevant to what an agent can “positively conceive of”.42 
By definition, an agent A can conceive of what S describes iff for A, it is prima facie 
conceivable that S. However, as Chalmers points out, prima facie conceivability does 
not entail possibility. Moreover, it is obvious that Hanrahan does not aim to argue 
against the claim that prima facie is a guide to possibility. Thus, she would miss her 
target if what is in discussion is what she can “positively conceive of”. To avoid this 
problem, I think we should read “I positively conceive of S” as meaning “I claim that 
S is ideally positively conceivable”.43   
Third, Hanrahan is aware that “Chalmers is quite explicit that ideal 
conceivability doesn’t involve our describing a whole (logically possible) world”.44 
In Chalmers’ theory, logically possible worlds are identified with “equivalence 
classes of qualitatively complete descriptions”.45 In other words, logically possible 
worlds are identified with maximal consistent sets. Plus, Chalmers admits that “when 
S is ideally positively conceivable, it must be possible in principle to flesh out any 
missing details of an imagined situation that verifies S”.46 But if we were required to 
construct a maximal consistent set in order to know what is ideally conceivable, that 
would be too demanding a requirement to be met. In this case, we would never know 
what is ideally conceivable. Moreover, “any epistemology that requires us to do what 
we in fact can’t do isn’t to be considered an epistemology”.47 So if we were required 
to provide a qualitatively complete description of a logically possible world in order 
to know what is ideally positively conceivable, the CP+ thesis would not be qualified 
                                                
41 Hanrahan (2009), p. 283. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Hanrahan (2009), p. 284. 
45 Chalmers (2002), p. 193. 
46 Chalmers (2002), p. 153. 
47 Hanrahan (2009), p. 284. 
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to be an epistemology of modality.  
Chalmers has noticed this potential problem. He never says that in order to make 
a conceivability judgment we are required to construct a maximal consistent set in 
practice. Rather, he says:  
    In practice, to make a conceivability judgment, one need only consider a 
conceivable situation — a small part of a world — and then make sure that one 
is describing it correctly. If there is a conceivable situation in which a statement 
is true, there will obviously be a conceivable world in which the statement is true, 
so this method will give reasonable results while straining our cognitive 
resources less than conceiving of an entire world!48 
To rephrase, to show that it is ideally positively conceivable that p, one just has to 
find another coherent proposition q such that q entails p, or construct a consistent set 
of propositions Г such that Г contains a finite number of propositions and Г entails p. 
According to Chalmers, if there is such a q or Г, “there will obviously be a 
conceivable world”, i.e., a maximal consistent set in which p is true.49 Consider 
Chalmers’ definition of ideal positive conceivability again:  
(IPC)  For a proposition p, it is ideally positively conceivable that p iff there is a 
consistent set of propositions, Г, such that Г verifies (or entails) p. 
According to this definition, in order to show that p is ideally positively conceivable, 
we are only required to construct a consistent set, rather than a maximal consistent 
set.  
So both Chalmers and Hanrahan admit that making a conceivability judgment 
does not require that we construct a maximal consistent set. But why is the modal 
skeptic justified in asking one about the details of the situation one has intuited? The 
reason is probably as follows: According to the definition of IPC, in order to establish 
that it is ideally positively conceivable that p, one needs to construct a consistent set 
that entails p. We can name this set Г1. To construct a set that entails p is not difficult. 
In order to do so, we can even simply take p itself, and conjoin p with further 
propositions necessary.  
But how can we demonstrate that Г1 is consistent? Since ideal positive 
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conceivability and logical possibility are equivalent, one way to show that Г1 is 
consistent (that is, logically possible) is to show that the conjunction of all the 
members of Г1 is ideally conceivable. In order to do so, we have to resort to another 
consistent set of propositions, Г2, which entails every member of Г1 and which is itself 
consistent. (We can say more about this step: Saying that Г1 is consistent is to say that 
the conjunction of all of its members, which I call p1, is contradiction-free, i.e., 
logically possible. Since ideal positive conceivability and logical possibility are 
equivalent, saying that p1 is logically possible is to say that p1 is ideally positively 
conceivable. In order to show that p1 is ideally positively conceivable, by definition, 
we have to resort to a consistent set of propositions that entails p1. This is why we 
need Г2.) How, then, can we construct Г2? Again, we can take all the members of Г1, 
and conjoin them with other propositions that are necessary. However, the same 
problem occurs once more: How can we demonstrate that Г2 is consistent? In order to 
do this, we have to appeal to another set of proposition, Г3, and will face a regress.  
Put differently, for each Гn, in order to demonstrate that Гn is consistent, we have 
to appeal to the ideal positive conceivability of Гn (or to be more accurate, we have to 
appeal to the ideal positive conceivability of the conjunction of all members of Гn). 
Then, in order to show that the conjunction of all members of Гn is ideally positively 
conceivable, we need another set, Гn+1, where Гn+1 entails each member of Гn. In 
order to construct Гn+1, we can take all members of Гn and add further propositions. If 
p is not contradiction-free, then this regress might end at somewhere when a 
contradiction reveals itself. But if p is contradiction-free, the regress will not end until 
we construct a maximal consistent set. However, no one can entertain all the members 
of a maximal consistent set. As a result, it can never be justified that p is ideally 
positively possible. In this case, ideal positive conceivability cannot provide us with 
an epistemic guide to what is metaphysically possible. Therefore, CP+ cannot be 
considered a modal epistemology. 
Hanrahan depicts a finite regress that ends at a point that we cannot reach. I think 
it is the following three premises that are implicitly presupposed by her that lead to 
the regress: 
1.  To demonstrate that it is ideally conceivable that p requires that we 
construct a consistent set of propositions, Г1, such that Г1 entails p. 
2. To construct a set of propositions, Г1, such that Г1 entails p, requires that p 
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be a member of Г1. Moreover, for any Гn (n≥1), to construct a set of 
propositions, Гn+1, such that Гn+1 entails each member of Гn requires that Гn 
be a subset of Гn+1.  
3.  For any set Гn (n≥1), the only way to demonstrate that Гn is consistent is to 
demonstrate that the conjunction of all of its members is ideally positively 
conceivable.  
But is what is described in Premise 2 the only model for constructing a set of 
propositions that entails p and for constructing any set Гn+1 that entails each member 
of Гn? Can the regress be avoided by appealing to another model? As to the first 
question, the answer is “no”. We can construct a set of propositions that entails p 
without postulating p as a member of this set. For example, the proposition “if it is 
raining, I will take an umbrella” is the logical consequence of the proposition “I will 
take an umbrella”. Thus, the set {I will take an umbrella}, which contains the 
proposition “I will take an umbrella” as its only member, entails the proposition “if it 
is raining, I will take an umbrella” without containing the latter as its member.  
Similarly, we can construct two sets of propositions such that one of them entails 
each member of the other without containing the latter as a subset. Let Δ1 be a set that 
contains two propositions as its members: “2+2=4” and “I will take an umbrella”. Let 
Δ2 be a set whose members are two propositions: “2+2=4” and “if it is raining, I will 
take an umbrella”. Every member of Δ2 is a logical consequence of Δ1, but Δ2 is not a 
subset of Δ1.   
As can be seen, to construct a set that entail p does not require that p be a 
member of this set. To construct a set Гn+1 that entails each member of Гn does not 
require that Гn+1 contain Гn as a subset, either. Now we can consider whether the 
regress can be avoided if we keep Premise 1 and 3 but we replace Premise 2 with 
Premise 2’: 
2’.  To construct a set of propositions, Г1, such that Г1 entails p, requires that p 
not be a member of Г1. Moreover, for any Гn (n≥1), to construct a set of 
propositions, Гn+1, such that Гn+1 entails each member of Гn requires that Гn 
not be a subset of Гn+1. 
1.2 Bailey’s Argument 
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Bailey’s argument has 2’ as its premise. According to Bailey, the regress will not 
be eliminated, either. Moreover, the regress in Bailey’s model is an infinite one. In the 
following, I quote his argument: 
    For some contested modal conclusion p to be justified, an argument from 
conceivability A must be established as sound; but argument A can only be 
shown to be sound by another argument from conceivability, B. Since B is also 
an argument from conceivability, it in turn can only be established by argument 
from conceivability C, and so on in an infinite regress. This regress is vicious 
since p is not justified unless all the premises of A are, but all the premises of A 
are not justified unless all the premises of B are, and so on: since the regress is 
infinite, the justification of p is never — even partially — achieved.50 
Bailey’s argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
1.  To demonstrate that it is ideally conceivable that p requires that we 
construct a consistent set of propositions, Г1, such that Г1 entails p. 
2’.  To construct a set of propositions, Г1, such that Г1 entails p, requires that p 
not be a member of Г1. Moreover, for any Гn (n≥1), to construct Гn+1 such 
that Гn+1 entails each member of Гn requires that Гn not be a subset of Гn+1. 
3.  For any set Гn (n≥1), the only way to demonstrate that Гn is consistent is to 
demonstrate that the conjunction of all of its members is ideally positively 
conceivable.  
The rationale of the above argument is similar to that of Hanrahan’s: To show that it 
is ideally positively conceivable that p requires an argument for the consistence of Г1 
such that Г1 entails p. Since logical possibility and ideal positive conceivability are 
equivalent, to show that Г1 is consistent is to show that the conjunction of all members 
of Г1 is ideally positively conceivable. In order to show that the conjunction of all 
members of Г1 is ideally positively conceivable, we need a further consistent set, Г2. 
Then, in order to show that Г2 is consistent, we have to appeal to a new set, Г3, and so 
on. Note that according to Bailey’s argument, Г1 does not contain p as a member. 
Moreover, any set Гn+1 does not contain Гn as a subset. So any set Гn cannot be a 
maximal set because some propositions are logical consequences of it without being 
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members of it. This is why Bailey’s conclusion is different from that of Hanrahan’s 
argument. According to Hanrahan, the regress ends when Гn is a maximal consistent 
set. But in Bailey’s view, since any set Гn is not a maximal consistent set, the regress 
is infinite.  
1.3 A “Hybrid” Version of the Regress Argument 
Furthermore, we can create a hybrid version of these two models of regress if we 
construct sets of propositions according to the rule laid down in Premise 2’’ (see 
below). Thus, a “hybrid” version of regress argument can be constructed as follows:  
1. To demonstrate that it is ideally conceivable that p requires that we 
construct a consistent set of propositions, Г1, such that Г1 entails p. 
2’’.  To construct a set of propositions, Г1, such that Г1 entails p, does not 
require that p be or not be a member of Г1. Moreover, for any Гn (n≥1), to 
construct Гn+1 such that Гn+1 entails each member of Гn does not require 
that Гn be or not be a subset of Гn+1. 
3.  For any set Гn (n≥1), the only way to demonstrate that Гn is consistent is 
to demonstrate that the conjunction of all of its members is ideally 
positively conceivable.  
According to Premise 2’’, p may or may not be a member of Г1. And for any Гn+1, Гn 
may or may not be a subset of Гn+1. In this case, to show that p is ideally positively 
conceivable, we are required to construct a maximal consistent set, or we face an 
infinite regress. But the problem does not simply disappear: In either case, the claim 
that it is ideally positively conceivable that p cannot be justified. That is to say, the 
way in which we construct sets of propositions is not essential to the problem. It is 
Premise 1 and 3 that lead to the regress. In the following, I consider whether Premise 
1 and 3 hold true. 
1.4 Why the Regress Arguments Fail 
Premise 1 is arguably true. One may argue that the requirement given in Premise 
1 is more demanding than it should be. According to the definition of IPC, that it is 
ideally positively conceivable that p merely requires that there be a consistent set that 
entails p. It follows that in order to show that it is ideally positively conceivable that p, 
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we are merely required to provide a reason for the existence of such a set. In other 
words, according to this view, we do not have to specify which propositions are 
contained in this set. But is there a way to demonstrate that there is a set that entails p 
without specifying any member of the set? I am not sure. But I think it may be very 
difficult to do so.  
One may argue further that in order to establish that p is ideally positively 
conceivable, we just need to show that p is not a priori ruled out (i.e., that p is ideally 
negatively conceivable). This is a legitimate step because IPC and INC are equivalent 
to one another as well as to logical possibility. If we appeal to the ideal negative 
conceivability of p, we do not have to construct a set Г1 that entails p. Thus, we do not 
have to demonstrate the consistency of Г1. Therefore, the regress can be avoided at 
the very beginning. However, if in order to show that p is ideally positively 
conceivable, we are merely required to show that p is ideally negatively conceivable, 
then IPC will conflate with INC, from which it follows that IPC is redundant in 
Chalmers’ theory. So I think we had better not adopt this strategy but instead take 
what Premise 1 gives as a plausible requirement: To establish that p is ideally 
positively conceivable, we have to construct a set that entails p and demonstrate that 
this set is consistent.  
 As to Premise 3, I do not think that it holds. And what is worse, I think it is this 
very premise that creates the regress. Indeed, as has been mentioned, to show that p is 
ideally positively conceivable requires that we construct a consistent set of 
propositions. But in order to show that the set is consistent, do we have to construct a 
new set? I do not think so. For any set Гn, saying that Гn is consistent is saying that the 
conjunction of all its members is logically possible. (Let us name the conjunction pn.) 
How, then, can we show that pn is logically possible? Hanrahan and Bailey implicitly 
presuppose that there is only one way: In order to show that pn is logically possible, 
we have to demonstrate that it is ideally positively possible that pn (because IPC and 
logical possibility are equivalent). This is why they hold that we have to appeal to a 
new set Гn+1, and why the regress occurs. But they lose sight of the fact that there is 
another way to prove the logical possibility of the proposition pn: that is to show that 
pn is ideally negatively conceivable. To say that pn is ideally negatively conceivable is 
to say that pn is not ruled out a priori. In order to show that pn is not ruled out a priori, 
we do not have to invoke a new proposition, let alone a set of propositions. Thus, the 
regress can be avoided.  
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In the following, I provide an example to show how a regress arises and how it 
can be avoided. Consider how we can demonstrate that the proposition “if it is raining, 
I will take an umbrella” is ideally positively conceivable. Firstly, we should provide a 
consistent set of propositions that entails it, say, the set {I will take an umbrella}. 
Then, how can we prove the consistency of this set? Since to say a set is consistent is 
to say that the conjunction of all its members is logically possible, and logical 
possibility is equivalent to INC and IPC, there are two ways to prove the consistency 
of this set: One way is to demonstrate that the proposition “I will take an umbrella” is 
ideally positively conceivable; the other way is to demonstrate that the proposition “I 
will take an umbrella” is ideally negatively conceivable. If we decide for the first 
option, we have to resort to another set of propositions that entails the proposition “I 
will take an umbrella”. Thus, a regress arises. But if we decide for the second option, 
we can show the consistency of the proposition “I will take an umbrella” without 
invoking a further set. In this case, we can avoid a regress.  
The following diagram shows the difference between the three models of how to 
demonstrate that p is ideally positively conceivable: 
Diagram 1 
 
Hanrahan’s 
Model  
Bailey’s 
Model 
 
The Third 
Model  
The rightward arrows indicate that for any Гn (n≥1), if we demonstrate the 
consistency of Гn by appealing to the ideal positive conceivability of pn (which is the 
conjunction of all members of Гn), then another set, Гn+1, will be required and a 
regress (finite or infinite) will arise. The downward arrows indicate that for any Гn (n
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≥1), if we demonstrate the consistency of Гn by appealing to the ideal negative 
conceivability of pn, no new set will be required and, accordingly, no regress will  
occur. 
2. Hanrahan’s Criticism of Ideal Negative Conceivability 
In section 1, I have argued that if we demonstrate the consistency of a set of 
propositions by appealing to ideal negative conceivability, the regress with regard to 
ideal positive conceivability will end. In this case, the question we have to answer 
next is this: Can we know or have evidence for whether a proposition is ideally 
negatively conceivable? Hanrahan claims that we cannot. She says: 
    It might be that to establish that S is ideally negatively conceivable, one needs to 
consider both the proposition that describes S and those propositions that are 
implied by this description, and determine (via rational reflection) that no 
contradiction is contained within this set of propositions (subset S)… 
But,…there are an infinite number of propositions implied by any one 
proposition and we can’t ever consider each and every one of them. Thus, we 
won’t be able to establish that there isn’t a contradiction amongst these 
propositions, which means we won’t be justified in concluding that S is 
possible.51 
In her argument, Hanrahan presupposes the following premise: 
4.  For any proposition p, to demonstrate that p is ideally negatively 
conceivable (i.e., to demonstrate that p is not ruled out a priori) requires that 
we examine all the logical consequences of p. 
However, for some propositions, we can know that they are not ruled out a priori 
without examining all their logical consequences. For example, we know the 
proposition “Donald Trump is bald” is not ruled out a priori because we know that the 
truth-value of this proposition is knowable a posteriori (even if we do not know 
whether it is true). We also know that “Donald Trump is the 45th president of the US” 
and “2+2=4” are not ruled out a priori because we know that they are true (We know 
that the former proposition is a posteriori true and the latter is a priori true). In all 
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these cases, to establish that a given proposition is ideally negatively conceivable, we 
do not have to examine any logical consequences it might have. So Hanrahan sees a 
problem where there actually is none.  
In sum, according to their regress arguments, Hanrahan and Bailey conclude that 
(a) holds.  
(a) For any proposition p, we cannot know or have evidence for whether it is 
ideally positively conceivable that p.  
However, as I have argued, their arguments presuppose that there is only one way to 
demonstrate the consistency of a set, i.e., by examining whether the conjunction of all 
of its members is ideally positively conceivable, which is a false premise. If we turn 
to ideal negative conceivability, the regress with regard to ideal positive 
conceivability will not arise. But Hanrahan goes on to defend the following claim: 
(b) For any proposition p, we cannot know or have evidence for whether it is 
ideally negatively conceivable that p.  
I have also argued that Hanrahan’s argument for (b) presupposes a false premise. So 
Hanrahan’s second argument collapses, too. Since (b) is false, (a) is false. Thus, based 
on the discussion in Section 1 and 2, we can claim that (c) is true. 
(c) For some proposition p, we can know or have evidence for whether it is 
ideally conceivable that p.  
In what follows, I discuss Worley’s criticism, which claims that (d) holds.  
(d) For some proposition p, we cannot know or have evidence for whether it 
is ideally conceivable that p.  
3. Worley’s Criticism 
In her paper Conceivability, Possibility and Physicalism, Worley argues that we 
are not able to detect all incoherent descriptions of a situation. She concludes by 
saying that we cannot always tell whether a situation is ideally conceivable, and 
therefore cannot always tell whether a situation is possible. She says: 
    Although a situation is impossible only if there is some description which reveals 
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its incoherence, we need not be aware of this description. Some situation may 
seem conceivable to us because the description or mode of presentation under 
which we are thinking of it is not sufficient to reveal its incoherence, even 
though there is some other description available, in principle, which does reveal 
its incoherence. Even if, in short, conceivability is not relativized to our 
epistemic status, our judgments about what is conceivable must necessarily be 
relativized to that status. So our judgments about what is conceivable may not be 
reliable indicators of what actually is conceivable… [In this case], surely the 
most we can say now is that it seems to us that it (the situation in question) is 
conceivable, or, perhaps, that we simply cannot tell whether or not it is 
conceivable.52 
Here I list all of her premises: 
5. By definition, ideal conceivability is equivalent to logical possibility. 
6. A situation is logically possible iff all descriptions of it are logically 
possible. 
7. A single situation may be associated with more than one description. 
8. If one description of a situation is incoherent, then the situation is 
incoherent. 
9. We may not be aware of some incoherent descriptions. 
From Premises 5-9, she concludes that there are some situations such that we cannot 
know or have evidence for whether they are ideally conceivable. In the following, I 
explain her premises in turn. Premise 5 holds. As has been said, there are two ways to 
define logical possibility: One way is to define it in terms of what is not ruled out a 
priori, the other is to define it in terms of what is contained in a maximal consistent 
set. These two ways are also how Chalmers defines ideal conceivability. As a result, 
saying that it is ideally conceivable that p is saying that it is logically possible that p.  
In fact, Chalmers takes conceivability as a property of statements or propositions 
and confines his discussion to the conceivability of the primary intension (which is a 
proposition) of any statement. By contrast, what Worley considers is the 
conceivability (that is, logical possibility) of situations. Moreover, according to 
Worley, the notion of coherency, i.e., logical possibility, merely applies to 
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descriptions but not to situations. Plus, in her view, the most plausible way to interpret 
the claim that a situation is logically possible is to read it as meaning that the 
description(s) of a situation is logically possible. This is why she presupposes Premise 
6.  
But a problem arises: A single situation may be associated with more than one 
description (Premise 7). What if some descriptions are coherent but the others are not? 
Is this situation logically possible in virtue of its coherent descriptions or logically 
impossible in virtue of its incoherent descriptions? Consider this situation as an 
example: The great philosopher, Kant, who is a bachelor, is not male. Let us name 
this situation S. There are at least two ways to describe S: 
(i)  The great philosopher is not male. 
(ii)  The bachelor who was born in Königsberg on April 22nd, 1724, is not 
male. 
(i) and (ii) are both descriptions of the same situation S. (i) is coherent but (ii) is not. 
Then we can consider this question: Is S coherent in virtue of (i) or incoherent in 
virtue of (ii)? According to Worley, “the existence of at least one incoherent 
description of a situation is enough to show that situation is (logically) impossible”.53 
(Premise 8) Since (ii) involves a contradiction, Worley would say that the incoherent 
description (ii) is enough to show that S is logically impossible.  
So far, I think Premises 6-8 are all true. However, the problem is that they 
involve a misunderstanding of Chalmers’ program. According to Chalmers, when we 
try to determine whether a situation is conceivable, our reasoning does not proceed 
along the following lines: We first find out all the descriptions of a situation, and then 
examine whether any of these descriptions are contradictory. In Chalmers’ theory, 
conceivability and possibility are linked to statements or propositions, but not to 
situations. In other words, the domain of the CP thesis is statements or propositions, 
not situations.  
So for Chalmers, we only need to consider whether what a statement or a 
proposition says is ideally conceivable. Our reasoning concerning conceivability 
proceeds along the following lines: For each statement in question, we first find out 
what its primary intension is. We then examine whether its primary intension, which 
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is a proposition, involves any contradictions. Indeed, Chalmers himself talks about the 
conceivability of situations occasionally. But the situations that he talks about are 
associated with specific descriptions, rather than “bare” situations. So when it comes 
to the conceivability of a situation, he actually speaks of the logical possibility of a 
certain description of this situation. It is not his concern whether there are other 
descriptions of a situation or whether these descriptions are logically possible. Due to 
this, Premises 6-8 are irrelevant to Chalmers’ theory. 
Premise 9 says that we are not always aware of the incoherent description(s) of a 
situation. Indeed, sometimes a situation may seem logically possible to us without 
actually being so. In the case of Kant, we may conclude that S is logically possible 
because we are not aware of description (ii), which is incoherent. For this reason, 
Worley claims that our judgments about what is logically possible are not a reliable 
guide to what is actually logically possible.  
But I think we can read Premise 9 in two ways. Firstly, we can read it as 
meaning 9’:  
(9’)  For a given situation, we may not be aware of some of its descriptions, 
which may or may not be coherent.  
However, as has been addressed, the mere fact that we are not aware of some 
descriptions does not pose any problems to Chalmers’ program. What concerns him is 
the logical possibility of a statement or proposition, or a situation associated with a 
specific description. The logical possibility of a “bare” situation is not his concern.    
Secondly, we can read Premise 9 as meaning 9’’: 
(9’’)  For some descriptions, we may not know or have evidence for whether 
they are incoherent.  
I think 9’’ is a plausible premise and what it says poses a real problem to Chalmers’ 
theory. Due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot always detect the contradiction(s) 
involved in a given proposition if there is one. If we cannot detect a contradiction(s), 
in other words, if we cannot rule out the proposition a priori, then the most we can say 
is that it is prima facie conceivable for us that p (Recall the definition of prima facie 
negative conceivability). Perhaps, arguably, we can say further that we know or have 
evidence that it is prima facie conceivable that p. However, the fact that we cannot 
detect a contradiction in p does not entail that p is contradiction-free. In other words, 
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what is prima facie conceivable for us is not a guide to what is ideally conceivable. 
We cannot, therefore, take the evidence of what is prima facie conceivable as 
evidence for what is ideally conceivable.  
Based on Premise 5 and 9’’, we can draw the following conclusion: 
(d) For some proposition p, we cannot know or have evidence for whether it 
is ideally conceivable that p.54  
To illustrate (d), Worley takes the case of the Goldbach Conjecture (GC) as an 
example. She says: “Although an equivalent of a Laplacean demon for mathematics 
would indeed see that worlds in which Goldbach’s conjecture is false are necessarily 
incoherent, we are not such Laplacean demon.”55 Since we cannot a priori detect the 
incoherence of ¬GC, ¬GC is prima facie conceivable for us. But we should not take 
its prima facie conceivability as a guide to its ideal conceivability. In this case, the 
most we can say is that we simply do not know whether ¬GC is ideally conceivable. 
We cannot say that ¬GC is ideally conceivable or that we know or have evidence that 
¬GC is ideally conceivable. 
Furthermore, Worley draws an analogy between the case of GC and the zombie 
example and draws a further conclusion very quickly: Just as we cannot determine 
whether ¬GC is ideally conceivable, whether or not the existence of zombies is 
ideally conceivable is not clear, either. She says: 
    And given that we are not Laplacean demons, it’s unclear why we should trust 
our intuitions with respect to the conceivability of zombies anymore than we 
should trust our intuitions with respect to any such question about what the 
physical entails, or about which mathematical propositions are true.56  
However, (d) merely states that we cannot know or have evidence of the ideal 
conceivability of some propositions, but it does not tell us the ideal conceivability of 
which propositions cannot be known or justified. Without further specification as to 
when we cannot know or have evidence of the conceivability of a proposition, we 
cannot conclude that we cannot know or have evidence that the existence of zombies 
is ideally conceivable.  
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In the remainder of this chapter, I argue for the following three claims (e)-(f), 
which indicate in which cases we cannot know or have evidence for the ideal 
conceivability of a proposition. I will return to the case of the zombies in Chapter 5. 
First, let us consider (e): 
(e) If the truth-value of p is a priori knowable, then we cannot know or have 
evidence for whether p is ideally conceivable without knowing or having 
evidence of its truth-value.  
If the truth-value of p is a priori knowable, according to the definition of ideal 
negative conceivability (INC), it is ideally negatively conceivable that p iff p is true. 
In other words, between p and ¬p, only one is ideally negatively conceivable, but the 
other is not. Assume that we can tell the one that is ideally negatively conceivable 
from the one that is not. Assume further that we know or have evidence that p is 
ideally negatively conceivable. It follows that we take ¬p as the inconceivable one. In 
other words, it follows that we have knowledge or evidence that ¬p is a priori false, 
that is to say we have knowledge or evidence that p is a priori true. On the other hand, 
if we know or have evidence that p is ideally negatively inconceivable, it follows that 
we know or have evidence that p is a priori false. Thus, if the truth-value of p is a 
priori knowable, then to know or have evidence for whether p is ideally negatively 
conceivable requires that we know or have evidence of p’s truth-value. It follows that 
without knowing or having evidence of p’s truth-value, we cannot know or have 
evidence for whether p is ideally negatively conceivable.  
Moreover, by definition, INC and IPC (ideal positive conceivability), both of 
which are defined in terms of logical possibility, are equivalent. Thus, without 
knowing or having evidence for whether p is true, we cannot know or have evidence 
for whether p is ideally positively conceivable, either. 
Let us now consider (f):  
(f)  If p is a proposition such that if it is possibly true, then it is true; and if it is 
possibly false, then it is false, then we cannot know or have evidence for 
whether p is ideally conceivable without knowing or having evidence of its 
truth-value.  
As has been shown in Chapter 2, if the CP thesis holds, then any necessary 
proposition (that is, any proposition whose possible truth entails its truth and whose 
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possible falsehood entails its falsehood) has to be either a priori true or a priori false. 
So if (e) holds, (f) is true.  
Finally, let us consider (g):  
(g)  If p is a proposition such that we know that p is false but do not know or 
have evidence for whether the truth-value of p is a posteriori knowable, 
then we cannot know or have evidence for whether p is ideally conceivable.   
According to the definition of INC, p is ideally negatively conceivable iff p is not a 
priori false. In other words, p is ideally negatively conceivable iff p is a priori true or 
p’s truth-value is a posteriori knowable. If we know that p is false, p is ideally 
negatively conceivable iff p is a posteriori false. So we cannot know or have evidence 
for whether p is ideally negatively conceivable without knowing or having evidence 
for whether the truth-value of p is a posteriori knowable. Since INC and IPC are 
equivalent, in this case, we cannot know or have evidence whether p is ideally 
positively conceivable, either.   
(e)-(g) will be used in the discussion of the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4: Is the CP Thesis Self-Defeating? 
In Chapter 3, I have argued that if p is a proposition such that if it is possibly true, 
then it is true; and if it is possibly false, then it is false, then we cannot know or have 
evidence for whether p is ideally conceivable without knowing or having evidence of 
p’s truth-value. In this case, ideal conceivability cannot provide us with a guide to 
possibility. The CP thesis, which says that ideal conceivability entails possibility, is 
itself a proposition such that its possible truth entails its truth and its possible falsity 
entails its falsity. In this chapter, I argue that we cannot know or have evidence for 
whether the CP thesis is possibly false (and therefore false) by appealing to a 
conceivability argument. This is due to the lack of knowledge or evidence for whether 
the falsity (or necessary falsity) of CP is ideally conceivable. My discussion in this 
chapter is based on the arguments in Howell (2008) and Mizrahi & Morrow (2015). 
Chalmers establishes the CP thesis on the grounds that the counterexamples of 
Kripkean a posteriori necessities can be explained away within the framework of 2-D 
semantics. In other words, if Chalmers is right, then it is not easy to find a 
counterexample to CP anymore. As Howell puts it:  
The very statement of two-dimensionalism provides a recipe for creating one sort 
of counterexample: find a sentence that expresses a coherent scenario that does 
not have a primary intension that is true in any possible world. It is difficult to do 
this without begging any questions, so metaphysical two-dimensionalism can 
seem a safe bet.57  
However, some philosophers nevertheless regard the CP thesis as too strong to be true. 
According to Howell, there is an “overlooked strategy for developing a 
counterexample to metaphysical two-dimensionalism: find a sentence that expresses a 
coherent scenario, but that entails the falsity of metaphysical two-dimensionalism if 
either the primary intension or the secondary intension of the sentence is true in any 
metaphysically possible world.”58 It is this strategy that Howell (2008) and Mizrahi 
& Morrow (2015) adopt to attack CP. They construct several reductio arguments, 
each of which begins with a conceivability premise, which says that it is conceivable 
that CP fails (or that it is conceivable that CP fails necessarily). By the same CP thesis, 
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one can infer that it is possible that CP fails (or that it is possible that CP fails 
necessarily), from which it follows that CP fails. In other words, the CP thesis is 
proven to be self-defeating if any of these arguments are sound. In this chapter, I aim 
to examine these arguments. In my view, the problem with them is that their 
conceivability premises are not justified. I propose two possible ways in which one 
can provide a reason for these conceivability premises. However, I argue further that a 
move in either direction would render the reductio arguments themselves redundant. 
1. Howell’s Argument Against CP  
In his paper The Two-Dimensionalist Reductio, Howell argues against the idea 
that conceivability entails possibility. His original argument is presented as below: 
Argument 1 
1.  If metaphysical two-dimensionalism is true, the conceivability1 of a 
statement’s truth entails its possibility1. 
2.  SN is conceivable1. 
3.  If metaphysical two-dimensionalism is true, SN is possible1. 
4.  If SN’s primary and secondary intensions coincide, SN’s being possible1 
entails that SN is possible2. 
5.  SN’s primary and secondary intensions coincide. 
6.  If SN is possible2, SN is true. 
7.  If SN is true, metaphysical two-dimensionalism is false. 
8.  If metaphysical two-dimensionalism is true, it is false.59 
Before moving on, a few of the moves in the argument, as well as the terminology 
Howell uses, need to be clarified. Firstly, the notation used by Howell is different 
from that used by Chalmers. For example, Chalmers uses “1-conceivability” and 
“2-conceivability” to refer to primary conceivability and secondary conceivability. 
Accordingly, “1-possibility” and “2-possibility” respectively stand for primary 
possibility and secondary possibility. Howell, in his paper, however, uses 
“conceivability” and “possibility” with a subscript to refer to a particular kind of 
conceivability and possibility.  
Secondly, the key theses involved in Howell’s argument and the relations 
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between them require an explanation. The first thesis is metaphysical 
two-dimensionalism:  
(M2D)  The space of metaphysically possible worlds is not more limited than 
the space of conceivable worlds. 
The main idea of M2D is very close to that of modal monism, which says that the 
space of metaphysically possible worlds is not more limited than the space of 
logically possible worlds (that is, ideally conceivable worlds). The only difference is 
that the notion of conceivability in the formulation of M2D is not qualified as ideal. I 
put this point aside and return to it later.  
As has been addressed in Chapter 2, Kripkean a posteriori necessities pose a 
threat to the hypothesis that conceivability and possibility are co-extensive. But if we 
introduce 2-D semantics, we will find that conceivability and metaphysical possibility 
merely come apart at the level of statements. At the level of worlds, there are no 
counterexamples to the hypothesis that the space of conceivable worlds is 
co-extensive with the space of metaphysically possible worlds.60 In other words, 
within the framework of 2-D semantics, M2D remains intact. If M2D is true, then an 
entailment between conceivability and possibility can be established: 
(CEP)  For any proposition p, that it is conceivable that p entails that it is 
possible that p.  
CEP’ is an equivalent reformulation of CEP: 
(CEP’)  For any proposition p, necessarily, if it is conceivable that p, then it is 
possible that p. 
Accordingly, the main idea behind CEP and CEP’ is very close to that of the CP 
thesis, which follows from the truth of modal monism. The difference is that 
conceivability in the formulation of the CP thesis is ideal conceivability, whereas 
conceivability in the formulation of CEP or CEP’ is not qualified as ideal.  
SN is the negation of M2D: 
(SN)  The space of metaphysically possible worlds is more limited than the 
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space of conceivable worlds. 
From (SN), we can derive the negation of CEP and that of CEP’: 
(¬CEP)  For some proposition p, that it is conceivable that p does not entail 
that it is possible that p. 
(¬CEP’)   For some proposition p, possibly, it is conceivable that p and that it 
is not possible that p. 
Altogether, the relation between each of these theses is as follows: 
(1)  M2D, which says that the space of possible worlds is not more limited than 
that of conceivable worlds, entails the truth of CEP (or CEP’), which says 
that conceivability entails possibility:  
    (M2D) → (CEP) (or CEP’) 
    (2)  SN, which says that the space of possible worlds is more limited than that 
of conceivable worlds, entails the falsity of CEP (or CEP’):  
(SN) → (¬CEP) (or ¬CEP’) 
(3)  SN is equivalent to the negation of M2D: 
(M2D) ↔ (¬SN) 
From (1), (2) and (3), we can infer that SN is equivalent to the negation of CEP (or 
the negation of CEP’):  
(SN) ↔ (¬CEP) (or ¬CEP’) 
Thirdly, let us consider why SN’s being possibly true entails that it is true. Howell 
says: “since SN is a statement about the whole of logical space, however, it is a 
necessary truth if it is a truth at all. But if a necessary truth is true in any possible 
world, then it is true in all possible worlds and is therefore true in the actual world.”61 
However, I think we can expand on this. Howell’s statement may be easier to 
understand if we begin by considering the following question: Is CEP a thesis such 
that if it is possibly false, then it is false? The answer is “yes”. CEP is equivalent to 
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CEP’. If we take both the Barcan formula and the converse Barcan formula as 
plausible:  
(BF)  ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx 
(CBF)  □∀xFx→∀x□Fx 
We will conclude that CEP’ is equivalent to (CEP’’): 
(CEP’’)  Necessarily, for any proposition p, if it is conceivable that p, then it is 
possible that p.  
In S5, ◊¬□p→¬□p is a theorem. Thus, CEP’’, which is a necessity claim, is false if it 
is possibly false. Given that CEP’ and CEP’’ are equivalent, that CEP’ is possibly 
false entails that it is false. Given that CEP and CEP’ are equivalent, that CEP is 
possibly false entails that it is false. As a result, since SN is the negation of CEP, that 
SN is possibly true entails that it is true.  
Lastly, the primary intension and the secondary intension of each of the above 
theses coincide. In the previous chapters, I have shown that some statements have 
different primary and secondary intensions. For example, the primary intension and 
the secondary intension of the statement “water = H2O” come apart, because “which 
world is actual matters to the evaluation of necessary truths concerning water.”62 But 
unlike in the case of water, which world is actual does not matter to the evaluation of 
the necessary truths of SN or CEP. Thus, it is valid to infer that SN is 2-possible from 
the fact that it is 1-conceivable. This explains why Premises 4 and 5 hold. Given that 
there is no difference between 1-conceivability/possibility and 
2-conceivability/possibility in SN or CEP, for the sake of brevity, I use 
“conceivability” to refer to 1-conceivability and “possibility” to refer to 1-possibility. 
Altogether, I think that it is acceptable to replace SN with “that CEP fails” in 
Howell’s argument and that it will not undermine the idea of his argument if we 
simplify it as follows: 
Argument 2 
9.  It is conceivable that CEP fails. 
    10.   If CEP holds and it is conceivable that CEP fails, then it is possible that 
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CEP fails. 
11.  If it is possible that CEP fails, then CEP fails. 
Conclusion: If CEP holds, then CEP fails. 
Let us consider again what CEP says: 
(CEP)  For any proposition p, that it is conceivable that p entails that it is 
possible that p. 
It can be seen that in the formulation of CEP, Howell does not distinguish between 
positive and negative conceivability. Moreover, he refrains from qualifying the notion 
of conceivability as ideal. Given this, I think that he implicitly introduces another a 
kind of conceivability (other than INC or IPC) and incorporates this kind of 
conceivability in the formulation of CEP. I call this new kind of conceivability 
H-conceivability. Put differently, Howell does not intend to rebut CP− or CP+ but a 
different conceivability-to-possibility entailment, namely the one from 
H-conceivability to (metaphysical) possibility. I call this new entailment CPH. 
However, at the end of his paper, Howell also considers how Chalmers might respond 
if the conceivability involved in his argument is qualified as ideal. In view of this, I 
think that it is reasonable to read his argument in two ways. In the first way, we can 
read it as an argument against the thesis of CPH: 
(CPH)  For any proposition p, that it is H-conceivable that p entails that it is 
possible that p. 
Accordingly, we should reformulate his argument as follows: 
Argument 3 
9’.  It is H-conceivable that CPH fails. 
    10’.  If CPH holds and it is H-conceivable that CPH fails, then it is possible 
that CPH fails. 
11’. If it is possible that CPH fails, then CPH fails. 
Conclusion: If CPH holds, then CPH fails. 
In the second way, we can read his argument as a rebuttal of CP− or CP+: 
(CP−/CP+)  For any proposition p, that it is ideally (negatively/positively) 
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conceivable that p entails that it is possible that p.63 
Accordingly, the reductio argument against CP should be reformulated as follows: 
Argument 4 
9’’. It is ideally conceivable that CP fails. 
10’’.  If CP holds and it is ideally conceivable that CP fails, then it is possible 
that CP fails. 
11’’.  If it is possible that CP fails, then CP fails. 
Conclusion: If CP holds, then CP fails. 
I will first examine Argument 3, and then Argument 4.  
In Argument 3, Premise 10’ is plausible. By applying the general principle that 
H-conceivability entails possibility, we can infer that the failure of CPH is possible 
from the fact that the failure of CPH is H-conceivable. Premise 11’ is true if we 
presuppose S5. The CPH thesis, as an entailment, can be read as a necessity claim: 
(CPH’)  For any proposition p, necessarily, if it is H-conceivable that p, then it 
is possible that p. 
Given that the Barcan formula and the converse Barcan formula hold, CPH’ is 
equivalent to CPH’’: 
(CPH’’)  Necessarily, for any proposition p, if it is H-conceivable that p, then it 
is possible that p. 
In system S5, if a necessity claim is possibly true, then it is true (◊□p→□p); if it is 
possibly false, then it is false (◊¬□p→¬□p). Hence, in S5, that CPH’’ is possibly false 
entails that it is false. This conclusion also applies to CPH, since CPH and CPH’’ are 
equivalent. This is why Premise 11’ holds. Thus, the soundness of Argument 3 
depends highly on Premise 9’, which depends, in turn, on how H-conceivability is 
characterized.  
Another reason why it matters how H-conceivability is characterized is because 
it determines how CPH is spelled out. In order for a reductio argument to play a role 
in rebutting CPH, CPH has to be a thesis that is strong enough to preclude any obvious 
counterexamples. Otherwise, it is not necessary to argue against CPH by appealing to 
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a reductio argument. In his paper, Howell tries to convince us that Premise 9’ is true 
by arguing that the failure of CPH is conceivable in a strong sense. But I think that it is 
not clear that CPH, if formulated in terms of this “strong” conceivability, is strong 
enough to be immune to obvious counterexamples. In the following, I respond his 
argument by arguing that CPH is indeed not immune to obvious counterexamples. 
Before moving on, I first respond to Howell that it is not tenable to eliminate the 
qualification of ideal conceivability. Howell does not qualify his conceivability as 
ideal because he believes that this would lead to a circular definition: “Conceivability 
is ideal iff it tracks [metaphysical] possibility.”64 However, Chalmers is very careful 
to avoid the danger of circularity. He is aware that the link between conceivability and 
metaphysical possibility would be trivialized if the reasoning about conceivability 
were defined even in part as reasoning that tracks metaphysical possibility.65 As has 
been mentioned, there are two ways in which Chalmers defines ideal conceivability. 
For one thing, ideal conceivability is defined in terms of what is not ruled out a priori. 
For another, ideal conceivability is defined in terms of what is verified (or entailed) 
by a consistent set of propositions. In a word, Chalmers defines ideal conceivability 
by invoking the notions of apriority, coherence and verification, each of which is 
wholly grounded in rational concepts and does not presuppose metaphysical 
possibility. Because of this, “we have an entirely independent grounding for the 
notion [of ideal conceivability]”.66 Actually, in either way in which it is defined, ideal 
conceivability tracks logical possibility rather than metaphysical possibility. Thus, 
there is no danger of trivializing the link between ideal conceivability and 
metaphysical possibility. 
On the contrary, eliminating the qualification of ideal from the formulation of 
CPH may endanger Howell’s own program, because it is contentious whether the 
conceivability-to-possibility entailment thus formulated is immune to obvious 
counterexamples. Howell realizes that CPH will be too weak if H-conceivability is 
read as prima facie conceivability. p is prima facie conceivable for a subject iff she 
cannot rule out p a priori or iff she can construct a set of propositions that she regards 
as verifying p. According to this definition, both GC (Goldbach’s Conjecture) and 
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¬GC are prima facie conceivable for us. However, it cannot be the case that GC is 
both possibly true and possibly false.  
Howell then puts forward another kind of conceivability that he believes to be 
stronger than prima facie conceivability. He claims that it is conceivable in this 
stronger sense that this stronger kind of conceivability does not entail possibility. In 
defense of this claim, he invokes two possible scenarios constructed by Loar and 
McGinn, respectively. 
According to Loar, “phenomenal concepts are conceptually independent of 
physical-functional descriptions”.67 They are recognitional concepts, which pick out 
their referents through a direct process of recognition. Because of this, a phenomenal 
concept and a microphysical concept may “converge in their reference despite their 
cognitive independence”. 68  In other words, we may not know a priori that a 
phenomenal concept A and a physical concept B are co-extensive, although they are 
in fact so. Whether Loar is right is not my concern. But by citing Loar, Howell 
describes a situation in which we cannot realize a priori that the phenomenal concept 
A co-refers with the physical concept B. An identity claim is necessarily true if it is 
true. That we cannot know a priori that A = B means that we can negatively conceive 
that A ≠ B. Thus, in other words, by citing Loar, Howell actually provides a situation 
that we can conceive of and in which what we can conceive of (i.e., that A ≠ B) is 
necessarily false. That is to say, in the situation Howell describes, what we can 
conceive of does not entail possibility.  
McGinn provides a more radical view. He puts forward the idea of “cognitive 
closure”: “A type of mind M is cognitively closed with respect to a property P (or 
theory T) if and only if the concept-forming procedures at M’s disposal cannot extend 
to a grasp of P (or an understanding of T).”69 But whether M can cognitively access P 
is irrelevant to whether P exists. For example, that we cannot see some invisible part 
of a thing does not entail that the invisible part does not exist. By the same token, 
“cognitive closure with respect to P does not imply irrealism about P. That P is (as we 
might say) noumenal for M does not show that P does not occur in some naturalistic 
scientific theory T. It shows only that T is not cognitively accessible to M.”70 In view 
of this, McGinn establishes the following theses: “(i) there exists some property of the 
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brain that accounts naturalistically for consciousness; (ii) we are cognitively closed 
with respect to that property.”71 If McGinn is right, then it is conceivable that some 
phenomenal consciousness is not physical, although it is in fact necessarily physical. 
Whether or not McGinn is right is not relevant, either. But by citing McGinn, Howell 
describes a situation in which what we can conceive of (i.e., that phenomenal 
consciousness is not physical) is necessarily false.  
In these two situations, “what is possible has no necessary connection to what we 
can conceive, and our particular access to the facts allows us to conceive of situations 
that are in fact impossible.”72 Moreover, both these situations are something we can 
conceive of. Put differently, by citing Loar and McGinn, Howell describes two 
situations that we can conceive of and in which what we conceive of (i.e., that 
phenomenal concepts and scientific concepts do not co-refer; that phenomenal 
consciousness is not physical) is impossible. If this kind of conceivability, which 
Howell claims stronger than prima facie conceivability, can be taken as a candidate 
for H-conceivability, then indeed, it is H-conceivable that H-conceivability does not 
entail possibility.  
However, as far as I am concerned, the so-called “stronger” conceivability 
nevertheless depends on our cognitive capabilities and therefore suffers from our 
cognitive limitations. Due to our cognitive limitations, there is bound to be something 
that we can conceive of but that is not contradiction-free and that therefore fails to be 
metaphysically possible. Hence, CPH is not immune to obvious counterexamples if it 
is formulated by invoking this “stronger” conceivability. In this case, it is not 
necessary to resort to a reductio argument to refute CPH. As a result, Howell’s 
program is threatened.  
In order not to render a reductio argument redundant, it is probably best if we 
give up CPH and turn our attention to CP. In the following, I will turn my discussion 
to Argument 4: 
Argument 4 
9’’. It is ideally conceivable that CP fails. 
10’’.  If CP holds and it is ideally conceivable that CP fails, then it is possible 
that CP fails. 
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11’’.  If it is possible that CP fails, then CP fails. 
Conclusion: If CP holds, then CP fails. 
Since Premise 10’’ and 11’’ are true, and there are no obvious counterexamples to CP, 
the soundness of this argument hinges on its conceivability premise, i.e., Premise 9’’. 
Howell imagines several ways how Chalmers might object to this argument and 
responds to these possible objections in turn. First, according to Howell, to deny the 
conceivability premise of this argument, Chalmers might claim that “we cannot grasp 
it enough to form a robust conception of its truth or falsity.”73 In his view, Chalmers 
might analogize our conception of the falsity of CP to that of the truth of Goldbach’s 
conjecture (GC), because “in neither case do we really comprehend what it is for 
these propositions to be true”.74 Indeed, if we do not comprehend what it is for a 
given proposition to be true, then we should not presuppose that there is no 
contradiction involved in the assertion of this proposition; in other words, we should 
not presuppose what the proposition says is ideally conceivable. But if Chalmers 
defended his position by claiming that we do not really understand the conceivability 
premise, as Howell argues, then Chalmers would only provide a reason not to accept 
the premise — not, however, give a reason to reject it. In Howell’s view, it is not 
sufficient to avoid Argument 4 this way. 
On this point, I think Howell is mistaken in two respects. To begin with, he 
assumes that there is a burden of defense on Chalmers’ side that Chalmers does not 
have. In order to refute the reductio argument, Chalmers does not have to provide a 
reason against its conceivability premise since Howell fails to provide a reason for 
this premise. On the contrary, in order to defend his argument, it is Howell’s own 
burden to vindicate this premise.75 Furthermore, even if Howell did provide a reason 
for his conceivability premise, Chalmers would not have to reject this premise. What 
he would have to do is to reject the reason that Howell provides.  
Additionally, Chalmers does not react as Howell expects him to. In fact, 
Chalmers never admits that we cannot understand CP, but instead maintains that CP is 
a priori true. In his paper The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism, he 
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claims that he has an a priori argument to show that CP is true, which “involves 
locating the roots of our modal concepts in the rational domain”.76 He writes:  
    When one looks at the purposes to which modality is put  (e.g., in the first 
chapter of Lewis 1986), it is striking that many of these purposes are tied closely 
to the rational and the psychological: analyzing the contents of thoughts and the 
semantics of language, giving an account of counterfactual thought, and 
analyzing rational inference. It can be argued that for a concept of possibility and 
necessity to be truly useful in analyzing these domains, it must be a rational 
modal concept that is tied constitutively to consistency, rational inference, or 
conceivability.77  
If this argument is a priori and sound, the failure of CP is ruled out a priori. As a 
consequence, it is neither ideally negatively nor positively conceivable that CP fails, 
and therefore, the reductio argument can be avoided. As Howell points out, Chalmers’ 
argument is based on two premises: “1) ‘for a concept of possibility and necessity to 
be truly useful in analyzing’ the contents of thought, etc., ‘it must be a rational modal 
concept’ tying conceivability to possibility, and 2) the concept of possibility and 
necessity that should be used when doing metaphysics is such a concept of possibility 
and necessity.”78 If this argument is an a priori argument, both of its premises have to 
be a priori true. In other words, the negation of either of its premises should lead to a 
contradiction. But as Howell points out, Chalmers has not shown any contradiction. If 
either premise of Chalmers’ a priori argument is denied, what he shows at best is that 
“the final picture of modal discourse is unlovely”. 79  Because of this, Howell 
concludes that Chalmers fails to defend his position. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to evaluate Chalmers’ a priori argument or 
Howell’s response. Nevertheless, although Chalmers fails to demonstrate that CP is a 
priori true, Howell provides no evidence for the claim that CP is not a priori true, 
either. So why should one believe that it is ideally conceivable that CP fails？Once 
again, Howell seems to assume a burden of proof on Chalmers’ side. I think that it 
looks like this: 
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(BP)  If one holds that p, then the burden of proof is on one’s opponent to show 
that p is false; otherwise, p should be accepted.  
However, I do not think that this principle is reasonable. Say I claim that p is true. Say 
someone else, whom I call A, questions that claim. Assume further that I fail to 
provide a reason for accepting p. Plus, A does not provide a reason for rejecting p, 
either. In this case, according to BP, Howell would say that p should be accepted. 
However, we can also understand the case the other way around: A claims that p is 
false. I question this statement. A does not provide a reason for ¬p. I cannot provide a 
reason for rejecting ¬p, either. In this case, and by the same BP, Howell has to 
conclude that p should be denied, too. In other words, BP leads to a contradiction. 
Thus, it should be abandoned.  
As far as I am concerned, if one insists that p is true, it is one’s own burden to 
provide a reason for accepting p, even if one’s opponent cannot provide a reason 
against p. If there is neither sufficient reason for p nor against p, then p remains 
neither justifiably rejected nor accepted. In this case, it would be premature to 
conclude either that p should be accepted or that p should be denied. By the same 
token, not providing any reason to vindicate the conceivability premise, Howell is too 
hasty in concluding that his conceivability premise is true and that CP should be 
rejected. I will return to this point and consider how we can defend this premise later.  
2. Mizrahi & Morrow’s Arguments Against CP  
Unlike Howell, Mizrahi & Morrow follow Chalmers’ definition of conceivability. 
They distinguish between negative and positive conceivability, and qualify the 
relevant concepts as ideal. Moreover, they focus their discussion on IPC and CP+. In 
their paper Does Conceivability Entail Metaphysical Possibility?, they provide two 
arguments against CP+. I will examine them in turn.  
I reconstruct their first argument as below: 
Argument 5 
12.  It is ideally positively conceivable that CP+ is false. 
13. If CP+ is true, and if it is ideally positively conceivable that CP+ is false, 
then it is possible that CP+ is false.  
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14. If it is possible that CP+ is false, then it is necessarily possible that CP+ is 
false. (S5: ◊p→□◊p) 
15.  If it is necessarily possible that CP+ is false, then ideal positive 
conceivability is not conclusive evidence for possibility. 
16. If CP+ is true, then ideal positive conceivability is conclusive evidence for 
possibility.  
Conclusion: If CP+ is true, then ideal positive conceivability is and is not 
conclusive evidence for possibility. 80  
Premise 15 and 16 require an explanation. Let us consider Premise 16 first. That “p 
entails q” can be read as meaning that “necessarily, if p is true, then q is true.” “In 
other words, if p entails q, then p is conclusive evidence for q.”81 Accordingly, if 
ideal positive conceivability entails possibility, then the former is conclusive evidence 
for the latter. However, according to Mizrahi & Morrow, if it is “necessarily possible 
for ‘it is ideally, positively conceivable that p’ to be true and for ‘it is possible that p’ 
to be false”, this “means that ‘it is ideally, positively conceivable that p’ is not 
conclusive evidence for ‘it is possible that p’”.82 This is why Premise 15 holds.  
If Premise 15 is true, then the soundness of the argument depends highly on 
Premise 12: It is ideally positively conceivable that CP+ fails. A common way to 
show that it is ideally positively conceivable that p is to find another proposition q 
such that q entails p and q is coherent (i.e., contradiction-free). So in order to 
vindicate Premise 12, we have to provide a description that is coherent and that entails 
that CP+ fails. Mizrahi & Morrow resort to “intelligent beings with systematically 
distorted modal intuitions”.83 Due to their cognitive distortion, these intelligent 
beings “regard certain kinds of metaphysically impossible states of affairs to be 
possible, even after ideal rational reflection”.84 In other words, for some p that is 
necessarily false, these intelligent beings can conceive of what p says even after their 
ideal rational reflection.  
Either such an intelligent being is an ideal agent, whose rational reflection cannot 
be defeated by better reasoning, or it is not. If it is an ideal agent, then what it can 
conceive of tracks ideal positive conceivability. However, saying that what an ideal 
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agent can conceive of is not possible is equivalent to saying that ideal positive 
conceivability does not entail possibility. If this is the case, resorting to such an 
intelligent being cannot provide any justification for Premise 12. On the other hand, if 
this intelligent being is not an ideal agent, then what it can conceive of does not track 
ideal positive conceivability. In this case, Premise 12 is not vindicated, either. In other 
words, whether or not the intelligent being is an ideal agent, appealing to a (non-ideal 
or ideal) cognitive agent is not a promising way to vindicate the premise that the 
falsity of CP+ is ideally positively conceivable. Mizrahi & Morrow cannot provide 
any justification for Premise 12 in this way. 
However, Mizrahi & Morrow themselves have expected this objection. They 
argue that this objection reduces CP+ to a tautology, for it implies that “one has not 
successfully conceived of a state of affairs unless that state of affairs is genuinely 
metaphysically possible”. 85  However, just like Howell, Mizrahi & Morrow 
misunderstand what ideal conceivability is. Conceivability is qualified as ideal iff it 
tracks coherency or logical possibility, rather than metaphysical possibility. Thus, we 
can say that what a proposition says is ideally positively conceivable only if the 
proposition is genuinely logically possible. So the objection, in fact, does not reduce 
CP+ to a tautology.    
Mizrahi & Morrow’s second reductio argument hinges on the premise that CP’s 
necessary failure is ideally positively conceivable. I reformulate their argument as 
follows: 
Argument 6 
17.  It is ideally positively conceivable that it is necessary that CP+ fails. 
18.  If CP+ holds, and if it is ideally positively conceivable that it is necessary 
that CP+ fails, then it is possible that it is necessary that CP+ fails. 
19.  If it is possible that it is necessary that CP+ fails, then it is necessary that 
CP+ fails. (S5: ◊□p→□p) 
20.  If it is necessary that CP+ fails, then CP+ fails. 
Conclusion: If CP+ holds, then CP+ fails.   
To vindicate Premise 17, Mizrahi & Morrow resort to a Spinozistic deity. A 
Spinozistic deity is a being that makes “everything that happens in its world happen 
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necessarily”.86 Undoubtedly, this deity makes all propositions that are a posteriori 
true necessarily true. It follows that some propositions which are logically possible 
are rendered metaphysically impossible. Thus, the existence of a Spinozistic deity 
entails that CP+ fails (in the actual world).87 Once again, due to its nature of making 
all truths necessarily true, this Spinozistic deity makes CP+ fail in all possible worlds. 
That is to say, the existence of this Spinozistic deity entails that CP+ necessarily fails. 
However, whether the notion of such a deity is coherent remains to be answered. 
In addition, one can also construct a reductio argument against CP− by appealing 
to the ideal negative conceivability of the necessary failure of CP−: 
Argument 7 
21.  It is ideally negatively conceivable that it is necessary that CP− fails. 
22.  If CP− holds, and if it is ideally negatively conceivable that it is necessary 
that CP− fails, then it is possible that it is necessary that CP− fails. 
23.  If it is possible that it is necessary that CP− fails, then it is necessary that 
CP− fails. (S5: ◊□p→□p) 
24.  If it is necessary that CP− fails, then CP− fails. 
Conclusion: If CP− holds, then CP− fails.   
Again, to show that this argument is sound, one has to demonstrate that the necessary 
failure of CP− is coherent.  
Before moving on, I discuss a possible objection that Mizrahi & Morrow 
mention. They say: 
    Some might object to our argument by distinguishing between modal claims (e.g., 
‘it is possible that p’ and ‘necessarily p’, where p is a non-modal claim) and 
meta-modal claims (e.g., ‘it is possible that there are no other possible worlds’) 
and then argue that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ applies only to the former, not 
the latter.88 Our modal imaginations, on this view, are like telescopes that allow 
us to peer into other possible worlds. If we can ‘see’ some state of affairs in 
some possible world, then there must be some possible world in which that state 
of affairs exists. But we cannot, on this view, ‘zoom out’ our imaginative 
                                                
86 Mizrahi & Morrow (2015), p. 7. 
87 Since the existence of a Spinozistic deity entails that CP+ fails, the key premise of Mizrahi & Morrow’s first 
argument, i.e., Premise 12, can also be justified if the notion of a Spinozistic deity is coherent.   
88 Weak Modal Rationalism is the CP+ thesis.  
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telescopes to see the entire panoply of possible worlds at once. Thus, the 
rationale for treating conceivability as a guide to possibility would not apply to 
claims about the existence or non-existence of certain possible worlds.89 
To rephrase, according to Mizrahi & Morrow, the opponents of Argument 6 and 7 
may object to them by denying that the CP thesis applies to modal claims. According 
to them, our imaginations merely allow us to conceive of what happens in the actual 
world or in some possible worlds, but they do not allow us to conceive of what 
happens in all possible worlds. But by introducing a Spinozistic deity, which exists in 
the actual world, Mizrahi & Morrow respond that we only conceive that such a being 
(“whose attributes and actions are necessary”) exists in the actual world but do not 
conceive of what happens in other possible worlds.90  
I put aside Mizrahi & Morrow response here. As to the objection, I do not think 
it is reasonable. According to Mizrahi & Morrow, one may claim that CP does not 
apply to modal claims because we cannot “‘zoom out’ our imaginative telescopes to 
see the entire panoply of possible worlds at once”.91 Chalmers himself has similar 
concerns. He holds that all modal claims should be excluded from the scope of the CP 
thesis because it is difficult for us to conceive what happens in all possible worlds. 
However, I think that our capacity of imagination has nothing to do with the issue of 
whether a given proposition is ideally conceivable. To say that a proposition is ideally 
conceivable is to say that it is logically possible. Why should logical possibility be 
relevant to our capacity of imagination? So I do not think that a proposition’s being 
ideally conceivable requires that we can conceive of what it says. To know or have 
evidence that a proposition is ideally conceivable does not require that we can 
conceive of what it says, either. In view of this, the claim that the CP thesis does not 
apply to modal claims does not hold. I will return to this point and address it in more 
detail in Chapter 5.  
3. The Redundancy of the Reductio Arguments 
In Section 1, I have argued that Howell does not provide a reason for his 
conceivability premise, which says that it is ideally conceivable that CP fails. Mizrahi 
& Morrow’s arguments suffer from a similar problem. Their two reductio arguments 
                                                
89 Mizrahi & Morrow (2015), p. 8. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
  73 
one of which hinges on the claim that the failure of CP+ is ideally positively 
conceivable and the other of which hinges on the claim that the necessary failure of 
CP+ is ideally positively conceivable may be justified if the notion of a Spinozistic 
deity is coherent. However, Mizrahi & Morrow provide no reason for its coherence 
but rather take it for granted that “a Spinozistic deity is logically possible”.92 At the 
end of Section 2, I construct a reductio argument against CP−, which has the same 
form as Mizrahi & Morrow’s argument against CP+. This argument also calls for a 
vindication of its conceivability premise. In this section, I will consider how to 
demonstrate the coherency of the following three claims: 
(a)  CP (CP+ or CP−) fails. 
(b)  A Spinozistic deity exists. 
(c)  It is necessary that CP− fails. 
One might suggest that we are justified in believing that p is coherent if we cannot 
detect a contradiction in p. However, this is not true. We cannot detect any 
contradiction in either GC or ¬GC. If the fact that we cannot detect a contradiction in 
GC implies that we are justified in believing that GC is coherent, then the fact that we 
cannot detect a contradiction in ¬GC also has to be evidence for the belief that ¬GC is 
coherent. Thus, we have to accept that we are justified in believing that both GC and 
¬GC are coherent. But this conclusion is absurd. Hence, we cannot take the fact that 
we are unable to detect a contradiction in p as evidence for the claim that p is coherent. 
At best, we can say that the fact that we cannot detect a contradiction in p merely 
indicates that we do not have a reason to accept that p is incoherent. It does not 
indicate that we have a reason to accept that p is coherent. Consequently, proponents 
of the reductio arguments have to appeal to other methods to demonstrate that (a)-(c) 
are coherent. 
Below, I will propose two possible ways to defend the coherency of (a)-(c). 
These two ways are established in view of the equivalence of coherency and logical 
possibility: To say that a proposition is coherent is to say that it is logically possible. 
A proposition is logically possible iff it is not ruled out a priori. Hence, a proposition 
is coherent if either of the following conditions is met: First, its truth-value is a 
posteriori knowable (i.e., it is either a posteriori true or a posteriori false); second, it is 
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true (either a priori true or a posteriori true). Thus, (a)-(c) will be proved coherent if 
we can construct an independent argument to show that their truth-values are a 
posteriori knowable or that they are true.  
Presumably, however, the supporters of the reductio arguments would not like to 
do the latter, because the reductio arguments would be rendered redundant. Let us 
consider (a) first. If one has an independent argument that justifies one in believing 
that (a) is true, then one can claim that CP fails by invoking this new argument. In that 
case, why should one bother to construct a reductio argument? Argument 4, therefore, 
is redundant. As to (b), since the existence of a Spinozistic deity entails that CP+ fails, 
then if one can show that a Spinozistic deity exists, one can directly infer that CP+ 
fails from the fact that the Spinozistic deity exists. In this case, a reductio argument 
against CP+ is not necessary, either. By the same token, if one has another argument 
with the conclusion that CP− necessarily fails, then one can infer that CP− fails. One 
does not need to construct a reductio argument. Hence, if one can demonstrate that 
(a)-(c) are true, then no reductio arguments is needed anymore. 
The reductio arguments would also be rendered redundant if one decided for the 
first way. As I have already addressed in Section 1 of this chapter, if a reductio 
argument can play a role in defeating CP, then there should not be any obvious 
counterexamples to CP. Counterexamples arise if there is a proposition that is 
logically possible (i.e., ideally conceivable) but not metaphysically possible. Since 
saying that p is logically possible is to say that p is not ruled out a priori, a 
counterexample arises if there is a proposition that is not a priori false but necessarily 
false, or if there is a proposition that is not a priori true but necessarily true. In other 
words, a counterexample arises if there is a proposition that is necessarily true or 
necessarily false but whose truth-value is a posteriori knowable.93 That a proposition 
p is either necessarily true or necessarily false means that the following thesis holds 
for this proposition: If it is possible that p is true, then it is true; if it is possible that p 
is false, then it is false. So if we can find a proposition such that its truth-value is a 
posteriori knowable but its possible truth entails its truth and its possible falsity entails 
its falsity, then we can find a counterexample to CP. 
Let us consider (a)-(c) in turn. As has been addressed, the CP thesis, which is an 
entailment, is true if it is possibly true and false if it is possibly false. So if one can 
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do not pose a counterexample to CP but the former do.  
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show that the truth-value of the proposition “CP fails” is a posteriori knowable, one 
can find a counterexample to CP. By the same token, the proposition “it is necessary 
that CP− fails” is also a counterexample if its truth-value is a posteriori knowable. In 
these two cases, a reductio argument is not required.  
Let us consider why “a Spinozistic deity exists” is a proposition that is either 
necessarily true or necessarily false. The rationale goes like this: If such a deity exists 
in the actual world, it renders itself existent in all possible worlds due to its very 
nature of making every truth necessarily true. For the same reason, if it exists in any 
possible world other than the actual world, its existence in that world renders it 
existent in all possible worlds, including the actual world. So we come to the 
conclusion that the existence of a Spinozistic deity entails its necessary existence, and 
its possible existence entails its existence. Put differently, a Spinozistic deity is a 
being for which it is either necessary to exist or necessary not to exist. Hence, if one 
can show that the truth-value of the proposition “a Spinozistic deity exists” is a 
posteriori knowable, then one can rebut CP without invoking a reductio argument. 
Consequently, there is a dilemma for the reductio arguments: Either their soundness 
cannot be justified, or they are redundant.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore the reason for the dilemma. One 
factor that leads to the dilemma is that each of (a)-(c) is a proposition such that if it is 
possibly true, then it is true; and if it is possibly false, then it is false. For proponents 
of reductio arguments, they can consider this question: Are the truth-values of (a)-(c) 
a priori knowable or a posteriori knowable? We have good reasons to believe that 
they would deny that the truth-values of (a)-(c) are a posteriori knowable. In Chapter 
2, as has been said, the CP thesis is established on the basis of modal rationalism or 
modal monism: 
(MRp)  For any statement p, p is metaphysically possible iff p is not ruled out a 
priori. 
(MM)  The space of logically possible worlds is co-extensive with the space of 
metaphysically possible worlds.  
If one accepts CP, one has to accept that all propositions that are either necessarily 
true or necessarily false are either a priori true or a priori false. In other words, if one 
accepts CP, one has to accept that the truth-value of any necessary proposition is 
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knowable in an a priori way. So the proponents of the reductio arguments, who take 
the CP thesis as their premise, have to accept that the truth-values of (a)-(c) are a 
priori knowable. If they hold that the truth-values of (a)-(c) are a posteriori knowable 
for other reasons, they actually reject the CP thesis for the same reasons. In this case, 
a reductio argument is not needed.  
So in order not to render a reductio argument redundant, the only option for the 
proponents of those arguments is to accept that the truth-values of (a)-(c) are a priori 
knowable. But as has been argued in Chapter 3, we cannot know or have evidence for 
whether a given proposition is ideally conceivable without knowing or having 
evidence of its truth-value if its truth-value is a priori knowable. A typical example is 
the case of the Goldbach Conjecture (GC). As an a priori knowable proposition, GC is 
ideally conceivable iff it is true. Without knowing or having evidence for its 
truth-value, we cannot know or have evidence for whether it is ideally conceivable. 
By the same token, if the truth-values of (a)-(c) are a priori knowable, without 
knowing or having evidence for their truth-values, we are in no position to tell 
whether they are ideally conceivable. In this case, we cannot provide a justification 
for the soundness of the reductio arguments. As a result, no matter whether the 
truth-values of (a)-(c) are a posteriori or a priori knowable, it is hopeless to rebut CP 
by appealing to a reductio argument.  
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Chapter 5: Conceivability Arguments in the Debate of 
Physicalism Vs. Dualism 
In this Chapter, I discuss several conceivability arguments in the debate of 
physicalism vs. dualism. In Section 1, I outline the main ideas of three versions of 
physicalism and dualism: 
(1)  substance physicalism and substance dualism; 
(2)  type physicalism and type dualism; 
(3)  minimal physicalism  
Moreover, I explain in more detail the modal commitments of these views. In Section 
2, I discuss the conceivability arguments for or against each version of physicalism or 
dualism, such as: 
1. Descartes’ argument for substance dualism;  
2. Kripke’s modal argument against type physicalism;  
3. Chalmers’ zombie argument against minimal physicalism;  
4. the meta-modal argument for minimal physicalism.  
In Section 3, I argue that for each conceivability argument (except Chalmers’ zombie 
argument), we can construct an “inverted” argument that has the contrary conclusion 
of the original argument. I argue further that between a conceivability argument and 
its “inverted” counterpart, we cannot know or have evidence for which one is sound. 
It follows that we cannot determine whether physicalism is true by appealing to a 
conceivability argument. I present this problem in the form of a dilemma.  
In Section 4, I discuss Chalmers’ zombie argument. I argue that Chalmers does 
not provide sufficient justification for its first premise. As a result, it is not clear 
whether the zombie argument is sound. Therefore, we cannot determine whether 
minimal physicalism is false by resorting to this argument. In a word, none of the 
conceivability arguments can provide us with an answer to the question whether 
physicalism is true. 
1. Physicalism, Dualism and Their Modal Commitments 
Roughly speaking, physicalism is the thesis that only physical things exist, or 
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that everything is physical. In contrast, dualism is the view that over and above the 
physical things in the actual world, there are “mental” things. But what does “physical 
things” mean? What are “mental things”? Philosophers have provided different 
answers to these questions at different times. In what follows, I will outline the main 
ideas of three versions of physicalism and dualism. Moreover, I will argue that each 
view has its own modal commitment.  
1.1 Substance Physicalism and Substance Dualism 
According to substance monism, everything in the world is a substance of one 
kind. According to one form of substance monism, so-called “idealism”, all things in 
the world are constituted of mental stuff. For example, in Berkeley’s view, any object 
that we know is a collection of “ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as 
are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas 
formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely 
representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.”94 However, as the 
modern sciences developed, this view was confronted with a lot of explanatory 
problems and consequently received less advocacy than before. In this dissertation, I 
put aside the discussion about idealism. 
The other form of substance monism, so-called “substance physicalism”, holds 
that everything in the world is constituted of material stuff. In particular, according to 
substance physicalism, the mind of any human being, i.e., its capacity to perceive, 
will, doubt, reason, etc., is material stuff (or in other words, a material substance). 
Contrasting with this view, substance dualism holds that mind and body are two 
distinct entities.95 According to substance dualism, the mind of a person is a mental 
(or non-material) substance; the body of a person is a material substance. Every 
human being is composed of a mind and a body, that is, a mental substance and a 
material substance.  
Roughly speaking, a substance can be analogous to an individual. This is for two 
reasons: Firstly, any substance can exist independently of any other substances. Just 
as a mug can exist independently of a table and a table can exist independently of a 
                                                
94 Berkeley, G. (1948–1957). Vol., 2. p. 109. 
95 In this dissertation, I use “Cartesian dualism” and “substance dualism” interchangeably. Note, however, that 
there are other versions of substance dualism that should be distinguished from Cartesian dualism. For example, 
Lowe (2006) claims that any human being is a composite entity consisting of a body and another person. But he 
argues that this other person cannot be considered mental stuff.  
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mug, if one’s body and one’s mind are two separate substances, then they can exist 
without the existence of each other. Secondly, a substance instantiates properties. A 
mug can be red, round and light. Being red, round and light are properties of the mug. 
Our minds and bodies, as two different kinds of substances, instantiate different 
properties. As has been mentioned, our minds can perceive, will, doubt and reason, 
etc. Our bodies have weight, height and color, etc.  
There are various ways to formulate the commitments of substance physicalism 
and substance dualism. In the following, I discuss two formulations. According to the 
first, which resorts to the identity of mind and body, substance physicalism can be 
read as a thesis as follows: 
(T1)  My mind = my body. 
Correspondingly, substance dualism can be regarded as the negation of T1: 
(T2)  My mind ≠ my body. 
According to the second formulation, which is established in terms of the relation 
between a substance and its properties, substance physicalism can be regarded as a 
thesis as follows: 
(T3)  My mind is material. 
Correspondingly, substance dualism can be regarded as the negation of T3: 
(T4)  My mind is not material. 
Moreover, both substance physicalism and substance dualism have their modal 
commitments. Since there are two ways to characterize them, respectively, there are 
correspondingly two ways in which their modal commitments can be characterized.  
Before moving on, I presuppose T5 as a plausible premise.  
(T5)  If a = b, then it is necessary that a = b.96 
If “a” and “b” are both rigid designators, then this thesis is true. As Kripke argues, a 
rigid designator refers to the same thing throughout all possible worlds. Thus, if the 
referents of two rigid designators are identical in the actual world, they are identical in 
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all possible worlds.  
Furthermore, based on Kripke’s theory of rigid designators, we have good 
reasons to believe that if the referents of two rigid designators are not identical in the 
actual world, they are not identical in all possible worlds. So the following thesis, T6, 
is also plausible: 
(T6)  If a ≠ b, then it is necessary that a ≠ b. 
 “My mind” and “my body” are two rigid designators. “My mind” refers to my mind 
in the actual world, therefore, it refers to my mind in all possible worlds in which I 
exist. “My body” refers to my body in the actual world, therefore, it refers to my body 
in all possible worlds in which I exist. So if “my mind” and “my body” co-refer 
actually, they co-refer necessarily. That is to say, T7 is acceptable: 
(T7)  If my mind = my body, then it is necessary that my mind = my body. 
For the same reason, T8 should also be accepted: 
(T8)  If my mind ≠ my body, then it is necessary that my mind ≠ my body. 
Moreover, since substance physicalists hold that my mind and my body are identical, 
then based on T1 and T7, they have to accept T9: 
(T9)  It is necessary that my mind = my body.  
By the same token, since substance dualists hold that my mind and my body are not 
identical, then based on T2 and T8, they have to accept T10: 
(T10)  It is necessary that my mind ≠ my body. 
It follows that if it is possible that my mind = my body, then substance physicalism is 
true but substance dualism is false; and if it is possible that my mind ≠ my body, then 
substance dualism is true but substance physicalism is false.  
Another way to formulate the modal commitments of substance physicalism and 
dualism is to appeal to the notion of essential property. We can understand the 
distinction between an essential property and a non-essential property by help of the 
following example. Consider a mug. It is red. Yet, it could exist without being red. It 
could be blue, yellow, or any other color. We can thus say that being red is a 
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non-essential property of this mug. On the contrary, the mug, which has spatial 
extension, cannot exist without having spatial extension. Thus, we can say that having 
spatial extension is an essential property of this mug.  
Being material is an essential property for any thing if it is material. Plus, being 
non-material is an essential property for any thing if it is non-material. Thus, although 
it is to be determined whether or not my mind is material, at least one thing is clear: If 
my mind is material, then it is essentially material; if my mind is not material, then it 
is essentially non-material. Moreover, as is commonly accepted, the distinction 
between an essential property and a non-essential property can be understood in terms 
of modal terms: An essential property of a thing is a property that this thing has 
necessarily; a non-essential property of a thing is a property that this thing has 
contingently. Thus, we can accept the following two theses, T11 and T12:97 
(T11)  If my mind is material, then it is necessary that it is material.  
(T12)  If my mind is not material, then it is necessary that it is not material.  
Since substance physicalists hold T3, which says that my mind is material, they have 
to accept T13: 
(T13)  It is necessary that my mind is material. 
Since substance dualists hold T4, which says that my mind is not material, they have 
to accept T14: 
(T14)  It is necessary that my mind is not material. 
It follows that if it is possible that my mind is material, then substance physicalism is 
true but substance dualism is false; and if it is possible that my mind is not material, 
then substance dualism is true but substance physicalism is false.  
1.2 Type Physicalism and Type Dualism 
Over the course of the past few decades, the idea that a mind is a mental 
substance has encountered many explanatory problems and consequently plays a 
                                                
97 Some philosophers deny that the distinction between an essential property and a non-essential property can be 
characterized in terms of modal terms. For example, Fine argues that although it is necessary for the number 2 to 
be the member of the set {2}, being the member of {2} is not an essential property for the number 2. See Fine 
(1994). However, I will not discuss the difference between essentiality and necessity in this dissertation but 
assume that they are equivalent.  
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small role in contemporary discussion in philosophy of mind. For example, the fact 
that mind, as a mental substance, would exist in time but not in space, is considered 
incompatible with contemporary physics. Moreover, if minds are independent entities, 
then it seems impossible to know what happens in other persons’ minds.  
Type dualism, which is a logically weaker view, is immune to these problems. 
Type dualists hold that there is only one kind of stuff in the world. Moreover, they 
hold that there are two kinds of properties, that is, material properties and mental 
properties, exemplified by one kind of substance.98 That is to say, according to type 
dualists, it is not necessary to postulate two kinds of stuff. The fact that one’s mind 
can think and one’s body is spatially extended can be explained by appealing to one 
kind of stuff with two kinds of properties.  
But one problem that both substance dualism and type dualism have in common 
is that the interaction between mind and body (in other words, the correlations 
between physical states and mental states) cannot be fully explained. This problem is 
considered to be fatal to substance dualism: If a change can be caused in a physical 
thing, the change has to take place in physical space. However, mind, according to 
substance dualism, is not located in physical space. So the consequence of substance 
dualism is that a mind can have no causal effect on a body. The problem of interaction 
also poses a difficulty for type dualism: It seems impossible that a non-physical 
property can exert a causal effect on a physical property.  
In contrast with the view that there are two kinds of properties, type physicalists 
identify mental states with neural states.99 That is to say, type physicalism holds that 
for any kind of mental state, there is an identity with a certain kind of neural state. 
Philosophers believe this doctrine due to the observation that certain neural states of 
the brain and certain mental phenomena correlate with each other. For example, 
neuroscientists have observed that pain and C-fiber firing always occur at the same 
time: Every time one feels pain, one’s C-fiber is firing. How can we explain this 
correlation? One natural answer is that pain is identical with C-fiber firing. If these 
two states are in fact the same one, it is no mystery why they co-occur.  
So far, I have outlined the main ideas of type dualism and type physicalism. In 
the following, I will probe into the modal commitments that these theories have to 
hold. The following thesis is one of the commitments of type physicalism: 
                                                
98 For more details on type dualism, see Campbell (1984); Swinburne (1986); Strawson (1994); Chalmers (1996).  
99 For the idea of type physicalism, see Place (1956); Feigl (1967); Smart (1959). 
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(T15)  Pain = C-fiber firing 
Type dualists, who hold that mental states and neural states are two different kinds of 
properties, must deny T15. Rather, they would accept the negation of T15, i.e., T16:  
(T16)  Pain ≠ C-fiber firing. 
Moreover, “pain” and “C-fiber firing” are both rigid designators. As a result, if we 
follow Kripke, and if pain and C-fiber firing are identical in the actual world, then 
they are identical in all possible worlds. In other words, if Kripke is right, the 
following conditional is true: 
(T17)  If pain = C-fiber firing, then it is necessary that pain = C-fiber firing.  
For the same reason, the following conditional also holds: 
(T18)  If pain ≠ C-fiber firing, then it is necessary that pain ≠ C-fiber firing. 
If this is true, then based on T15 and T17, type physicalists have to accept T19, which is 
the modal commitment of type physicalism: 
    (T19)  It is necessary that pain = C-fiber firing.  
Based on T16 and T18, type dualists then have to accept T20, which is the modal 
commitment of type dualism: 
    (T20)  It is necessary that pain ≠ C-fiber firing.  
It follows that if it is possible that pain = C-fiber firing, then type physicalism is true 
but type dualism is false; if it is possible that pain ≠ C-fiber firing, then type dualism 
is true but type physicalism is false.  
1.3 Supervenience Physicalism as Minimal Physicalism  
Type physicalism is criticized for not allowing for the occurrence of one and the 
same mental state in other organisms whose nervous systems differ from ours. If pain 
is identical with C-fiber firing, according to type physicalism, it follows that an 
organism can only feel pain if it has C-fibers. In other words, according to type 
physicalism, some other species that have a nervous system different from ours 
cannot feel pain. However, this is rather counter-intuitive. It was this difficulty that 
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has led to a decline of type physicalism. Physicalists then turned to weaker forms of 
physicalism, such as functionalism. According to functionalism, a property 
exemplified in the actual world can be realized in different ways.100 Pain may be 
realized by C-fiber stimulation, but also by a radically different nervous system.  
Among all versions of physicalism, supervenience physicalism dubbed as 
“minimal physicalism” is the weakest form. 101  That is to say, supervenience 
physicalism is the view that anyone who calls herself a physicalist has to accept. The 
idea of supervenience can be illustrated with the following example: 
A dot-matrix picture has global properties — it is symmetrical, it is cluttered, 
and whatnot — and yet all there is to the picture is dots and non-dots at each 
point of the matrix. The global properties are nothing but patterns in the dots.102 
According to supervenience physicalism, all properties of the actual world are 
analogous to the global properties in the picture, and the microphysical properties of 
the actual world are analogous to the dots in the picture. If the patterns in the dots are 
fixed, the global properties in the picture are fixed. By the same token, if the 
distribution of the microphysical properties is fixed, the distribution of all the 
properties of the actual world is fixed. In other words, supervenience physicalism 
holds that any property of the actual world is necessitated by all microphysical 
properties of the actual world.103 According to this view, a microphysical duplicate of 
the actual world has to be a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world.  
Phenomenal properties, which are the qualitative aspects of our consciousness, 
are properties of the actual world. For example, when one experiences pain, there is 
something it is like to be in pain; when one is looking at a green leaf, there is 
something it is like to see the very green. If supervenience physicalism is true, it 
follows that phenomenal properties of the actual world are necessitated by all 
microphysical properties of the actual world. In other words, if a possible world is 
microphysically identical with the actual world, then it has to be phenomenally 
identical with the actual world. If we take P as the conjunction of all the 
                                                
100 For more detail on functionalism, see Putnam (1960); Armstrong (1968). 
101 Lewis (1983), p. 361.  
102 Lewis (1986), p. 14. 
103 In this dissertation, I assume that the supervenience view, which says that every property of the actual world 
supervenes on all microphysical properties, and the necessity view, which says that every property of the actual 
world is necessitated by all microphysical properties, are equivalent. For more about the equivalence, see Stoljar 
(2005), p. 116. 
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microphysical truths of our world, and Q as any arbitrary phenomenal truth of our 
world, then it seems that minimal physicalism requires that T21 be true.  
    (T21)  It is necessary that if P is true, then Q is true. (i.e., □ (P→Q))  
T21 is a rough formulation of minimal physicalism, which may face obvious 
counterexamples. For example, it is confronted with the so-called “epiphenomenal 
ectoplasm problem”.104 Consider a possible world W, in which the distribution of 
microphysical and phenomenal properties is the same as in the actual world with one 
difference: World W contains an extra epiphenomenal ectoplasm, which is a 
phenomenal property that has no causal interaction with other properties in W. We 
have a strong intuition that even if minimal physicalism is true, the existence of W is 
possible. That is to say, the truth of minimal physicalism and the existence of W as a 
possible world are compatible. However, if we take T21 as the true characterization of 
minimal physicalism and if we assume that minimal physicalism is true in the actual 
world, then we have to exclude W as a possible world: According to T21, if minimal 
physicalism is true in the actual world, then any possible world that is a microphysical 
duplicate of the actual world has to be a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. 
However, W, which is a microphysical duplicate of the actual world, is phenomenally 
different from the actual world, for it has an epiphenomenal ectoplasm — a property 
the actual world does not have. As a result, we have to eliminate W as a possible 
world, which is counter-intuitive.  
In order to preserve our intuition that W’s being a possible world and 
physicalism’s being true in the actual world are compatible, Jackson suggests that we 
adjust the formulation of minimal physicalism by introducing the notion of minimal 
physical duplicates. A minimal physical duplicate of the actual world is a world that is 
microphysically identical with the actual world and that contains nothing else.105 
Minimal physicalism, then, can be formulated as a thesis which says that any minimal 
microphysical duplicate of the actual world has to be a duplicate simpliciter of the 
actual world. In other words, if minimal physicalism is true, then any possible world 
in which P is true and in which there is no other fundamental truth besides what is 
expressed by P is a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. That is to say, minimal 
physicalism requires that T22, in which T stands for a “that is all” clause, be true.  
                                                
104 See Horgan (1983); Lewis (1983). 
105 See Jackson (1998), p. 26. 
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(T22)  It is necessary that if PT is true, then Q is true. (i.e., □ (PT→Q)) 
The epiphenomenal ectoplasm problem does not hold for T22: Since W, which 
contains an extra epiphenomenal ectoplasm, is not a PT-world, we do not have to rule 
it out as a possible world even if physicalism is true in the actual world.  
Contrary to supporters of minimal physicalism, dualists hold the opposite view, 
which can be formulated as T23:106 
(T23)  It is possible that PT∧¬Q. (◊ (PT∧¬Q)) 
So far, we have seen that each version of physicalism and dualism has its modal 
commitment, as listed below: 
The modal commitment of substance physicalism: 
(T9)  It is necessary that my body = my mind.  
or,  
(T13)  It is necessary that my mind is material. 
The modal commitment of substance dualism: 
(T10)  It is necessary that my mind ≠ my body. 
or,  
(T14)  It is necessary that my mind is not material. 
The modal commitment of type physicalism: 
(T19)  It is necessary that pain = C-fiber firing.   
The modal commitment of type dualism: 
    (T20)  It is necessary that pain ≠ C-fiber firing.  
The modal commitment of minimal physicalism: 
(T22)  □ (PT→Q) 
                                                
106 In order to distinguish the dualism which holds that ◊ (PT∧¬Q) from substance dualism and type dualism, I 
call this version of dualism “minimal dualism” in the following.  
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The modal commitment of minimal dualism: 
(T23)  ◊ (PT∧¬Q) 
In the following sections, I will discuss the conceivability arguments for or against 
each version of physicalism or dualism in turn.  
2. Conceivability Arguments 
Generally, a conceivability argument has the following structure: 
It is ideally (negatively/positively) conceivable that p. 
Ideal (negative/positive) conceivability entails possibility. (CP− or CP+) 
Conclusion: It is possible that p. 
Furthermore, if p in question is a proposition such that its being possibly true entails 
that it is true, then we can construct an alternative form of conceivability argument 
with the following structure: 
It is ideally (negatively/positively) conceivable that p. 
Ideal (negative/positive) conceivability entails possibility. (CP− or CP+) 
If it is possible that p is true, then p is true.  
Conclusion: p is true. 
In what follows, we will see that except Chalmers’ zombie argument, all the 
following conceivability arguments take the alternative form.  
1. Descartes’ arguments for substance dualism;  
2. Kripke’s modal argument against type physicalism;  
4. the meta-modal argument for minimal physicalism.  
In the remainder of this section, I will discuss these arguments in turn. In Section 3, I 
will argue that the soundness of each one cannot be known or justified. In Section 4, I 
will argue that the soundness of the zombie argument, the trouble with which is 
different from that with other conceivability arguments discussed in this chapter, 
cannot be known or justified, either.  
2.1 Descartes’ Conceivability Argument 
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Since there are two ways to formulate Descartes’ substance dualism, there are 
correspondingly two ways to reconstruct his argument for substance dualism. The 
first version of reconstruction that I use is due to Wilson. I simplify it as follows:  
1.  If A can exist apart from B, and vice versa, A is really distinct from B, and B 
from A. 
2. Whatever I can clearly and distinctly understand can be brought about by 
God. 
3.  If I can clearly and distinctly understand A apart from B, and B apart from A, 
then God can bring it about that A and B are apart. 
4. If God can bring it about that A and B are apart, then A and B can exist 
apart. 
5. Let A be my mind, and let B be my body. 
Conclusion: My mind exists apart from my body.107   
A few of the steps in the argument need to be clarified. Premise 1 says that if it is 
(metaphysically) possible that A and B are apart, then they are actually apart. Premise 
1 is in fact the contraposition of T5, which says that if a = b, then it is necessary that a 
= b, and the truth of which has been vindicated in Section 1. Let us now consider 
Premise 4 and 2. As Balog interprets, “the possibility of God’s bringing about 
something can be thought in terms of possibility simpliciter”, i.e., metaphysical 
possibility.108 Understood in this way, Premise 4 is actually a tautology: If it is 
(metaphysically) possible that A and B are apart, then it is (metaphysically) possible 
that A and B are apart. Thus, Premise 4 is redundant in this argument. Plus, Premise 2 
can be read as follows:  
(ICP)  Whatever I clearly distinctly conceive of is (metaphysically) possible.   
However, as has been argued in Chapter 2, that we can conceive of something does 
not entail possibility due to our cognitive limitations. We can conceive of a situation 
in which GC is false, but it is impossible for GC to be false. So if Premise 2 is read as 
ICP, then Descartes’ argument collapses. 
In order to interpret Descartes’ argument in a more charitable way, we can 
                                                
107 This is a simplified version of Wilson’s reconstruction. For her original reconstruction of Descartes’ argument, 
see Wilson (1978), p. 166.  
108 Balog (1998), p. 54. 
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interpret Premise 2 as the CP thesis since there are no obvious counterexamples to 
CP.  
(CP)  Ideal conceivability entails possibility.  
Putting all this together, Descartes’ argument can be reconstructed as follows:  
Argument 1 
6.  It is ideally conceivable that my mind ≠ my body. 
7.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
8.  If it is possible that my mind ≠ my body, then my mind ≠ my body.  
Conclusion: My mind ≠ my body.  
Another way to reformulate Descartes’s argument for substance dualism is as follows:  
    Argument 2 
    9.   It is ideally conceivable that my mind is not material. 
10.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility.  
11.  If it is possible that my mind is not material, then my mind is not material. 
Conclusion: My mind is not material.109 
Chalmers argues that these two arguments are not valid. Without doubt, the sense of 
conceivability involved in Premise 6 and 9 should be 1-conceivability, for 
2-conceivability is not always acquired a priori. So it is 1-conceivability that is our 
central concern and that plays a role in philosophical discussions. It is also clear that 
Premise 8 and 11 should be interpreted as involving 2-possibility. This is because it is 
2-possibility that characterizes what is metaphysically possible. Without giving any 
reason, however, Chalmers concludes quickly that the arguments are not valid 
because in each of them, the first premise involves 1-conceivability but the third 
premise involves 2-possibility.  
Indeed, as has been addressed in Chapter 2, 1-conceivability is not a guide to 
2-possibility. However, I have also argued that, it is valid to infer that a statement is 
2-possible from the fact that it is 1-conceivable if the primary and secondary intension 
of this statement coincide. So if Chalmers is right regarding Descartes’ arguments, he 
                                                
109 This version of reconstruction is due to Chalmers. See Chalmers (2010), p. 199. 
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needs the following premises: 
(a)  The primary and secondary intension of the statement “my mind ≠ my body” 
are different. 
(b)  The primary and secondary intension of the statement “my mind is not 
material” are different.  
However, it is contentious that (a) and (b) are true. In the case of water, the term 
“water” has two different intensions because there are two ways for us to know its 
referent. Firstly, we can know what water is by means of the meaning of “water”. 
Anyone who knows the meaning of “water” knows that water is watery stuff. So the 
knowledge that water is watery stuff is acquired a priori. Secondly, we can know what 
water is through its essence, which requires empirical evidence. Anything is regarded 
to be a sample of water iff it has the same microstructure as water. In other words, 
anything can be taken as a sample of water iff it is a sample of H2O. Thus, the 
primary and secondary intension of “water”, which reflect two different ways in 
which we know the referent of “water”, are different.  
But unlike in the case of water, there are not two different ways for us to know 
what “my mind” or “my body” refers to. If there is only one way to know the referent 
of the terms “my mind” and “my body”, then the primary and secondary intension of 
these two terms are the same, respectively. In fact, I am not sure whether Chalmers is 
right on this point. Either Chalmers is right, or he is wrong. If Chalmers is right, then 
Descartes’ argument fails. If he is wrong, then there is a chance that Descartes’ 
argument might be sound. However, I will argue in the next section that, even if 
Descartes’ argument is sound, we cannot know or have evidence for this. So in either 
case, whether or not substance dualism is true cannot be determined by appealing to 
Descartes’ conceivability argument.  
2.2 Kripke’s Modal Argument 
In Naming and Necessity, Kripke provides a modal argument against type 
physicalism, according to which pain is identical with C-fiber firing. As has been said 
in the last section, pain and C-fiber firing are necessarily identical if they are identical. 
So if it is possible that pain is not C-fiber firing, then pain is not C-fiber firing. At any 
rate, it seems possible that pain is not C-fiber firing. So if the apparent possibility is a 
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guide to the actual possibility, then we can conclude that pain is not C-fiber firing and 
rebut type physicalism. 
However, some statements seem possibly true, but this apparent possibility is not 
a guide to what is actually possible. For example, it seems that “heat might have 
turned out not to be molecular motion”, but it is not actually possible that heat is not 
molecular motion.110 Both of the terms “heat” and “molecular motion” refer rigidly. 
So if they refer to the same thing in the actual world, they co-refer in all possible 
worlds. This is why the apparent possibility that heat is not molecular motion is not an 
actual possibility.  
However, as Kripke argues, this apparent possibility can be “explained away”: 
When we say that it is possible that heat is not molecular motion, what is true in what 
we say is that we “could have sensed a phenomenon in the same way we sense heat, 
that is, [feel] it by means of its production of the sensation we call ‘the sensation of 
heat’ (call it ‘S’), even though that phenomenon was not molecular motion.”111 In 
other words, in the case of heat, what is actually possible is that the sensation of heat 
is not molecular motion. According to Kripke, from the fact that it is apparently 
possible that heat is not molecular motion, we can only infer that it is actually 
possible that the sensation of heat is not molecular motion, but we cannot infer that it 
is actually possible that heat (which is in fact molecular motion) is not molecular 
motion. However, the feeling that pain is not C-fiber firing cannot be explained away 
in this way, because the sensation of pain is pain itself. So according to Kripke, if it is 
apparently possible that pain is not C-fiber firing, then it is actually possible that pain 
and C-fiber firing are not identical.  
If we interpret the notion of apparent possibility as 1-conceivability, then we can 
rephrase Kripke’s reasoning within the framework of Chalmers’ 2-D semantics. In the 
case of heat, from the fact that it is 1-conceivable that heat is not molecular motion, 
we can only infer that it is 1-possible that heat is not molecular motion, but we cannot 
infer that it is 2-possible that heat is not molecular motion. However, in the case of 
pain and C-fiber, the primary intension and secondary intension of “pain” are the 
same, so if it is 1-conceivable that pain is not C-fiber firing, then it is 2-possible that 
pain is not C-fiber firing.  
As has been addressed in Chapter 2, only ideal conceivability is a guide to 
                                                
110 Kripke (1980), p. 150. 
111 Ibid. 
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possibility. Thus, in the framework of Chalmers’ theory of conceivability and 
possibility, Kripke’s argument against type physicalism can be reconstructed as 
follows: 
Argument 3 
12.  It is ideally conceivable that pain ≠ C-fiber firing. 
13.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
14.  If it is possible that pain ≠ C-fiber firing, then pain ≠ C-fiber firing.  
    Conclusion: Pain ≠ C-fiber firing.112 
2.3 Chalmers’ Zombie Argument 
In his book The Conscious Mind, Chalmers advances a zombie argument against 
minimal physicalism. As Chalmers puts it, the basic idea of this argument is as 
follows:  
If a physically identical zombie world is logically possible, it follows that the 
presence of consciousness is an extra fact about our world, not guaranteed by the 
physical facts alone. The character of our world is not exhausted by the character 
supplied by the physical facts; there is extra character due to the presence of 
consciousness… The failure of logical supervenience implies that some positive 
fact about our world does not hold in a physically identical world, so that it is a 
further fact over and above the physical facts... [Materialism is] the doctrine that 
the physical facts about the world exhaust all the facts, in that every positive fact 
is entailed by the physical facts. If zombie worlds or inverted worlds are possible, 
the physical facts do not entail all the positive facts about our world, and 
materialism is false.113 
A zombie world is a microphysical duplicate of the actual world but lacks 
phenomenal consciousness. If we take P as a conjunction of all the microphysical 
truths of the actual world, and T as a “that is all” clause and Q as any phenomenal 
truth of the actual world, then a world W is a zombie world iff PT∧¬Q is true in W. 
If a zombie world is ideally conceivable (i.e., logically possible), this means that it is 
                                                
112 This reconstruction is due to Chalmers. See Chalmers (2010), p. 201. 
113 Chalmers (2006), pp. 123-124. Note that “materialism” in this passage refers to minimal physicalism. 
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ideally conceivable that PT∧¬Q. Moreover, since ideal conceivability entails 
possibility, we can infer that it is possible that PT∧¬Q from the fact that it is ideally 
conceivable that PT∧¬Q. As has been said in Section 1, the truth of minimal 
physicalism requires that □ (PT→Q) be true. Thus, if it is ideally conceivable that 
PT∧¬Q, and if CP holds, then minimal physicalism is false.  
The zombie argument runs as follows: 
Argument 4 
15.  It is ideally conceivable that PT∧¬Q. 
16.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
Conclusion: It is possible that PT∧¬Q. 
2.4 The Anti-Zombie Argument 
Some philosophers respond to Chalmers’ zombie argument by appealing to the 
anti-zombie argument, which has the conclusion that □ (PT→Q) is true. 114 
Anti-zombies are defined “as beings which are bare physical duplicates of us, 
inhabiting a universe which is a bare physical duplicate of ours, but none the less 
having exactly the same conscious experiences as we do. That is, in the anti-zombie 
world consciousness is a physical phenomenon, supervening metaphysically on the 
world’s microphysical features.”115 If anti-zombies exist, this means that □ (PT→Q) 
is true. Naturally, we do not know whether anti-zombies exist. Nevertheless, the 
anti-zombists argue that the existence of anti-zombies is ideally conceivable, therefore 
possible. Furthermore, they argue that the possibility of the existence of anti-zombies 
entails that dualists’ criticism of minimal physicalism cannot hold. It is not difficult to 
see why: If anti-zombies exist in a possible world, this means that □ (PT→Q) is 
possibly true. Since for any p, ◊□p→□p is true in system S5, □ (PT→Q) is true if it is 
possibly true.  
So the anti-zombie argument runs as follows: 
Argument 5 
17.  It is ideally conceivable that □ (PT→Q). 
                                                
114 See Marton (1998); Sturgeon (2000); Frankish (2007); Brown (2010) 
115 Frankish (2007), p. 653. 
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18.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
19.  If it is possible that it is necessary that p, then it is necessary that p. (S5: 
◊□p→□p) 
Conclusion: □ (PT→Q) is true. 
3. The “Inverted” Conceivability Arguments 
In the last section, I have presented five conceivability arguments for or against 
each version of physicalism or dualism. In this section, I will argue that for each 
conceivability argument except Chalmers’ zombie argument, we can construct an 
“inverted” argument that has the contrary conclusion of the original one.  
The “inverted” argument of Descartes’ argument reconstructed in the first of the 
two ways described above runs as follows: 
Argument 1’ 
6’.  It is ideally conceivable that my mind = my body. 
7’.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
8’.  If it is possible that my mind = my body, then my mind = my body.  
Conclusion: My mind = my body.  
The “inverted” argument of Descartes’ argument reconstructed in the second of the 
two ways described above runs as follows: 
    Argument 2’ 
    9’.   It is ideally conceivable that my mind is material. 
10’.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility.  
11’.  If it is possible that my mind is material, then my mind is material. 
Conclusion: My mind is material. 
The “inverted” argument of Kripke’s argument can be constructed as follows: 
Argument 3’ 
12’.  It is ideally conceivable that pain = C-fiber firing. 
13’.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
14’. If it is possible that pain = C-fiber firing, then pain = C-fiber firing. 
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    Conclusion: Pain = C-fiber firing. 
The “inverted” argument of the anti-zombie argument can be constructed as follows: 
Argument 5’ 
17’.  It is ideally conceivable that ¬□ (PT→Q). 
18’.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
19’.  If it is possible that it is necessary that ¬p, then it is necessary that ¬p. (S5: 
◊¬□q→¬□q) 
Conclusion: ¬□ (PT→Q) (i.e., ◊ (PT∧¬Q)) is true.116 
Here is a reason for why some conceivability arguments have their “inverted” 
counterparts: If p is a proposition such that its being possibly true entails that it is true 
and its being possibly false entails that it is false, then we can construct a pair of 
parallel conceivability arguments which have contrary conclusions. A conceivability 
argument has the following structure: 
C1.  It is ideally conceivable that p. 
C2.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
C3.  If it is possible that p is true, then p is true.  
Conclusion: p is true. 
Its “inverted” counterpart has the following structure: 
I1.  It is ideally conceivable that ¬p. 
I2.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
I3.  If it is possible that ¬p is true, then ¬p is true.  
Conclusion: ¬p is true. 
These two arguments cannot both be sound, otherwise we have to accept the 
conclusion that p is both true and false, which is absurd. It follows that if the CP 
thesis holds, then between C1 and I1, only one is true, but the other is not. The 
proponents of conceivability arguments, who believe that we can make the right 
decision between dualism and physicalism by appealing to a conceivability argument, 
                                                
116 It can be seen that the “inverted” argument of the anti-zombie argument has the same conclusion as the zombie 
argument, but the premises and the structure are different.  
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have to tell the sound one from the unsound one. That is to say, it is their duty to 
single out the true proposition between C1 and I1. However, I do not think they are 
able to do this. In the following, I will argue that there is a dilemma when we try to 
single out the sound conceivability argument from its “inverted” counterpart.    
As has been addressed at the end of Chapter 2, if p is a proposition such that if it 
is possibly true, then it is true and if it is possibly false, then it is false, and if the CP 
thesis holds, then the truth-value of p is a priori knowable. Moreover, according to the 
definition of ideal negative conceivability (INC), which says that p is ideally 
negatively conceivable iff p is not ruled out a priori, we can conclude that for any p 
whose truth-value is a priori knowable, it is ideally negatively conceivable iff it is true. 
Since by definition, INC and IPC (ideal positive conceivability) are equivalent, if p’s 
truth-value is a priori knowable, p is ideally positively conceivable iff p is true. In a 
word, if p’s truth-value is a priori knowable, p is ideally conceivable iff p is true. Put 
differently, if p’s truth-value is a priori knowable, then between p and ¬p, the one 
which is true is ideally conceivable, but the other one is not.  
Let us now consider this question: If p’s truth-value is a priori knowable, 
between p and ¬p, can we know or have evidence for which one is ideally 
conceivable? Assume that we can. In order to tell the conceivable one from the 
inconceivable one, we have to appeal to an independent argument. Let us assume that 
this argument provides a reason for accepting that p is ideally negatively conceivable. 
It follows that ¬p is demonstrated to be inconceivable, that is, a priori false. In other 
words, this argument actually shows that p is a priori true and therefore true. By the 
same token, if the independent argument shows that ¬p is ideally negatively 
conceivable, it actually shows that ¬p is true. Thus, if p’s truth-value is a priori 
knowable, it is necessary that one provides an argument to determine the truth-value 
of p in order to tell whether p is ideally negatively conceivable. However, if we can 
know or have evidence for whether p is true by appealing to this argument, why do 
we need to invoke a conceivability argument? In this case, a conceivability argument 
is rendered redundant. On the other hand, without such an independent argument, we 
have no idea as to whether p is ideally negatively conceivable. Thus, there is a 
dilemma for CP– when we use it to determine whether a given proposition is possibly 
true if the truth-value of this proposition is a priori knowable. 
We face the same dilemma if we turn to CP+. INC and IPC are equivalent by 
definition. Hence, if we invoke another argument to determine which one, p or ¬p, is 
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ideally positively conceivable, it should suffice to demonstrate which one is ideally 
negatively conceivable. Thus, the same dilemma with CP– also holds for CP+: Either 
this additional argument renders a conceivability argument redundant, or the 
soundness of this conceivability argument cannot be justified.117  
4. The Problem with the Zombie Argument 
The structure of the zombie argument is different from other conceivability 
arguments discussed in this chapter. Some philosophers hold that the anti-zombie 
argument is the “inverted” counterpart of the zombie argument, but I do not think 
so.118 The zombie argument and the anti-zombie argument do have a contrary 
conclusion to each other, but their structures are different. I have argued that there is a 
condition for a conceivability argument to have an “inverted” counterpart: The 
proposition p, which is involved in a conceivability premise, has to be a proposition 
such that if it is possibly true, then it is true and if it is possibly false, then it is false. 
The anti-zombie argument meets this requirement because ◊□ (PT→Q)→□ (PT→Q) 
and ◊¬□ (PT→Q)→¬□ (PT→Q) hold. But we cannot determine whether it is the case 
that PT∧¬Q entails □ (PT∧¬Q); nor whether it is the case that PT→Q entails □ 
(PT→Q). Because of this, we cannot construct an “inverted” argument for the zombie 
argument. So the problem with other conceivability arguments discussed in this 
chapter does not hold for the zombie argument. The problem (if indeed there is one) 
with it must be another one. 
Now let us consider the zombie argument. If the CP thesis holds, then its 
soundness depends on its conceivability premise:  
15.  It is ideally conceivable that PT∧¬Q. 
According to the definition of INC, Premise 15 is true iff PT∧¬Q is not a priori false. 
In other words, Premise 15 is true iff PT∧¬Q is a priori true or the truth-value of 
PT∧¬Q is a posteriori knowable. As has been mentioned, Q is a phenomenal truth of 
the actual world, so ¬Q is false. Therefore, PT∧¬Q is false. Thus, PT∧¬Q is ideally 
                                                
117 At the end of Chapter 3, my discussion has indicated this dilemma. I said: “If p is a proposition such that if it is 
possibly true, then it is true; and if it is possibly false, then it is false, then we cannot know or have evidence for 
whether p is ideally conceivable without knowing or having evidence of its truth-value.” 
118 See Frankish (2007); Brown (2010). 
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negatively conceivable iff PT∧¬Q is a posteriori false. So in order to show that the 
zombie argument is sound, we have to appeal to an independent argument that 
provides a reason for accepting that PT∧¬Q is a posteriori knowable.  
How, then, can we show that PT∧¬Q is a posteriori knowable? The only 
evidence that Chalmers provides is that we cannot deduce a priori that Q is true from 
the fact that PT is true. For example, in his paper Consciousness and Its Place in 
Nature, Chalmers argues that Type A physicalists fail to provide an argument for the 
claim that PT entails Q a priori. Type A physicalism is the thesis that PT→Q is a 
priori true (So Type A physicalists deny that it is ideally conceivable that PT∧¬Q). 
Chalmers considers several approaches that type A physicalists might adopt in order 
to defend their position. For example, he says:  
One way to argue for type-A materialism is to argue that there is some 
intermediate X such that (i) explaining functions suffices to explain X and (ii) 
explaining X suffices to explain consciousness.119 
If there is an intermediate X such that it itself can be fully explained in terms of the 
language of physics and it can fully explain phenomenal consciousness, it follows that 
phenomenal consciousness can be fully explained in terms of the language of physics. 
In this case, PT→Q is a priori true because we can deduce Q a priori from PT. But as 
Chalmers puts it, the problem with this approach is obvious: Either X is itself a 
functional property, which can be fully explained in terms of the language of physics, 
or X itself is a non-functional property, which cannot be fully explained in terms of 
the language of physics. In the former case, (ii) is not satisfied; in the latter case, (i) is 
not satisfied. Hence, Chalmers concludes, “either way, the epistemic gap between the 
functional and the phenomenal remains as wide as ever”.120 
If Chalmers is right, then indeed Type-A physicalists cannot defend their 
position. But is it sufficient to conclude that PT∧¬Q is a posteriori knowable? I do 
not think so. It does not follow that p’s truth-value is not a priori knowable from the 
mere fact that we cannot know a priori that p. The fact that we cannot deduce that GC 
is true from all the mathematical theorems that available to us does not entail that GC 
is a posteriori knowable. By the same token, from the fact that we fail to show that 
                                                
119 Chalmers (2002), p. 252. 
120 Chalmers (2002), p. 253. 
  99 
PT→Q is a priori true, we cannot conclude that PT→Q is a posteriori knowable. So it 
remains to be determined whether or not it is ideally conceivable that PT→Q. In this 
case, it is to be determined whether or not the zombie argument is sound.121  
At the end of this chapter, let me briefly summarize my findings. I discuss a 
series of conceivability arguments in the debate of physicalism vs. dualism. Unlike 
many other opponents of these conceivability arguments, who typically respond to 
them by denying that their conceivability premises are true or that the CP thesis holds, 
I adopt a different strategy. I assume that the CP thesis holds. Based on this 
assumption, I argue that we cannot know or have evidence for whether the 
conceivability premises of these arguments are true. In other words, I argue that we 
cannot tell the soundness of these arguments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
121 This conclusion has also been indicated at the end of Chapter 3, where I said that if p is a proposition such that 
we know p is false but we do not know whether the truth-value of p is a posteriori knowable, we cannot know or 
have evidence for whether p is ideally conceivable.   
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Chapter 6: The Problem with Meta-Modal Conceivability 
Arguments 
In this chapter, I discuss a kind of conceivability argument that is called 
“meta-modal conceivability argument”. In the last Chapter, I have argued that if p is 
ideally conceivable, then by resorting to the CP thesis, we can construct a 
conceivability argument and conclude that p is possibly true. The conceivability 
premise of a meta-modal conceivability argument is a modal claim which can be 
written as, for example, □q. Then, by appealing to the CP thesis, we can construct a 
meta-modal conceivability argument and conclude that □q is possibly true, and 
therefore true (since ◊□q→□q is a theorem in S5).  
However, there is an apparent problem with meta-modal conceivability 
arguments: By replacing “□q” with “¬□q” in the conceivability premise, a 
meta-modal conceivability argument can always be “inverted” to a parallel argument 
with the contrary conclusion (since ◊¬□q→¬□q also holds in S5). This seems a result 
that we are reluctant to accept. Because of this, opponents of CP, such as Yablo, claim 
that it is the failure of the CP thesis that leads to the problem. Chalmers refuses this 
diagnosis. He responds that the problem is caused by double modality and proposes to 
exclude all modal claims from the scope of CP. In this chapter, I respond to both sides 
and argue that they miss the real problem of meta-modal conceivability arguments 
that is hidden beneath the apparent one and draw their conclusions too hastily. 
Moreover, I present this problem in the form of a dilemma.  
1. Meta-Modal Conceivability Arguments  
The structure of a general conceivability argument is as follows: 
It is ideally conceivable that p. 
Ideal conceivability entails possibility.  
Conclusion: It is possible that p. 
If a proposition p involved in the conceivability premise is itself a modal claim that is 
written as, for example, □q, and if we take S5 as the logic of metaphysical modality, 
then we can construct a conceivability argument that takes the meta-modal form. This 
kind of conceivability argument, which has the following structure, is called 
  101 
meta-modal conceivability argument: 
It is ideally conceivable that □q. 
Ideal conceivability entails possibility.  
If it is possible that □q, then □q is true. (S5: ◊□q→□q) 
Conclusion: □q is true. 
However, a meta-modal conceivability argument can always be “inverted” to produce 
an argument that runs contrary to the original argument. The structure of the “inverted” 
counterpart is as follows:  
It is ideally conceivable that ¬□q. 
Ideal conceivability entails possibility.  
If it is possible that ¬□q, then ¬□q is true. (S5: ◊¬□q→¬□q) 
Conclusion: ¬□q is true. 
That is to say, to “invert” a meta-modal conceivability argument, we first replace □q 
with ¬□q in the conceivability premise. Next, by the CP thesis and the theorem 
◊¬□p→¬□p in S5, we can infer that ¬□q is true. In a word, by appealing to CP, a 
proposition □q can be proven both true and false. However, this is an unacceptable 
consequence. 
Below are two examples. The first one is the meta-modal conceivability 
argument for theism. The second one is the meta-modal conceivability argument for 
physicalism. I will discuss them in turn. The first conceivability argument is 
established on the basis of Plantinga’s modal argument for the existence of God, 
which appeals to the possible existence of a necessary being that is omniscient, 
omnipotent, and morally perfect. God, by definition, is a maximally excellent being. 
A being that has maximal excellence has two features. For one thing, as is generally 
accepted, a maximally excellent being possesses “omniscience, omnipotence, and 
moral perfection”.122 For another, according to Plantinga, a necessary being is greater 
than a mere actual being. Thus, necessary existence is a great-making property. To 
this point, Chalmers says:  
    Consider a pair of beings A and B that both do in fact exist. And suppose that A 
exists in every other possible world as well — that is, if any other possible world 
                                                
122 Plantinga (1974b), p. 213.  
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has been actual, A would have existed. On the other hand, B exists in only some 
possible worlds; there are worlds W such that had any of them been actual, B 
would not have existed. Now according to the doctrine under consideration, A is 
so far greater than B.123 
Therefore, if God exists, this means that it is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, 
and morally perfect being exists. Naturally, it is not clear whether such a being 
actually exists. However, at least, it seems possible that this being exists. This 
intuition contributes to the key premise of Plantinga’s modal argument for the 
existence of God: It is possible that it is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and 
morally perfect being exists. 
Altogether, Plantinga’s modal argument runs as follows: 
1.  It is possible that it is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally 
perfect being exists. 
2.  If it is possible that it is necessary that p, then it is necessary that p. (S5: 
◊□q→□q) 
Conclusion: It is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect 
being exists.  
Why is Premise 1 true? Plantinga does not provide a convincing reason but takes its 
truth for granted. As van Inwagen interprets, Plantinga’s idea would be like this: 
“while it is true that one who rejected the premise of P would not thereby violate any 
canon of reason, neither would one who accepted the premise of P violate any canon 
of reason.”124 However, if we do not violate any canon of reason even if we deny 
Premise 1, why should we accept, rather than deny it? So without providing any 
reason for this premise, the soundness of Plantinga’s argument is to be determined.  
Nevertheless, we can find some hints from Plantinga’s discourse on Anselm’s 
ontological argument: 
    And when he says that a certain state of affairs is conceivable, he means to say, I 
believe, that this state of affairs is possible in our broadly logical sense; there is a 
possible world in which it obtains. That means that step (3) (which says God’s 
existence in reality is conceivable) above may be put more perspicuously as  
                                                
123 Plantinga (1974a), pp. 104-105. 
124 P stands for Plantinga’s modal argument. See van Inwagen (1977), p. 388. 
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    (3’)  It is possible that God exists. 
    and step (6) as 
    (6’)  It is possible that there be a being greater than the being than which it is 
not possible that there be a greater.125 
According to this passage, it can be seen that Plantinga takes conceivability as 
equivalent to possibility. Thus, if it is conceivable that it is necessary that an 
omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being exists, and if conceivability and 
possibility are equivalent, then Premise 1 is true. Moreover, as has been mentioned, 
there are two kinds of conceivability: prima facie conceivability and ideal 
conceivability. The latter kind is a reliable guide to possibility but the former is not. 
So if to provide a justification for Premise 1 requires invoking the notion of 
conceivability, this kind of conceivability must be ideal conceivability.  
Taking into account the idea that ideal conceivability entails possibility, we can 
construct a meta-modal conceivability argument for the existence of God on the basis 
of Plantinga’s ontological argument:  
3.  It is ideally conceivable that it is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, 
and morally perfect being exists. 
4.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility.  
5.  If it is possible that it is necessary that p, then it is necessary that p. (S5: 
◊□p→□p) 
    Conclusion: It is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect 
being exists.  
However, as some philosophers, such as Yablo, point out, we can construct an 
“inverted” version of this conceivability argument. The “inverted” argument runs as 
follows: 
3’. It is ideally conceivable that it is not necessary that an omniscient, 
omnipotent, and morally perfect being exists. 
4’.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility.  
5’.  If it is possible that it is not necessary that p, then it is not necessary that p. 
                                                
125 Plantinga (1974a), p. 88. 
  104 
(S5: ◊¬□p→¬□p) 
    Conclusion: It is not necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally 
perfect being exists.126  
In a word, by constructing a meta-modal conceivability argument and its “inverted” 
counterpart, we can conclude that God both does and does not exist.  
Now we consider the second meta-modal argument, which I have already 
discussed in Chapter 5. Chalmers provides the zombie argument against minimal 
physicalism, which depends on the premise that PT∧¬Q is ideally conceivable and 
has the conclusion that PT∧¬Q is possible. In order to rebut the zombie argument, 
some philosophers construct the anti-zombie argument, which depends on the premise 
that □ (PT→Q) is ideally conceivable and has the conclusion that □ (PT→Q) is true. 
The anti-zombie argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
6.  It is ideally conceivable that □ (PT→Q). 
7.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
8.  If it is possible that it is necessary that p, then it is necessary that p. (S5: 
◊□p→□p) 
Conclusion: □ (PT→Q) is true. 
One may hold that the zombie argument is the “inverted” counterpart of the 
anti-zombie argument, but it is not.127 The anti-zombie argument has a meta-modal 
form, but the zombie argument does not. Rather, the “inverted” counterpart of the 
anti-zombie argument is the following one: 
6’.  It is ideally conceivable that ¬□ (PT→Q). 
7’.  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
8’.  If it is possible that it is not necessary that p, then it is not necessary that p. 
(S5: ◊¬□p→¬□p) 
Conclusion: ¬□ (PT→Q) is true. 
Thus, based on the anti-zombie argument and its “inverted” counterpart, we can 
conclude that □ (PT→Q) is both true and false.  
In sum, by assuming that the following premises, both of which involve 
                                                
126 See Yablo (2000), p. 101.  
127 See Frankish (2007), Brown (2010). 
  105 
respectively a modal claim, are true: 
3.  It is ideally conceivable that it is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, 
and morally perfect being exists. 
 6.  It is ideally conceivable that it is necessary that P→Q.  
and by assuming CP and S5, we can conclude from Premise 3 and 6 respectively: 
(Ca)  It is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being 
exists. 
(Cb)  □ (PT→Q) is true.  
Moreover, by “inverting” Premise 3 and 6, we can formulate the following two 
premises: 
3’.  It is conceivable that it is not necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and 
morally perfect being exists. 
6’.  It is conceivable that it is not necessary that P→Q. 
Next, by constructing two “inverted” meta-modal conceivability arguments, we can 
conclude respectively:  
(Ca’)  It is not necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect 
being exists.  
(Cb’)  ¬□ (PT→Q) is true. 
To sum thins up, CP can lead to a pair of contrary conclusions. Opponents of the CP 
thesis, such as Yablo, hold that it is the failure of the CP thesis that leads to the 
contrary conclusions. To avoid such an objection, Chalmers responds that the problem 
arises due to the double modality and proposes to exclude all modal claims from the 
scope of the CP thesis. Both sides regard S5 as problem-free. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will put issues on S5 aside, assuming that it is the correct logic for this 
discussion. I will respond to both Yablo and Chalmers, and argue that both fail to see 
the real problem of meta-modal conceivability arguments.  
2. An Objection to Yablo 
From the fact that the CP thesis leads to a pair of contrary conclusions, what we 
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can conclude is a conditional: For some proposition □q, if both □q and ¬□q are 
ideally conceivable, then CP fails. In other words, the conclusion we can draw is that 
the CP thesis is not compatible with the assumption that both □q and ¬□q are ideally 
conceivable. Hence, we can infer that CP fails if we can provide a good reason to 
accept that there are some □q such that □q and ¬□q are indeed ideally conceivable. 
Otherwise, whether or not CP fails is an open question. However, it is far from clear 
that Yablo provides such a reason. In his paper Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open 
Texture of Concepts, he says:  
    God in other words is either necessary or impossible. But, God is not impossible, 
since we can easily conceive him. Hence God is necessary, and so actual… 
Another thing that seems clearly conceivable is that there should fail to be a 
being whose essence includes existence; it seems conceivable, in fact, that there 
shouldn’t be anything whatsoever. Now we have talked ourselves into a 
contradiction. Textbook Kripkeanism has the result that (Hartshorne’s) God 
exists in some worlds but not in others. But it is a conceptual truth about this 
God that he exists in every world or none.128  
In this passage, it is not clear in which sense Yablo takes God’s existence and 
non-existence as conceivable. One possibility is that the conceivability he intends is 
ideal conceivability. If this is the case, it seems Yablo just claims that God’s existence 
and non-existence are both ideally conceivable without providing any evidence. In 
this case, his argument against CP is not complete. He should provide a justification 
for the claim that both God’s existence and non-existence are ideally conceivable.  
Another possibility is that the kind of conceivability involved in his argument 
stands for prima facie conceivability. Judging by his use of “we can easily conceive” 
and “seems clearly conceivable”, it seems that prima facie conceivability is the kind 
that Yablo has in mind. But if this is the case, it is possible that Yablo simply 
confuses prima facie conceivability and ideal conceivability, or that he presupposes 
either of the following two hypotheses: 
(H1)  For any proposition □q, prima facie conceivability entails possibility. 
                                                
128 Yablo (2000), pp. 100-101. 
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(H2) For any proposition □q, prima facie conceivability entails ideal 
conceivability. 
However, both H1 and H2 are false. In Chapter 2, I have addressed that in the 
non-modal realm, prima facie conceivability does not entail possibility. A proposition 
is prima facie conceivable if we cannot rule it out a priori or if we can find a 
seemingly consistent set of propositions that entails p.129 However, due to the 
limitations of our cognitive capabilities, p may involve a contradiction that we cannot 
detect. In this case, p is not possibly true. So prima facie conceivability does not 
entail possibility. Moreover, since ideal conceivability entails possibility, prima facie 
conceivability cannot be considered a guide to ideal conceivability in the non-modal 
realm.  
In the modal realm, prima facie conceivability cannot be considered a guide to 
possibility or ideal conceivability, either. We cannot a priori rule out either □GC or 
¬□GC. That is to say, both of them are prima facie conceivable. However, □GC is 
either necessarily true or necessarily false in S5. In other words, it cannot be the case 
that both □GC and ¬□GC are possibly true. Hence, prima facie conceivability does 
not entail possibility in the modal realm. Moreover, □GC, whose truth-value is a 
priori knowable, is either a priori true or a priori false. Hence, between □GC and 
¬□GC, one is not ideally conceivable. Since both □GC and ¬□GC are prima facie 
conceivable but one is not ideally conceivable, prima facie conceivability does not 
entail ideal conceivability in the modal realm. 
To sum things up, if Yablo intends to speak of ideal conceivability, then he does 
not provide a reason for the claim that both God’s existence and non-existence are 
ideally conceivable; if he intends to speak of prima facie conceivability, then his 
argument fails, since prima facie conceivability is not a reliable guide to possibility or 
ideal conceivability. Thus, Yablo’s argument against CP is not as convincing as he 
claims. Whether or not CP fails is yet to be determined.  
3. An Objection to Chalmers 
To avoid Yablo’s objection, Chalmers proposes to exclude all necessity claims 
from the scope of CP. However, as I have argued in the last section, Yablo’s 
                                                
129 Note the difference between prima facie conceivability and ideal conceivability. A proposition being ideally 
conceivable requires that it be contradiction-free, but there is no such requirement in the notion of prima facie 
conceivability. 
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argument is not very convincing. So why do we have to reduce the domain of CP to 
avoid his attack? And yet, Chalmers insists on doing so due to another concern. The 
reason, according to him, is that it is very difficult to conceive of what a necessity 
proposition says. Refuting Yablo’s idea that a necessary God is ideally conceivable, 
Chalmers says: “A god’s existence may be conceivable, but to conceive of a god’s 
necessary existence is much harder, especially given its conceivable nonexistence.”130 
His idea can be stretched using the metaphor by Mizrahi and Morrow.131 According 
to them, our capability to conceive of something works like a telescope that allows us 
to peer into some possible worlds, but we cannot “zoom out” to see all possible 
worlds. This explains why it is hard or even impossible for us to conceive of what a 
proposition □q says. Thus, in Chalmers’ view, the following premise is true: 
(P1)  For any proposition □q, it is hard to conceive of what it says.  
Elsewhere, Chalmers is quite explicit that if what a proposition says is hard to 
conceive of, then this proposition cannot be used in the conceivability premise of a 
conceivability argument. Refuting Sturgeon, who holds that phenomenal 
consciousness being a physical process is ideally conceivable (i.e., that □ (PT→Q) is 
ideally conceivable), Chalmers says:  
    Many people have noted that it is very hard to imagine that consciousness is a 
physical process. I do not think this unimaginability is so obvious that it should 
be used as a premise in an argument against materialism, but likewise, the 
imaginability claim cannot be used as a premise, either.132 
In this passage, it seems that Chalmers assumes the following principle: 
    (P2)  For any proposition p, non-modal or modal, if it is hard to conceive of 
what p says, then “it is ideally conceivable that p” cannot be used as a 
premise in a conceivability argument. 
According to (P1) and (P2), Chalmers draws the conclusion that all necessity 
propositions have to be excluded from the scope of the CP thesis. In the following, I 
will respond to Chalmers by arguing for the following three theses: 
                                                
130 Chalmers (2002), p. 189. 
131 Mizrahi & Morrow (2015), p. 8. 
132 For Sturgeon’s argument, see Sturgeon (2000), pp.114-116. For Chalmers’ attack, see Chalmers (2010), p. 180. 
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(T1)  For some proposition □q, it is not hard to conceive of what it says. 
(T2)  The difficulty to conceive of what a proposition p says is irrelevant to p’s 
ideal conceivability or our knowledge (or evidence) of p’s ideal 
conceivability. Thus, even if it is difficult to conceive of the contents of 
some modal claims, it is not necessary to exclude these modal claims 
from the scope of the CP thesis. 
(T3)  Even if we exclude all necessity claims from the scope of the CP thesis, 
the apparent problem with regard to all meta-modal conceivability 
arguments nevertheless arises with regard to some non-metamodal 
conceivability arguments. Thus, it is not sufficient to avoid the apparent 
problem by reducing the domain of CP.  
Let us consider (T1) first. When it comes to the difficulty of conceiving of something, 
Chalmers must refer to prima facie conceivability rather than ideal conceivability. To 
say that a proposition p is ideally conceivable is to say that p is logically possible. 
Whether p is logically possible has nothing to do with our cognitive activities, such as 
conceiving, let alone the difficulties involved in these activities. So the notion of 
difficulty can only apply to prima facie conceivability.  
Moreover, what Chalmers has in mind must be positive conceivability rather 
than negative conceivability. According to the definition of negative conceivability, if 
we cannot rule out p a priori, we can actually negatively conceive of what p says. In 
other words, to negatively conceive of what p says, we are merely required to not be 
able to do something, not, however, to be able to do something. It certainly is not a 
challenge not to be able to do something, so it is not difficult to negatively conceive 
of what p says.   
Therefore, if there is any difficulty in conceiving of something, the difficulty can 
only arise when we positively conceive of it.133 As has been said in Chapter 2, 
Chalmers draws an analogy between the activity of positive conceiving and 
imagination, and distinguishes two kinds of positive imagination: perceptual 
imagination and modal imagination. To perceptually conceive of what p says, we are 
required to form a mental image in which p is the case. Thus, in order to perceptually 
                                                
133 When the conceiving agent is non-ideal, such as ordinary people, the conceivability involved must be prima 
facie conceivability. So for the sake of brevity, I use “we positively conceive of something” instead of “we prima 
facie positively conceive of something”.  
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conceive of what □q says, we have to form a mental image about all possible worlds. 
However, we are not able to do so because the number of all possible worlds is 
infinite. Thus, it is indeed difficult for us to perceptually conceive of what a 
proposition □q says. 
 However, for some propositions □q, it is not difficult to modally conceive of 
what they say. By definition, for any p, to modally conceive of what p says, we just 
need to construct a set of propositions Г such that we regard it as entailing p and such 
that we cannot find a contradiction in Г. Any □q is the logical consequence of □□q. 
Thus, to modally conceive of what □q says, we only need to entertain the proposition 
□□q if we cannot find a contradiction in □□q. Another way to modally conceive of 
what □q says, due to Mizrahi & Morrow, is to invoke a Spinozistic deity, which is a 
being that makes “everything that happens in its world happen necessarily”.134 If q is 
true, then a Spinozistic deity will make it necessarily true. In other words, if q is 
actually true, the proposition “a Spinozistic deity exists” entails that q is necessarily 
true. It follows that if q is a true proposition, we can modally conceive of what □q 
says by appealing to the proposition “a Spinozistic deity exists”. Thus, there are at 
least two ways in which we can modally conceive of what some □q say without any 
difficulty. Therefore, (P1) is false and (T1) is true.  
Let us now consider (T2). As far as I am concerned, there are only two reasons 
for us to refuse that a proposition p is used in a conceivability premise: 
(i)  p is neither ideally negatively conceivable nor ideally positively 
conceivable. 
(ii)  We have no knowledge or evidence for whether p is ideally conceivable. 
If (i) holds, a conceivability argument which resorts to the ideal conceivability of p is 
unsound; if (ii) holds, we have no knowledge or evidence for whether a conceivability 
argument is sound. In either case, a conceivability argument cannot provide a guide to 
what is possible.  
However, the mere fact that what a proposition says is hard to conceive does not 
entail that this proposition is not ideally conceivable. It seems that Chalmers loses 
sight of the two definitions of ideal conceivability that he provides, INC and IPC. 
Both of them are defined in terms of apriority and coherence, and thus are grounded 
                                                
134 Mizrahi & Morrow (2015), p. 7. 
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in rational, rather than psychological notions. In this sense, ideal conceivability is not 
agent-relative. Therefore, it is independent from our cognitive capabilities. Whether it 
is ideally conceivable that p has nothing to do with the trouble we may have in 
conceiving of what p says, just like whether a flower is red does not depend on 
whether we are able to see it. As an a priori knowable proposition, □GC is ideally 
conceivable if it is true, although it may be hard for someone who lacks knowledge in 
logic to entertain a proposition that entails □GC (For example, someone who does not 
know that □□GC entails □GC may not be able to modally conceive that □GC is 
true).135 
That what a proposition says is hard to conceive of does not entail that we have 
no knowledge or evidence of its ideal conceivability, either. If we know that □GC is 
true, we can know that □GC is ideally conceivable. In this case, the difficulty in 
conceiving that □GC is true is irrelevant to our knowledge or evidence of the ideal 
conceivability of □GC. Since the difficulty in conceiving of what □q says has nothing 
to do with the ideal conceivability of □q or our knowledge of the ideal conceivability 
of □q, it is not necessary to exclude all □q from the scope of the CP thesis.   
Lastly, let us consider (T3). I have argued in the preceding chapter that we can 
formulate a pair of parallel conceivability arguments that have contrary conclusions 
even within the domain of non-modal propositions. One example for this is Descartes’ 
argument for dualism and its “inverted” argument. 
Descartes’ Argument:  
●  It is ideally conceivable that my mind ≠ my body. 
●  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
●  If it is possible that my mind ≠ my body, then my mind ≠ my body.  
Conclusion: My mind ≠ my body.   
The “Inverted” Argument of Descartes’ Argument: 
●  It is ideally conceivable that my mind = my body. 
●  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
●  If it is possible that my mind = my body, then my mind=my body.  
Conclusion: My mind = my body.   
                                                
135 Frankish holds the same view. He writes: “Conceivability is all or nothing, and one state of affairs may be 
harder to imagine than another without being less conceivable.” Frankish (2007), p. 660. 
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Another example is Kripke’s argument against type physicalism and its “inverted” 
argument. 
Kripke’s Argument:  
●  It is ideally conceivable that pain ≠ C-fiber firing. 
●  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
●  If it is possible that pain ≠ C-fiber firing, then pain ≠ C-fiber firing.  
Conclusion: Pain ≠ C-fiber firing. 
The “Inverted” Argument of Kripke’s Argument 
     ●  It is ideally conceivable that pain = C-fiber firing. 
     ●  Ideal conceivability entails possibility. 
     ●  If it is possible that pain = C-fiber firing, then pain = C-fiber firing.  
     Conclusion: Pain = C-fiber firing. 
Thus, even if we confine the domain to non-modal claims, the apparent problem that a 
pair of contrary conclusions can be inferred from CP does not disappear. So confining 
the domain is not sufficient to avoid the problem if there is one. 
4. A Dilemma 
In Section 2, I have argued that Yablo is too quick in drawing the conclusion that 
CP is false. In Section 3, I have argued that in order to avoid Yablo’s objection, it is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to confine the scope of CP to non-modal claims. In 
this section, I will present a problem with meta-modal conceivability arguments that 
Yablo and Chalmers fail to see. I will present this problem in the form of a dilemma.    
In Chapter 5, I have argued that a dilemma arises when the CP thesis is applied 
in a priori realm. If the truth-value of p is a priori knowable, then between p and ¬p, 
only one is ideally conceivable. To tell the conceivable one from the inconceivable 
one, an independent argument is required. However, if this independent argument 
provides a reason for accepting that p is ideally conceivable, it follows that p is 
proven to be true; if the independent argument provides a reason for accepting that ¬p 
is ideally conceivable, it follows that ¬p is proven to be true. Thus, if the truth-value 
of p is a priori knowable, to know or have evidence for whether p is ideally 
conceivable, we are required to provide an argument by which we can determine the 
truth-value of p. Thus, we are confronted with a dilemma: If we can provide such an 
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independent argument, we can know the truth-value of p without resorting to a 
conceivability argument. In this case, a conceivability argument is redundant. If we 
cannot provide such an independent argument, then we cannot know or have evidence 
for whether p is ideally conceivable. In this case, we cannot know or have evidence 
for whether a conceivability argument is sound.  
Moreover, as has been argued in Chapter 2, if p is a proposition such that if it is 
possibly true, then it is true; and if it s possibly false, then it is false, then p’s 
truth-value is a priori knowable if CP is true. In S5, the following holds for any 
proposition □q: If □q is possibly true, it is true; if □q is possibly false, it is false. Thus, 
in S5, the truth-value of any □q is a priori knowable if CP holds. It follows that 
between a meta-modal conceivability argument and its “inverted” counterpart, only 
one is sound, but the other is not. We have to invoke an independent argument to 
determine which one is sound. However, if we can provide such an argument, then a 
meta-modal conceivability argument is not needed anymore. If we cannot do this, 
then we cannot know or have evidence for whether a meta-modal conceivability 
argument is sound. In conclusion, if CP holds, it is shown to be of little use in the 
modal domain. 
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Chapter 7: Can Moderate Modal Skepticism Be Eliminated? 
In Chapter 4, I have argued that we cannot refute the CP thesis by appealing to 
reductio arguments. In Chapter 5, I have argued that we cannot determine whether or 
not physicalism is true by resorting to conceivability arguments. In Chapter 6, I have 
argued that if p is a modal claim which can be written as □q, then we cannot know or 
have evidence for whether p is possibly true. All of my arguments show that there are 
some propositions the possibility of which cannot be justified or known via 
conceivability, which leads to the view of van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. In this 
chapter, I discuss van Inwagen’s modal skepticism and provide a defense for this 
view. 
1. Moderate Modal Skepticism 
According to the extreme version of modal skepticism, if a claim is false, then 
we cannot know or be justified in believing that it is possibly true.136 However, this 
view is counter-intuitive. For example, even if Lily wore a green dress today, we 
would nevertheless know that she could have worn a dress that has a different color. 
In this chapter, I will focus my discussion on the less extreme version of modal 
skepticism, i.e., moderate modal skepticism. According to this view, if a claim is a 
so-called extraordinary claim, then we cannot know or be justified in believing that it 
is possibly true.137  
I trace moderate modal skepticism back to van Inwagen. In his paper Modal 
Epistemology, van Inwagen separates possibility claims into two groups. One group 
consists of claims that are not far removed from our daily life, such as “it is possible 
that the table that was in a certain position at noon [has] then been two feet to the left 
of where it in fact was.”138 Claims contained in this group are called ordinary claims. 
The other group comprises “philosophically interesting modal judgments about 
concerns remote from everyday life”, such as “it is possible that I exist and nothing 
material exist[s].”139 Claims contained in this latter group are called extraordinary 
claims. Van Inwagen argues that we can only have knowledge or evidence of ordinary 
                                                
136 M. Strohminger & J. Yli-Vakkuri (forthcoming). 
137 The words “statements”, “claims”, “judgments”, and so on will be used interchangeably throughout this 
section.  
138 van Inwagen (1998), p. 70.  
139 van Inwagen (1998), p. 67. 
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claims but cannot have knowledge or evidence of extraordinary claims by any means. 
I call this view MS: 
(MS)  If ◊p is an extraordinary claim, then it cannot be known or justified by 
any means.  
In particular, he argues that if ◊p is an extraordinary claim, then it cannot be known or 
justified via Yablo-style conceivability. I call this view MSY:140 
(MSY)  If ◊p is an extraordinary claim, then it cannot be justified via 
Yablo-style conceivability.  
MS is a highly contentious claim. Van Inwagen first examines a few methods by 
means of which we can acquire modal knowledge, and then argues that we cannot 
acquire knowledge or evidence of extraordinary claims via these means. For example, 
he argues that we can “validly deduce the conclusion that ‘It is possible for there to be 
orchids’ from the non-modal premise ‘There are orchids’”.141 Plus, he finds that we 
cannot acquire knowledge of extraordinary claims “by logical or mathematical 
deduction from basic modal knowledge and ‘facts about how the world is put 
together’”.142 He also argues that although we can acquire some modal knowledge 
via Yablo-style conceivability, we cannot acquire any knowledge or evidence of 
extraordinary claims in this way. However, many other modal epistemologies, such as 
similarity theory and counterfactual theory, have only been established or fully 
developed well after van Inwagen wrote his paper.143 Thus, a worry about MS is that 
van Inwagen seems too quick in drawing his conclusion. By examining only two 
methods by which we acquire modal knowledge or justification, we cannot draw the 
conclusion that the knowledge or evidence of extraordinary claims cannot be acquired 
by any means. 
One may, however, respond to this that in order to draw a general conclusion 
about all methods by means of which we can acquire modal knowledge or 
justification, van Inwagen does not have to examine all of them. After all, he gives an 
                                                
140 Note that unlike Chalmers, neither van Inwagen nor Yablo presupposes 2-D semantics. For them, only one 
proposition is associated with any statement. Thus, there seems no difference between “a proposition is justified” 
and “a statement is justified”. When I discuss van Inwagen or Yablo’s theory, I will use “statement” and 
“proposition” interchangeably. I will not do so, however, when I discuss Chalmers’ theory.  
141 van Inwangen (1998), p. 74. 
142 Ibid. 
143 For similarity theory, see Roca-Royes (forthcoming). For counterfactual theory, see Williamson (2005), 
(2007).  
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analogical argument for MS: Van Inwagen draws an analogy between our ability to 
acquire modal knowledge (or justification) and perception. He says that we can make 
judgments such as “that mountain is about thirty miles away” or “it’s about three 
hundred yards from that tall pine to the foot of the cliff” when we see things not far 
away from us.144 Although not all of these judgments are infallible, we can be 
justified in believing them to a large extent. But when we try to estimate how far way 
the sun or the moon are, we cannot rely on our perception.  
With respect to reliability, according to van Inwagen, our ability to acquire 
modal knowledge or justification is like our perception. Just like perception cannot 
provide a reliable justification for claims concerning physically distant objects, no 
modal epistemology can provide us with a justification for claims concerning modally 
distant things. Thus, van Inwagen concludes that there is no method by means of 
which we can acquire knowledge or evidence of claims “about concerns remote from 
everyday life”, that is, extraordinary claims.145 
This analogical argument is criticized by many philosophers. For example, as 
Hartl points out, “it is not clear why we should take for granted the analogy between 
physical distance and modal ‘distance’. Remoteness from the actual world cannot be 
‘measured’ in the same way that we can measure physical distance.”146 Secondly, 
even if the analogy holds, van Inwagen’s presupposition that we cannot know about 
distant objects by perception is vulnerable. For example, Geirsson argues that we 
cannot make visual judgments of distant things because we are average observers, 
who are not so able and reliable at observing objects at a distance. However, if we get 
visual training, we can see much further and can make better visual judgments than 
now. By the same token, according to him, if we know more about logic and more 
facts about the actual world, we can know extraordinary propositions by the same 
means by which we know ordinary propositions.147 At any rate, in this chapter, I 
focus mainly on MSY, which seems a more plausible thesis than MS.  
As to the argument for MSY, there are several weak points: Firstly, van Inwagen 
imposes a high standard on conceivability-based justification, which leads to a result 
that is inconsistent with MSY. Secondly, he merely provides some claims as 
examples of extraordinary claims, but he does not provide a clear definition of 
                                                
144 van Inwagen (1998), p. 70. 
145 van Inwagen (1998), p. 67. 
146 Hartl (2016), p. 275. 
147 Geirsson (2005), p. 282.  
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extraordinary claims. Without a clear definition, however, it is difficult to determine 
whether a given claim is an extraordinary or an ordinary one. Thirdly, van Inwagen 
just discusses modal skepticism within the framework of Yablo’s theory, which is not 
the most refined theory of conceivability. Hence, it is to be determined whether 
moderate modal skepticism is still true within the framework of a better theory of 
conceivability.  
As to the first problem, Hawke suggests a solution, which I adopt in this chapter. 
Moreover, I go one step further by providing a definition for the notion of 
extraordinary claims such that MSY is rendered true and van Inwagen’s argument for 
MSY holds. Finally, I show that moderate modal skepticism cannot be eliminated 
even within the framework of Chalmers’ theory of conceivability.  
2. Modal Skepticism Within Yablo’s Framework 
2.1 An Example 
Before discussing van Inwagen’s argument for MSY, let us consider one of the 
examples of extraordinary claims that he gives: the statement “it is possible that I 
exist and nothing material exist[s].” He argues that an extraordinary claim can be used 
as a “crucial” premise of a “possibility argument”.148 For example, the statement “it 
is possible that I exist and nothing material exist[s]” can be used as a crucial premise 
in the argument for Cartesian dualism, which goes as follows:  
●  It is possible that I exist and nothing material exist[s]. 
●  Whatever is material is essentially material. 
Conclusion: I am not a material thing.149 
Moreover, van Inwagen argues that “possibility arguments can often be ‘inverted’ to 
produce an argument for the denial of the conclusion of the original argument.”150 
The “inverted” counterpart of the argument above goes as follows: 
●  It is possible that I exist and nothing immaterial exist[s]. 
●  Whatever is immaterial is essentially immaterial. 
Conclusion: I am not an immaterial thing.151  
                                                
148 See van Inwagen (1998), p. 68. 
149 Ibid.  
150 Ibid.  
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Obviously, it cannot be the case that both a possibility argument that has an 
extraordinary claim as its crucial premise and its “inverted” counterpart are sound. 
Moreover, the following premise also seems plausible: 
For any proposition p, it cannot be the case that one is both justified in believing 
p and justified in believing ¬p.   
It follows that we cannot both be justified in believing that I am not a material being 
and justified in believing that I am not an immaterial being. It follows further that we 
cannot both be justified in believing that it is possible that I exist and nothing material 
exists, and justified in believing that it is possible that I exist and nothing immaterial 
exists.  
2.2 Yablo-Style Conceivability 
In his paper Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?, Yablo provides a 
definition of conceivability (in what follows, I will call this kind of conceivability 
“Yablo-style conceivability”): 
(YC)  For any p, p is conceivable for an agent A iff A can conceive of a world 
that A takes to verify p.152 
Moreover, Yablo is a proponent of the evidential account, according to which 
conceivability provides evidence of possibility. Thus, based on the definition of 
Yablo-style conceivability, he holds the following view: 
(YCP)  For any p, if an agent A can conceive of a world that A takes to verify p, 
then A is justified in believing that p is possible.  
However, Yablo does not say much on what verification means. Thus, a natural 
question poses itself: How does an agent A know that the relevant depth of the 
scenario he conceives of is sufficient to form the basis of the truth of a given claim p? 
This is the so-called “relevant-depth problem”.153 For example, when one conceives 
of a scenario in which mathematicians claim that the Goldbach Conjecture (GC) is 
                                                                                                                                      
151 Ibid. 
152 Yablo (1993), p. 29. It is worth noting that the term “world” cannot be read as a complete possible world, for 
nobody can conceive of such a world. Rather, it must be understood as a partial world or a scenario. 
153 See Vaidya, Anand, "The Epistemology of Modality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/modality-epistemology/>. 
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false, is this scenario in sufficient detail such that we can regard it as verifying ¬GC? 
To van Inwagen, the answer is definitely “no”. According to him, to conceive of a 
scenario that one takes to verify p requires that the scenario be incompatible with ¬p. 
In the case of GC, conceiving of a scenario in which mathematicians claim that GC is 
false is compatible with the fact that GC is true, since mathematicians may make 
mistakes.  
However, in many cases, it is beyond our reach to conceive of a scenario in 
sufficient detail such that ¬p is ruled out. Van Inwagen provides an example: He 
considers whether we can conceive of “worlds in which there are naturally purple 
cows, time machines, transparent iron, a moon made of green cheese, or pure 
phenomenal colors in addition to those we know.”154 According to him, anyone who 
tries to conceive of such worlds will fail to do so. Or in other words, we seem to be 
able to conceive a world in which the things in question exist, but in fact we are not 
able to do so. Van Inwagen argues that, only if “our imaginings take place at a level 
of structural detail comparable to that of the imaginings of condensed-matter 
physicists who are trying to explain, say, the phenomenon of superconductivity”, can 
we say that we can conceive of that transparent iron exists.155  
According to him, what we can say at best is that we conceive of a world in 
which “the new Nobel laureate thanks those who supported him in his long and 
discouraging quest for transparent iron and displays to a cheering crowd something 
that looks (in our imaginations) like a chunk of glass.”156 But this world is not a 
world in which transparent iron exists (nor a world in which transparent iron does not 
exist), because our imagination does not rule out the possibility that transparent iron 
does not exist. So by conceiving of such a world, we are not justified in believing that 
it is possible that transparent iron exists (nor justified in believing that it is possible 
that transparent iron does not exist). At best, what our imagination verifies is a 
disjunctive proposition that has the following propositions as some of its disjuncts: 
–  Transparent iron exists 
–  The scientific community has somehow been deceived into thinking that 
transparent iron exists 
                                                
154 van Inwagen (1998), p. 79. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
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–  A crackpot physicist who thinks he has created transparent iron is the butt of 
a cruel and very elaborate practical joke 
–  A group of fun-loving scientists have got together to enact a burlesque of a 
Nobel Awards Ceremony157 
Thus, via Yablo-style conceivability, at best we can be justified in believing that this 
disjunctive proposition is possibly true.  
One may suggest that we can simply stipulate that we conceive of a world in 
which transparent iron exists. By doing so, we can trivially conceive of a world that 
verifies that transparent iron exists. However, as Hawke points out, “this kind of 
stipulation appears to miss the point of the verification so central to 
Yablo-conceivability”.158 If to conceive of a world that verifies p meant to stipulate 
that p holds for this world, then we could conceive of anything as true in this sense, 
even if we know that p is necessarily false. For example, by stipulating that 2+2=5 is 
true in a given world, according to this view, we can conceive of a world that verifies 
that 2+2=5, and therefore, we are justified in believing that it is possible that 2+2=5 
via Yablo-style conceivability. However, we know that it is impossible that 2+2=5. 
Thus, Yablo cannot accept this kind of stipulation.  
2.3 Van Inwagen’s Argument for MSY 
Van Inwagen argues that if ◊p in question is an extraordinary claim, then no one 
can conceive of a scenario that is incompatible with ¬p. In this case, Yablo-style 
conceivability cannot provide a justification of ◊p. Van Inwagen’s argument can be 
reconstructed as follows: 
1.  For any claim p, one is justified in asserting the possibility of p only if one 
can conceive of a world that the conceiver takes to verify p. 
2.  For any claim p, one can conceive of a world that one takes to verify p only if 
one can conceive of a world in a sufficient amount of detail, relevant to p, so 
as to rule out the compatibility of the specified details of that world with ¬p.  
3.  If ◊p is an extraordinary claim, then no one can conceive of a world in a 
sufficient amount of detail relevant to p.  
                                                
157 Ibid. 
158 Hawke (2011), p. 355.  
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Conclusion: If ◊p is an extraordinary claim, then one is not justified in asserting 
the possibility of p.159 
As Hawke points out, this argument faces a potential objection that goes like this: 
Either Premise 2 is false, or it is true. If Premise 2 is false, then van Inwagen’s modal 
skepticism collapses. If Premise 2 is true, then the possibilities of extraordinary 
claims cannot be justified via Yablo-style conceivability, nor can the possibilities of 
ordinary claims be justified this way. In other words, if Premise 2 is true, this will 
lead to a more radical version of modal skepticism that is inconsistent with van 
Inwagen’s view.  
Geirsson is a proponent of this objection. In his paper Conceivability and 
Defeasible Modal Justification, he provides the following example to illustrate his 
idea: We know that it is possible that the LPs do not work when we play them 
because we can conceive of a situation in which the LPs do not work when we play 
them. However, no one is able to imagine the “details of the technology that allows 
one to play LPs without background noise” because “the details are too many and 
require too much for anyone to entertain them”.160 Thus, if van Inwagen is right, then 
we have to accept the conclusion that we cannot be justified in believing that it is 
possible that the LPs do not work when we play them via Yablo-style conceivability.  
It is not difficult to find additional examples. Hawke, for instance, provides his 
favorite mug-case as an example. We can conceive of the following scenario: Hawke 
prepares himself a cup of tea in his favorite tea mug. But what we conceive of is 
compatible with the case that the mug in our imagination is not his favorite mug but 
another one that has the same observable properties as Hawke’s favorite mug.161 If 
we insist on the strict standard of conceivability that van Inwagen imposes, then we 
have to conclude that our belief that it is possible that Hawke prepares himself a cup 
of tea in his favorite tea mug cannot be justified via Yablo-style conceivability, which 
leads to a general skepticism about modal claims.  
In view of these examples, Hartl suggests that van Inwagen’s strict standard on 
conceivability is unrealistic and consequently denies that modal skepticism is true 
within Yablo’s framework. He admits that in the case of GC, to provide evidence for 
the possibility of GC requires that we conceive of a scenario that entails GC (and 
                                                
159 I am using Hawke’s reconstruction of van Inwagen’s argument. See Hawke (2011), p. 352.  
160 Geirsson (2005), p. 287.  
161 Hawke (2011), p. 355.  
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therefore, rules out ¬GC). However, he argues that this requirement is “only 
applicable to mathematical and logical propositions where the possibility of p 
logically implies the truth of p.”162 If p is not a mathematical or logical claim, 
according to Hartl, to conceive what p says does not require that ¬p be ruled out. 
However, I do not think that Hartl is right on this point. The falsehood of his idea can 
be illustrated by means of the following example that he provides.  
Hartl argues that the Greeks can conceive of a world that verifies that Hesperus 
is brighter than Phosphorus, even if their imagination does not rule out the possibility 
that Hesperus is not brighter than Phosphorus. So by appealing to YCP, he concludes 
that the Greeks are justified in believing that it is possible that Hesperus is brighter 
than Phosphorus.163 In view of this example, I think that Hartl would accept the 
following line of reasoning: The Greeks can also conceive of a world in which 
Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus, even if this imagination does not rule out the possibility that 
Hesperus = Phosphorus. Thus, according to YCP, Hartl would accept that the Greeks 
are justified in believing that it is possible that Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus.  
However, if to conceive of what p says does not require that ¬p be ruled out, 
then the Greeks can also conceive of a world in which Hesperus = Phosphorus. By the 
same principle (YCP), Hartl has to accept the conclusion that the Greeks are justified 
in believing that it is possible that Hesperus = Phosphorus. Moreover, since that it is 
possible that Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus entails that Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus, and it is 
possible that Hesperus = Phosphorus entails that Hesperus = Phosphorus, Hartl has to 
accept the conclusion that via Yablo-style conceivability the Greeks are actually 
justified both in believing that Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus and in believing that Hesperus 
= Phosphorus.164  
By the same token, I think Hartl would also accept the assumption that we can 
both conceive a world where I exist and nothing material exists and conceive a world 
where I exist and nothing immaterial exists. If I am right, then he would accept the 
conclusion that we are both justified in believing that I am a material thing and 
justified in believing that I am an immaterial thing. To sum things up, for some ◊p 
(including extraordinary claims, such as “it is possible that I exist and nothing 
                                                
162 Hartl (2016), p. 279. 
163 Hartl (2016), p. 282. 
164 Let us assume that the Greeks know the following conditional: That it is possible that Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus 
entails that Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus, and that it is possible that Hesperus = Phosphorus entails that Hesperus = 
Phosphorus.  
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material exists”), if we give up the strict standard of modal justification, i.e., if to 
conceive of a world that verifies p does not require that ¬p be ruled out, then we can 
be justified in believing both p and ¬p via Yablo-style conceivability. However, this 
conclusion means that Yablo’s theory of conceivability does not hold, which is a 
consequence that Hartl himself is reluctant to accept. (Recall that Hartl argues that the 
strict standard of conceivability is “only applicable to mathematical and logical 
propositions where the possibility of p logically implies the truth of p.”165 However, 
not only mathematical and logical claims are claims such that the possibility of p 
implies the truth of p, but also many non-logical and non-mathematical propositions 
have this feature, such as “Hesperus = Phosphorus”, “I exist and nothing material 
exists”, etc. Thus, it is untenable to propose that the strict standard of conceivability is 
only applicable to mathematical and logical claims.)  
From these examples, we can see the difference between van Inwagen’s and 
Hartl’s view: According to van Inwagen, for any proposition ◊p, to conceive of what 
p says requires that ¬p be ruled out. A consequence of this demanding standard of 
conceivability is that Yablo-style conceivability cannot provide justification for even 
non-extraordinary claims, which is inconsistent with van Inwagen’s own position. On 
the other hand, according to Hartl, for any proposition ◊p, to conceive of what p says 
does not require that ¬p be ruled out if p is not a logical or mathematical claim. 
However, some p, although not logical or mathematical claims, are nevertheless 
claims such that their possibility implies their truth. In this case, Hartl has to conclude 
that both p and ¬p can be justified via Yablo-style conceivability. This is a conclusion 
that even Hartl himself must be reluctant to accept.  
Now we can consider the following question: Is there a way to modify van 
Inwagen’s argument such that the modified argument is sound? Hawke suggests a 
solution. According to him, “since the conclusion of van Inwagen’s argument is 
clearly directed at non-basic (i.e., extraordinary) modal claims”, we can “simply 
rephrase the entire argument in terms of extraordinary claims”.166 In other words, 
according to Hawke, van Inwagen’s high standard of conceivability merely applies to 
extraordinary modal claims. That is to say, we only need to replace Premise 2 with 2’ 
but keep Premises 1 and 3. Thus, the modified argument runs as follows:  
                                                
165 Hartl (2016), p. 279. 
166 Hawke (2011), p. 362.  
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1.  For any claim p, one is justified in asserting the possibility of p only if one 
can conceive of a world that the conceiver takes to verify p. 
2’.  If ◊p is an extraordinary claim, one can conceive of a world that one takes to 
verify p only if one can conceive of a world in a sufficient amount of detail, 
relevant to p, so as to rule out the compatibility of the specified details of 
that world with ¬p.  
3. If ◊p is an extraordinary claim, then no one can conceive of a world in a 
sufficient amount of detail relevant to p.  
Conclusion: If ◊p is an extraordinary claim, then one is not justified in asserting 
the possibility of p.167 
I think that Hawke’s solution is reasonable. It enables van Inwagen’s modal 
skepticism to be tenable within Yablo’s framework of conceivability. Yet, there are 
some questions that Hawke does not answer: Which claims exactly are extraordinary 
claims? If ◊p is an extraordinary claim, in virtue of what do we have to rule out the 
possibility of ¬p when we conceive of a world that verifies p? Another relevant 
question is this: Even if moderate modal skepticism holds within Yablo’s system, can 
it hold in Chalmers’ more refined theory of conceivability? In what follows, I will 
provide a characterization of extraordinary modal claims and discuss whether modal 
skepticism is true within Chalmers’ framework of conceivability.   
3. What Extraordinary Modal Claims Are 
In this section, I consider the first question: What kind of propositions are 
extraordinary modal claims? Actually, we can get some hints from the example 
provided by van Inwagen. As has been said, “it is possible that I exist and nothing 
material exist” is an extraordinary claim. Moreover, I have argued that “it is possible 
that I exist and nothing material exist[s]” and “it is possible that I exist and nothing 
immaterial exist[s]” cannot both be justified, for otherwise we have to accept the 
conclusion that both “I am a material thing” and “I am an immaterial thing” are 
justified. This is because “I exist and nothing material exist[s]” is a claim such that its 
being possibly true entails that it is true and its being possibly false entails that it is 
false. Thus, why not simply define the notion of extraordinary claims in the following 
way? 
                                                
167 Hawke (2011), p. 363.  
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 (EC)  ◊p is an extraordinary claim iff p is a claim such that if it is possible that 
p is true, then p is true; and if it is possible that p is false, then p is false. 
According to this definition, it is not difficult to see why to conceive of a world that 
verifies p requires that ¬p be ruled out if ◊p is an extraordinary claim. If to conceive 
of a world that verifies p only requires that this world be compatible with p but not 
entail p (that is to say, this world is compatible with ¬p, too), then we can easily 
conceive of another world that verifies ¬p. Then, by YCP, we can draw the 
conclusion that both ◊p and ◊¬p are justified via Yablo-style conceivability. Since ◊p 
is an extraordinary claim, that is to say, p is a claim such that if it is possible that p is 
true, then p is true; and if it is possible that p is false, then p is false, we have to 
conclude that both p and ¬p are justified. However, this conclusion is not acceptable. 
As a result, if ◊p is an extraordinary claim, the world that we conceive of and that we 
regard as verifying p has to be incompatible with ¬p. 
According to EC, it can be seen that the following groups of claims are all 
extraordinary claims: 
(1)  Claims about necessities. For example:  
    –  It is possible that it is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and 
morally perfect being exists. 
    – It is possible that □ (PT→Q) is true (P, T and Q respectively stand for a 
conjunction of all the microphysical truths of the actual world, a “that is 
all” clause and an arbitrary phenomenal truth of the actual world.) 
(2)  Claims about identity (or non-identity). For example:  
    –  It is possible that pain ≠ C-fiber firing. 
    –  It is possible that water ≠ H2O. 
    –  It is possible that Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus.   
(3)  Mathematical and logical claims. For example:  
    –  It is possible that GC is true. 
    –  It is possible that “‘7777’ occurs in the decimal expansion of π”.168  
4. Can Modal Skepticism Be Eliminated via Chalmers-Style 
Conceivability? 
                                                
168 This example is due to van Inwagen (1977), p. 385.  
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Given the definition of extraordinary claims, MSY can be read in the following 
way:  
If ◊p is a claim such that if it is possible that p is true, then p is true, and if it is 
possible that p is false, then p is false, then ◊p cannot be justified via Yablo-style 
conceivability.  
In what follows, I will consider whether modal skepticism is true within Chalmers’ 
framework of conceivability. In other words, I will consider whether the following 
view, which I call MSC, is true. 
(MSC)  If ◊p is an extraordinary claim, then it cannot be known or justified via 
Chalmers-style conceivability. 
In order to do so, it is necessary to address the differences between Yablo’s and 
Chalmers’ theories of conceivability and possibility. Firstly, Chalmers’ theory 
presupposes 2-D semantics but Yablo’s theory does not. As has been said in Chapter 
2, according to Chalmers, any statement is associated with two intensions, that is, two 
propositions. By distinguishing the two intensions, what we are concerned with is 
whether what a statement’s primary or secondary intension says is conceivable. 
Moreover, as Chalmers points out, the conceivability of a statement’s secondary 
intension is not always acquired a priori. This is why the conceivability of a 
statement’s primary intension is of central concern.  
Due to this difference, some extraordinary claims for Yablo turn out to be 
non-extraordinary claims in Chalmers’ theory. Take the claim “it is possible that 
water ≠ H2O” as an example. According to the definition of an extraordinary claim 
that I provide, this claim is an extraordinary claim in Yablo’s framework, for if it is 
possible that water ≠ H2O, then water ≠ H2O; and if it is possible that water = H2O, 
then water = H2O. Unlike Yablo, Chalmers would focus his discussion on the 
proposition “it is possible that watery stuff is not H2O”, which is the primary 
intension of the statement “it is possible that water ≠ H2O”. The proposition “it is 
possible that watery stuff is not H2O” is not an extraordinary claim. By the same 
token, the claim “it is possible that Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus” is an extraordinary claim 
in Yablo’s framework, but the proposition “it is possible that the brightest star in the 
evening is not the brightest star in the morning” is not an extraordinary proposition in 
Chalmers’ framework. The claim “it is possible that pain ≠ C-fiber firing”, on the 
  127 
other hand, is a different case. It has the same primary and secondary intension. Since 
the possibility of the claim “pain ≠ C-fiber firing” entails its truth, and the possibility 
of its falsity entails its falsity, the claim “it is possible that pain ≠ C-fiber firing” is an 
extraordinary claim both in Yablo’s and Chalmers’ theories.  
In sum, if a statement is an extraordinary claim, and if its primary and secondary 
intension do not coincide, then its primary intension is not an extraordinary 
proposition. If a statement is an extraordinary claim, and if its primary and secondary 
intension are the same, then its primary intension is an extraordinary proposition. 
The second difference between Yablo’s theory and Chalmers’ theory is that the 
latter appeals to ideal conceivability (i.e., logical possibility), but the former does not. 
Thus, for Yablo, whether or not we can be justified in believing that p is possibly true 
depends on whether or not we can conceive of a world that verifies p. By contrast, for 
Chalmers, whether p is possibly true depends on whether p is ideally conceivable, i.e., 
logically possible — which has nothing to do with our capability of conceiving. 
Whether we can know or have evidence for p’s possibility does not depend on our 
capability of conceiving, either, but instead depends on our judgment of p’s ideal 
conceivability (i.e., logical possibility).  
Now let us consider this question: If ◊p is an extraordinary claim, can it be 
known or justified by means of Chalmers-style conceivability? To answer this 
question, we first have to consider the following question: If ◊p is an extraordinary 
claim, can we know or have evidence for whether p is ideally conceivable? If ◊p is an 
extraordinary claim, this means that p is such a proposition that if it is possibly true, 
then it is true, and if it is possibly false, then it is false (in other words, (◊p→p) ∧ 
(◊¬p→¬p) holds). At the end of Chapter 2, I have argued that in Chalmers’ theory, if 
p is a proposition for which (◊p→p) ∧ (◊¬p→¬p)) holds, then the truth-value of p is 
a priori knowable, i.e., p is either priori true or a priori false. Moreover, if the 
truth-value of p is a priori knowable, then p is ideally conceivable (i.e., logically 
possible) iff p is true. In order to know or have evidence for whether p is ideally 
conceivable, we have to provide an independent argument. If this argument 
demonstrates that p is ideally conceivable, it follows that p is proven to be true; if this 
argument demonstrates that p is ideally inconceivable, then p is proven to be false. In 
other words, to tell whether p is ideally conceivable requires that we provide an 
independent argument by which the truth-value of p is determined. That is to say, we 
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cannot provide such an argument without knowing or having evidence of p’s 
truth-value. In this case, we cannot know or have evidence for whether p is ideally 
conceivable.  
Here are some propositions that have been mentioned or discussed in previous 
chapters. We cannot know or have evidence for whether they are ideally conceivable 
without knowing or having evidence of their truth-values. In this case, we cannot 
know or have evidence for whether they are possible via Chalmers-style 
conceivability.  
–  It is necessary that an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect being 
exists. 
–  □ (PT→Q) is true. 
–  Pain ≠ C-fiber firing. 
–  GC is true. 
–  “7777” occurs in the decimal expansion of π. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I evaluated whether the CP thesis can qualify as an epistemic 
guide to possibility. I argued that in some cases, it cannot serve us as an epistemic 
guide to possibility. Generally, there are two lines of argument that opponents of the 
CP thesis can choose from: Either, they deny that the CP thesis is true. Or, for a 
proposition p which is involved in a conceivability premise, they deny that it is ideally 
conceivable that p. I have not adopted either strategy. Instead, I argued that even if CP 
is true and a given p is ideally conceivable, to know or have evidence for whether p is 
ideally conceivable is in some cases beyond our reach. Thus, in these cases, we 
cannot determine whether p is possible by appealing to the CP thesis. In Chapters 3-7, 
respectively, I argued in which cases we cannot know or have evidence for the ideal 
conceivability and possibility of p. In this final chapter, I will review the aspects of 
this dissertation that contributes to the discussion concerning conceivability and 
possibility.  
In Chapter 3, I argued against Hanrahan and Bailey, who hold that for any 
proposition p, we cannot know or be justified in believing that it is ideally 
conceivable that p. I then evaluated Worley’s argument, according to which there are 
some propositions p, for which we cannot know or be justified in believing that it is 
ideally conceivable that p. On the basis of Worley’s view, I went one step further by 
specifying three cases in which the ideal conceivability of a given proposition cannot 
be known or justified. I applied these conclusions in the discussion of the following 
chapters.  
In Chapter 4, I responded to a series of reductio arguments against the CP thesis. 
I found that none of their conceivability premises was fully justified. And I argued 
further that any attempt to provide a reason for accepting these conceivability 
premises would render the reductio arguments redundant. As a result, I demonstrated 
that there is a dilemma: Either we cannot vindicate the reductio arguments, or they are 
redundant. Thus, I concluded that it is hopeless to refute the CP thesis by appealing to 
conceivability arguments. 
In Chapter 5, I discussed all conceivability arguments involved in the debate of 
physicalism vs. dualism. I argued that for each conceivability argument, we cannot 
know or have evidence for whether its conceivability premise is true. As a result, we 
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cannot determine whether physicalism is true by appealing to any conceivability 
argument.  
In Chapter 6, I discussed a kind of conceivability argument, the so-called 
“meta-modal” conceivability argument. I argued that in order to determine whether 
such a meta-modal conceivability argument is sound, a new independent argument is 
required. However, this new argument will render the meta-modal argument 
redundant. Thus, there is a dilemma with meta-modal arguments: If we cannot 
provide such a new argument, then we cannot determine whether a meta-modal 
argument in question is sound. If we can provide such a new argument, then a 
meta-modal argument is redundant.  
Finally, in Chapter 7, I defended van Inwagen’s moderate modal skepticism on 
the basis of Hawke’s defense. Van Inwagen argues that we cannot have evidence of 
the truth of extraordinary claims via Yablo-style conceivability. However, he does not 
provide a definition for the notion of “extraordinary claims”. Moreover, his argument 
may lead to a result that is inconsistent with his view. Hawke solves the latter 
problem, but the former remains. In the same chapter, I also specified which kinds of 
claims are extraordinary claims. Moreover, I argued that moderate modal skepticism 
cannot be eliminated within the framework of Chalmers’ theory of conceivability and 
possibility.  
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